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In my dissertation I give a philosophical account of poetry from an analytic 
perspective—one that is also informed by studies in linguistic communication 
(pragmatics) and cognitive psychology, and that takes into account the many varieties 
of poetic traditions around the world. 
In chapter one I argue that philosophically rigorous study of poetry is long 
overdue, and that it should focus not on what poetry has in common with the other 
literary arts, but rather on what is distinct to it. In chapter two I give a cross-cultural 
history of poetry, showing the many types of features that are typical of the art form. 
From this history it emerges that beneath the variety of poetic traditions all over the 
globe lies a remarkably consistent set of features—the use of recurrence patterns. 
In chapter three I argue for an intentional-historical formalist definition of 
poetry according to which a poem is either (1) a verbal art object relationally or 
intrinsically intended to belong in the poetic tradition, or (2) a verbal art object 
intrinsically intended to involve use of repetition schemes (naïve poetry-making). In 
my fourth chapter I investigate the psychological reasons for poetry to have begun as 
and remained an art that relies on repetition devices, focusing on two non-literate 
groups: the illiterate trovadores of Northeastern Brazil, and pre-literate children. Both 
cases suggest an innate predisposition to attend to and produce linguistic recurrence 
structures of various, sometimes highly intricate, sorts. 
In my fifth chapter I consider the Relevance theory claim in pragmatics that, 
as a rule, repetition incurs extra linguistic processing effort, and that this must be 
outweighed by an increase in contextual effects, given the assumption of relevance. I 
argue that although this picture of poetic understanding is largely correct, repetition 
can also be seen as a cognitive facilitator, helping us draw connections that might 
have gone unnoticed without it. 
I conclude by exploring the contributions my approach to poetry may offer to 
other topics in aesthetics and philosophy art, such as aesthetic experience, aesthetic 
properties, and theories of interpretation. 
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I first had the idea for this project during the Art and Mind NEH Summer Institute 
organized by Jerrold Levinson at the University of Maryland. Already at an earlier 
graduate seminar Levinson taught, I had been struck by how philosophical 
discussions about literature invariably focused on narrative fiction, and how rarely, if 
ever, poetry was discussed. This trend remained true at the NEH Institute meetings, 
and as I heard some speakers discuss imaginative engagement with fictional 
characters and situations, I wondered how the theories they were working with—
various versions of simulation and ‘theory’ theory—might apply to poetry, especially 
lyric poetry, which is not narrative and seldom has characters. 
The more I researched on poetry, the less appealing that path seemed, and 
ultimately I gave up on the idea of adapting theories that seemed better suited for one 
kind of genre (as narrative fiction, broadly conceived, includes film and drama) to 
another kind of verbal art, as the differences between literary narrative fiction and 
poetry grew gradually more intractable. 
But as my road changed, research became more difficult. Philosophers not 
only were not talking about poetry, they were not writing about it either, and they had 
not been for quite a while. I looked far and wide and found myself drawn to work in 
phonetics and phonology (notably, the work on metrics by Morris Halle, Paul 
Kiparsky, and others) and in pragmatics (the ‘relevance theory’ of Dan Sperber and 
Deirdre Wilson). That, and what I was discovering about the various poetic traditions 
around the globe, made me want to tease out what I intuitively felt was unique to 
poetry, and to define it in terms of a pure formalism. My naiveté about that possibility 
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duly exposed, in the end I came right back home and found inspiration in the work of 
my advisor (with whom I had spent the better part of my graduate school years 
disagreeing!). 
What follows is a project that retains the interdisciplinary spirit of that NEH 
Institute. This means that, while it is guided by and centered around the more strictly 
philosophical aim of defining an art form, it draws from disciplines outside of 
philosophy as a means both to check my proposal against empirical data and actual 
communicative and poetic practices and (thereby) also to bolster support for the 
definition by providing what I think is its empirical ‘why’. 
I express my gratitude to Gregory Currie, for inspiring with his own 
interdisciplinary approach and supporting mine, to Georges Rey for pushing me to 
consider the broader and positively fundamental philosophical questions, and  to 
Levinson for giving me the space to pursue what I wanted, and the philosophical 
criticism, academic counseling, and encouragement that I needed. I wish to thank the 
committee as a whole for their patience and support. 
I dedicate my work to the memory of my grandmother Edília. 
 
A.C.S.R. 
 College Park, MD 
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Chapter 1: Poetry in Contemporary Philosophy of Art 
Poetry has enjoyed a stellar history since the beginnings of philosophy, and one 
arguably unmatched by any other art form. No lesser figures than Plato, Aristotle, 
Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche devoted serious thought to it, and Hume 
and Mill found it worth discussing in their works. Plato’s exclusion of poetry from his 
ideal city was philosophy’s greatest backhanded compliment to the power of the 
poetic art. Most, if not all, other philosophers looked favorably upon poetry, perhaps 
none so much as the German Idealists. Here, for instance, is Kant’s view: 
Among all the arts poetry holds the highest rank. (It owes its origin almost entirely to 
genius and is least open to guidance by precept or examples.) It expands the mind: 
for it sets the imagination free, and offers us, among the unlimited variety of possible 
forms that harmonize with a given concept, … that form which links the exhibition of 
the concept with a wealth of thought to which no linguistic expression is completely 
adequate, and so poetry rises aesthetically to ideas. Poetry fortifies the mind: for it 
lets the mind feel its ability—free, spontaneous, and independent of natural 
determination—to contemplate and judge phenomenal nature as having aspects that 
nature does not on its own offer in experience either to sense or to the understanding, 
and hence poetry lets the mind feel its ability on behalf of and, as it were, as a 
schema of the supersensible.1
For similar reasons, Hegel also placed poetry at the top of his hierarchy of the arts; 
even for Schopenhauer, it stands second only to music: an art form which, as an 
immediate copy of the Will itself, belongs in a different category altogether, so that 
poetry remains at the top of what Schopenhauer would call the representational arts. 
Given such a distinguished history, it is perhaps rather surprising to find that 
philosophers of art in the analytic tradition have not been very interested in poetry 
lately. Since the 1970s, there has been a steady decline in philosophical interest in 
poetry and a concomitant trend in the philosophy of literature to treat poetry as on a 
 
1 Kant, Critique of Judgment, § 53, p. 327 [orig.] (W.S. Pluhar tranlation, Hackett 1987 
[1790]). 
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par with novels and other forms of literary prose. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism is an excellent thermometer of the interest in poetry in the analytic 
philosophy tradition. Since its inception in 1942, the JAAC has published about 135 
articles on some aspect of poetry or poetics. Of these, 82 were published in the 1950s 
and ‘60s, that is, about 60% of the total.2 The 1970s still saw about 29 articles on 
poetry or on some poet’s work (with William Blake the sure winner among 
philosophers), so together those three decades account for 82% of all articles on 
poetry the journal has published to date. In the 1980s the JAAC published only nine 
articles on poetry; in the ‘90s, three. 
Frequently, also, work on topics that prima facie seem most intimately 
connected with poetry—as with the flurry of essays on metaphor in the 1970s and 
‘80s, most of them published in the Critical Inquiry3— even if they draw on poems 
for their examples, do not treat these as topics pertaining to poetry in particular but to 
literature or even art in general—and, in the case of metaphor, as is appropriate, as a 
topic pertaining to language as a whole. The most explicit acknowledgement, if not 
endorsement, of this attitude—which I will call a ‘generalist’ attitude to literature—is 
perhaps to be found in the opening sentences of the entry on poetry in the recently 
published Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics:
Not surprisingly, the philosophical issues that arise in connection with poetry 
as a form of art in almost all cases are not specific to it, but relevant to the 
understanding and evaluation of literature (and indeed other forms of art) 
more generally; an obvious example is that of the nature of metaphor. Thus it 
is far from clear that there is a ‘philosophy of poetry’ in anything like the 
 
2 The number is the result of keyword searches on ‘poetry’, ‘poem’, ‘poetic’, ‘form’, and 
‘prosody’ (in full text) in the JAAC at www.jstor.org, as well as a review of the table of 
contents of all JAAC issues from 1942 to 1962. 
3 Vol. 5, 1978. 
3
sense in which there is a ‘philosophy of literature’ and a ‘philosophy of 
criticism’.4
Such a trend, of course, is not without its reasons. Here I offer four factors that 
might jointly explain the prolonged lack of interest in poetry and the ‘generalist’ trend 
in the philosophy of literature. The first concerns in particular the current dearth of 
philosophical articles on poetry, while the remaining ones are about the pervasive 
generalist attitude toward literature. 
Perhaps the main reason poetry is not widely discussed in philosophy 
publications today is to be found in academic specialization and the proliferation of 
academic journals. It was far more common only a few decades ago for scholars in 
departments other than philosophy to publish in journals such as the JAAC. Indeed, a 
look at the articles on poetry from the first three decades of the JAAC’s publication 
shows that many of the Journal’s regular contributors of articles concerned with the 
literary arts used to usher from English and Comparative Literature departments. 
Perhaps it became professionally less appealing to non-philosophers to publish in 
journals such as the JAAC once journals in their home disciplines were of a sufficient 
number to accommodate the supply of articles being produced. Whatever the reasons, 
the fact that many of the JAAC’s articles on literature were being written by non-
philosophers unfortunately only shows philosophers’ lack of interest in poetry to be 
even more pervasive and long-standing than it appears at first. 
As for the generalist attitude that emphasizes the commonalities between 
poetry and other verbal art forms to the neglect of their differences, we would do well 
to look to the history of literature itself for its possible basis. Literature emerged as 
 
4 Alex Neill (2003), p. 605. 
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poetry—as versified poetry, that is—and forms such as the novel are rather recent 
arrivals that owe their existence in no small part to the invention of the printing press. 
Consider, for example, this ancient Sumerian poem, dating back to 2025 B.C: 
Bridegroom, dear to my heart, 
Goodly is your beauty, honeysweet, 
Lion, dear to my heart, 
Goodly is your beauty, honeysweet.5
In part because, for much of our history, what was said could not be easily recorded 
and had to be memorized, the use of various kinds of patterned repetition was 
essential to the preservation and dissemination of works. Thus the early oral poets 
created and relied on metrical schemes, formulaic phrases, and many other mnemonic 
devices. And so, if we look again at our first example, we will notice that only one 
word is changed in the second couplet of this stanza (we might surmise that the 
Sumerian poet in question must have had a particularly bad memory!). Now, when 
we move forward a few millennia to the seventeenth century, we begin to find 
passages such as the following: 
In the greatest heat of this hurly-burly, it came into Don Quixote’s head that 
he was certainly involved in the disorder and confusion of King Agramant’s 
camp; and calling out with a voice that shook the whole house, ‘Hold, 
valorous Knights,’ said he, ‘all hold your furious hands, sheath all your 
swords, let none presume to strike on pain of death, but hear me speak.’ The 
loud and monstrous voice surprised everybody into obedience, and the Don 
proceeded: I told you before, gentlemen, that this castle was enchanted, and 
that some legion of devils did inhabit it: now let your own eyes confirm my 
words…6
We still find some repetition in the form of grammatical parallelism in this passage 
(there are several clauses in the imperative, for instance), but nothing like the highly 
patterned structure that we find in, say, the Epic of Gilgamesh or the Illiad. It would 
 
5 ‘To the Royal Bridegroom’ (Johnson 1993, 715). 
6 Cervantes, The Life and Achievements of the Renowned Don Quixote de la Mancha. Ozell’s 
revision of Peter Motteux’s translation. New York: Modern Library, 1930, p. 390. 
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be considerably more difficult for this storyteller to hold even this short paragraph in 
memory; it would be impossible to consign the thousand pages that make up Don 
Quixote’s many adventures to it. Once the need to memorize is gone, the narrative is 
allowed to flow free of the constraints of conforming to a patterned structure 
(naturally, it must still conform to an overall narrative structure). In sum, the 
contemporary generalist attitude to literature, evinced most obviously in the 
widespread use of the terms ‘poetry’ and ‘literature’ interchangeably in philosophical 
works, may in part be explained by the fact that, for a good part of literary history, 
poetry and literature were indeed the same art form. 
However, while this may in part explain the generalist attitude, it evidently 
does not justify it. Once we have other forms of literature, such as the novel, it makes 
little sense to use the term ‘poetry’ to refer to them. Although with the novel literature 
largely let go of the musical element, poetry has retained its ‘musicality’, arguably to 
this day.7 So while poetry may often recapitulate music, and prose literature often 
recapitulate poetry,8 these three art forms belong in a historical continuum that 
nevertheless has marked discontinuities. Knowledge—even specialized knowledge—
about one of these art forms may well leave the specialist in the dark regarding the 
characteristics and conventions of the other two. In other words, knowledge about, or 
expertise in, one of these art forms does not entail knowledge about or expertise in the 
 
7 Free verse, of course, is a challenge to this claim. I will discuss free verse in the chapters to 
follow. 
8 It is interesting that, when such recapitulation occurs, we find that the art form is ‘at its 
best’, as evinced in these frequently made comments: ‘the best prose literature is as good as 
poetry’; ‘the best poetry is like music’. What, then, one wonders, is the best music as good 
as? I leave the answer to Schopenhauer and his followers. 
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others. Likewise, being a good or even talented practitioner of one of these art forms 
does not translate into being an able practitioner of either of the other two.  
One trend in philosophy in general and another in aesthetics in particular may 
also contribute to an explanation for this trend. The general interest in language—
particularly in issues of meaning and truth—that marked philosophy the last century 
manifested itself in philosophy of literature as an interest in figures of speech. Poetry, 
as is known, makes use both of sound schemes, such as rhyme, alliteration, and meter, 
and tropes, or figures of speech, such as metaphor, simile, and metonymy. Even if it 
is in literature, and especially in poetry, that the meanings of words are ‘stretched to 
their limit’, the use of metaphors and other figures of speech is part of our everyday 
use of language. Since these figures are not in the exclusive domain of poets but are 
the prerogative of all speakers of a language, they are not a differentiating 
characteristic among the literary arts. The focus on tropes, as opposed to schemes, can 
thus be seen as another contributing factor to the generalist approach to literature. The 
neglect of these formal aspects of poetry can thus be seen as another reason why 
philosophers have treated poetry as perhaps no more than the most striking in a 
continuum of verbal art forms rather than a literary kind deserving of separate study.  
Finally, the issue that helped launch analytic aesthetics in the 1950s—the 
search for a general definition of art—is reflected in the same search for 
commonalities among the literary arts. Even while Morris Weitz (1956) despaired of 
finding an essential feature to explain all the arts, defending instead a family-
resemblance approach, by doing so he spurred a search for this holy grail, and he is 
practically alone nowadays in holding that no common essence of art can be found, 
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even if it is widely agreed that he was right that such an essence would not be an 
intrinsic feature of artworks.9 So the generalist trend in philosophy of literature is in 
keeping also with traditional analytic aesthetics and philosophy of art. 
Nearly half a century after Weitz’s challenge, on the occasion of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the American Society for Aesthetics, Peter Kivy called upon 
philosophers of art to set aside those holistic goals and to engage in an exercise in 
differences (Kivy 1993). He argued then, and later in his Philosophies of Arts (1997), 
that many of the purported similarities among the arts—e.g. that they are all 
representational—have been presumed since the times of Plato and Aristotle partly 
because of an unchecked acceptance of their views and partly as a result of readings 
of the Republic and the Poetics that paid insufficient attention to the artistic 
environment to which they were responding. What today we call the literary arts were 
back then performing, and perforce mimetic, arts. While literature today is primarily 
read literature, literature in ancient times was predominantly spoken and heard. (One 
may not wish to call what a rhapsode reciting a lyric or a narrative does 
‘representational’ in the same sense that actors on stage represent actions, but then we 
will have to find a similar term to signify the interpretive reciting that is now absent 
when we read the words directly from the page, an activity that does not involve such 
performance.) Kivy noted how philosophical thinking about some specific art 
forms—most notable, music and film—had flourished in recent decades, partly 
because philosophers began to focus on what was peculiar to those forms rather than 
continue to search for what they shared with other ones. 
 
9 Recent attempts to revive Weitz’s family resemblance view include Gaut (2000, 2005). 
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I think Kivy’s call for philosophical attention to differences among the arts 
was a salutary move. Having said that, I also think that with respect to literature Kivy 
did not go far enough in the direction he encouraged us to take. While he persuasively 
argued that presumed analogies between novels and the visual arts do not stand 
scrutiny, and that these arts cannot both fall under the umbrella of ‘representational’ 
or ‘mimetic’ art, he nevertheless uses ‘poetry’ and ‘literature’ interchangeably, and 
largely ignored the differences within the literary arts that his own arguments would 
lead us to expect. Still, it seems clear that Kivy would only countenance a move 
toward finer distinctions within the literary arts as well. My purpose here is to heed 
his call and outline these distinctions, particularly with regard to how poetry can be 
defined, and how our experiences of poems differ substantially from our experiences 
of other literary forms such as the novel or short story. 
I begin my project by providing a survey of historical traditions around the 
globe. It is crucial, I think, to take into account the characteristics of all poetic 
practices, if a definition of poetry is to have any value. From this survey it emerges 
that, beneath the incredible variety of poetic traditions, ancient and contemporary, 
there lies a remarkably consistent set of features—the use of certain kinds of 
recurrence patterns. While there is variation as to which patterns predominate in a 
given poetic culture (variations dependent in part upon the prosodic nature of the 
language in which the poetry is written), more or less the same patterns emerge 
everywhere. 
In chapter three I argue for an intentional-historical formalist definition of 
poetry. In my view, a poem is either (1) a  verbal art object relationally or intrinsically 
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intended to belong in the poetic tradition, or (2) a  verbal art object intrinsically 
intended to involve use of repetition schemes (naïve poetry-making). The apparent 
circularity of the first disjunct in the definition is avoided by appeal to intentions to 
produce objects that belong to a tradition of texts and performances that in fact 
exhibit certain features, whether or not the poet thinks of them in this way. Inasmuch 
as the history of poetry has shown the concern with repetition schemes to be its one 
consistent feature, the intention to create a  verbal art object eligible for membership 
in the poetic tradition is therefore the intention to create a  verbal art object with 
concern for those repetition devices: following, transforming, or rejecting previously 
established patterns. 
Since my definition of poetry is backward-looking, the question arises as to 
what informed the intentions of the first poets. Naturally, they could not have 
intended their works to be like previous poems, since there weren’t any. In my fourth 
chapter, ‘Repetition and Poetic Effects’, I investigate the psychological reasons for 
poetry to have begun as and remained an art that relies on repetition devices. I focus 
on a contemporary oral culture, that of the illiterate trovadores of Northeastern Brazil, 
and pre-literate children. Both cases suggest a natural human predisposition to attend 
to and produce linguistic recurrence structures of various, sometimes highly intricate, 
sorts. I suggest that this innate predisposition was likely selected for in virtue of its 
contribution to language learning, and that it was exploited because of its mnemonic 
usefulness and aesthetic effects for ritualistic and artistic purposes. 
Moving from creators to appreciators, in that chapter I also consider the 
relevance theory claim that, as a rule, repetition incurs extra linguistic processing 
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effort, and that this must be outweighed by an increase in contextual effects, given the 
assumption of relevance. The relevance theory assumption is that linguistic 
communication works on a ‘maximum cognitive effects for the minimum cognitive 
effort’ model. I argue that although this picture of poetic understanding is largely 
correct, repetition can also be seen as a cognitive facilitator, helping us draw 
connections that might have gone unnoticed without it. In other words, sometimes 
repetition structures demand greater cognitive effort (a demand that typically results 
in greater cognitive effects), but sometimes such structures also aid cognition, 
promoting more cognitive effects for less effort than, for instance, a paraphrase 
without repetition might demand. I argue, in addition, that the claim made by 
relevance theorists that affective responses are reducible to cognitive effects is too 
strong. 
Finally, I conclude by exploring some further avenues of inquiry opened up 
by this project, sketching some issues in particular that could benefit from a closer 
look at poetry as a distinct art form. Such study could, for instance, (1) contribute to 
the intentionalism debate in interpretation; (2) contribute to a better understanding of 
the relationship between lower-level perceptual properties and aesthetic properties; 
and (3) contribute to an understanding of how that relationship affects how we 
evaluate poems. 
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Chapter 2: A Survey of Poetry 
 
It is a remarkable fact in the history of humankind that in all ancient cultures—the 
Egyptian, the Middle-Eastern, the Greek, the Indian, the Chinese—literature first 
emerged as poetry, and poetry as song. Religion played a fundamental role in the 
origins of our literary production, as most of it was initially tied to religious rituals.10 
Our earliest records date back to 2600 B.C., in the Pyramid Texts of Egypt, where we 
can find, among hymns to the entire array of ancient Egyptian gods, verses that reveal 
a belief in a creator god not unlike the god of later monotheistic religions: 
The generations come and go among mankind, 
and god, who knows all natures, 
still lies hidden. 
 … 
They are His living images, come from 
 His very self.11 
A common practice in Antiquity was the writing of ‘wisdom poetry’, a means of 
passing life instructions to the next generation, particularly in royal families, as in the 
Pharaoh Ptahhotep’s ‘First Maxim’, from ca. 2330 B.C.: ‘Never be arrogant because 
of your knowledge;/approach the unlettered as well as the wise’.12 Epithalamia,
panegyrics, odes, all appear in our earliest records; typically, performances of poems 
were accompanied by the lyre, the flute, the harp, cymbals or (beginning around the 
15th century) the sackbut. 
Why should it have been this way? Why should literature have emerged as 
music and versified language? Indeed, why should music have emerged as versified 
language? Already in antiquity Aristotle conjectured that the origin of poetry lay in 
 
10 This is true of ancient as well as more recent poetic traditions such as those of the Eskimo, 
the American Indians, and the Polynesians. See Johnson (1993), 715. 
11 J.L. Foster, (1993), 319. 
12 Id., p. 318. 
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our natural sense of harmony and rhythm, our inclination to imitate, and our pleasure 
in seeing or hearing others imitate actions or events.13 This of course presupposes a 
view of all poetry as mimesis, or imitation, a view which does not sit well with the 
personal character of the lyric, true as it may be of dramatic and even narrative 
poetry. But Aristotle’s conjecture need not for that reason be discarded; indeed, 
contemporary philosophical psychologists argue that our well-documented early 
inclination for pretend play is the basis of human creativity.14 Nevertheless, while it 
seems uncontroversial that we are by nature endowed with a disposition for mimesis,
there must be more to this picture if we are to explain the birth of literature as verse.
For just as we could have had music without words, we could have had words without 
music—that is, words without the added elements of versification15 as well as words 
that were neither chanted nor sung.16 I think Aristotle’s picture can be filled in if we 
 
13 Poetics 1148b. 
14 See, e.g., Carruthers 2002: ‘From the age of about eighteen months all normal children, in 
all human cultures, start to do something which (when viewed from an external perspective 
at least) appears very odd indeed—they begin to pretend. … It is hard to believe that these 
two species-specific properties—adult creativity and childhood pretend play—are not 
intimately connected with one another’ (228). 
15 All poetic terms will be highlighted when first used in the text, to indicate that a formal 
definition is given in Appendix I: Glossary of Poetic Terms. 
16 To be fair, Aristotle mentions a kind of poetry, for which there was no name at the time, 
which was recited, not sung, and without instrumental accompaniment. But unfortunately 
he gives us no examples and independent evidence of this kind of poetry in ancient Greece 
is scanty. Terry Brogan (1993c), e.g., claims that ‘strictly recited verse such as monody 
certainly existed, and the dialogue portions of drama were metrical’ (787, italics mine), but 
in 1993d he defines monody as a ‘solo song… originally an ode sung by a single voice [in 
contrast to the choral ode]’ (798, italics mine). Aristotle’s claim is in the Poetics, where he 
mentions a “nameless art that uses language, prose or verse, without harmony, as its 
means” (1448a): “There is further an art which imitates by language alone, without 
harmony, in prose or in verse, and if in verse, either in some one or in a plurality of metres. 
This form of imitation is to this day without a name. We have no name for a mime of 
Sophron or Xenarchus [who wrote brief prose dialogues on rural and city life] and a 
Socratic conversation [Plato’s dialogues]; and we should still be without one even if the 
imitation in the two instances were in trimeters or elegiacs or some other kind of verse” 
(1447b). 
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remind ourselves that the vastly rich recorded literature that we have emerged from 
oral traditions. 
 It is easy to agree with arguments to the effect that oral traditions require 
formulaic texts to aid memorization and thereby facilitate the transmission of hymns, 
narratives, or lyrics, and much work has been done on oral traditional poetry since the 
pioneering work of Milman Parry on Serbo-Croatian songs.17 Parry, together with 
Albert B. Lord, proposed that the transmission of literary and folkloric material 
occurs via a series of structural units, namely a formula, a theme, and a story-pattern.
According to Parry, the formulaic phrase is ‘a word or group of words regularly used 
under given metrical conditions to express a given essential idea’, while the theme 
and story-pattern are formulas at the levels of typical scene and tale-type respectively: 
The most often used phrases, lines, or even couplets—those which a singer 
uses most frequently when he is learning—establish the patterns for the 
poetry, its characteristic syntactic, rhythmic, metric, and acoustic molds and 
configurations. In time the individual practitioner of the art can form new 
phrases—create formulas—by analogy with the old as needed. When he has 
become proficient in thinking in the traditional patterns, including the 
traditional phrases and everything else like them, he is a full-fledged singer 
of oral traditional poetry. In essence, he has learned to speak—or to sing—
the special language of that poetry. He composes naturally in the forms of his 
tradition, unconsciously, and often very rapidly, as a native speaker speaks a 
language.18 
The Iliad and the Odyssey abound in such formulaic phrases, as do the Babylonian 
Epic of Gilgamesh and the Sanskrit Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana. While each 
Homeric epic, for example, will have formulae peculiar to the kind of story being 
 
17 Parry did not live to see his work in print, but it was completed and edited by Albert B. 
Lord in Serbocroatian Heroic Songs, and Lord was subsequently joined by Bela Bartók in 
the editing of Serbo-Croatian Folk Songs (1951). Parry’s oral-formulaic theory has been 
enormously influential in anthropology, sociology, socio-linguistics, and poetics. See J.M. 
Foley, The Theory of Oral Composition (1988) for an account of Parry’s work and 
influence. 
18 Lord 1993, 863. 
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told—war phrases in the Iliad, journey phrases in the Odyssey—in both epics 
Achilles is ‘swift-footed’, Odysseus is ‘wily’, Agamemnon is the ‘Son of Atreus, 
most lordly and king of men’, and (as Richard Lattimore notes) ‘children are 
innocent, women are deep-girdled, iron is gray, ships are hollow, words are winged 
and go through the barrier of the teeth, the sea is wine-blue, barren, and salt, and 
bronze is sharp and pitiless. The list is almost endless’.19 
Textual variations from poet to poet and performance to performance occur in 
accordance with the type of poetry that is being transmitted. Oral traditional poetry 
may be ritual, narrative, or lyric. Ritual songs (incantations, wedding and festivals 
songs, laments, eulogies, and lullabies) as well as lyric songs (predominantly love 
songs), tend to be shorter and therefore are easier to memorize word by word, 
although this is not always the case: many lyric songs, for instance, were occasional, 
so that memorization was not needed. Narratives (epics and ballads) on the other 
hand, which tend to be long, show more fluidity of text. Still, they remain 
fundamentally formulaic, as we have seen with the Greek epics, and in some cases, 
entire passages seem to be have been passed on verbatim, to tell by the different 
records of the Epic of Gilgamesh.20 
The structured, repetitive, and formulaic nature of oral traditional poetry 
clearly served a mnemonic purpose. But it seems to have served other, intrinsically 
related purposes as well, ones directly related to the affective effects that repetition 
can promote. In the case of incantations, for example, the rhythmic and repetitive 
 
19 Introduction to his translation of the Odyssey (New York: Harper, 1967), p. 21. 
20 In the introduction to his translation of the epic, N.K. Sandars points out that ‘What we 
have in both the Sumerian and Semitic versions is the word for word repetition of fairly 
long passages of narrative and conversation, and of elaborate greeting formulae’ (Penguin 
Classics, 1985 revised reprint of 1972 edition, p. 48). 
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structures of the songs also served the function of giving the event a ritualistic quality 
and inducing religious affect.21 The fact that ritual songs make far more frequent use 
of the recurrence of specific words and phrases than do narrative and lyric poetry may 
be taken as evidence that the ability to foster religious excitement is directly related to 
repetition schemes. Meditation and prayer also rely on the power of repetition to 
promote religious affect and help bring about mystical experiences, as in this Afro-
Brazilian ‘spiritual cleansing’ quatrain: 
Descarrega, descarrega 
todo o mal que aqui está; 
leva, leva, leva 
tudo pro fundo do mar.22 
Textual formulae are only part of the formalized structure that made poetry 
easy to remember, pleasing to the ear and moving to the heart and mind. A host of 
phonetic devices appear early on in poetic art and persist to this day. Indeed, as 
Kiparsky (1981) has pointed out, ‘of all art forms, literature, and especially poetry, 
has the greatest continuity of form in the Western tradition’.23 At the metrical level, 
for example, the phrase peri chroï (meaning ‘around the body’ or ‘next to the skin’), 
appears in both the Iliad and the Odyssey invariably at the same place in the verse 
 
21 Lord 1993, 863f., and Foley 1993, 867. 
22 ‘Unload, unload/all the evil that’s here/take, take, take/all to the bottom of the ocean’. 
23 Kiparsky 1981, 9. Kiparsky notes how painting was altered by the discovery of perspective 
in the Renaissance and how music changed with the development of chordal harmony: ‘It 
is impossible, however, to point to any such spectacular enrichments of technique in 
poetry. Styles and conventions have shifted, but not truly new forms have emerged. Both 
of the fundamental stylistic elements of poetry—figurative expression, using, for example, 
metaphor and metonymy, and schemes of formal organization such as those of parallelism, 
meter, rhyme and alliteration—have existed from the beginning’ (id.). 
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line, so as to form the quantitative metrical pattern peri chroï  ⁄ ∪ ∪ ⁄ ⁄,24 just as 
centuries later Dante repeatedly ends his lines with a paroxytonic word25 so as to keep 
the hendecasyllable line and meter he made the staple of Italian poetry. Alliteration, 
the repetition of initial consonant sounds, has been more ubiquitous even than rhyme, 
and is a regular feature of nearly every major poetry in the world.26 It appears in  
 Aeschylus 
 ′αµαρτιας σφε δει θεοις δουναι δικην,
′ως αν διδαχθη την ∆ιος τυραννιδα27
Virgil 
 cuncta mihi Alpheum linquens locusque Molorchi 
 cursibus et crudo decernet Graecia caestu 
the Beowulf epic 
 Oft Scyld Scefing sceathena threatum 
Dante 
 Così di ponte in ponte, altro parlando 
 Che la mia comedìa cantar non cura 
Goethe 
 Dann will ich gern zu Grunde gehn! 
 
Rimbaud 
 La nuit, l’amie oh! La lune de miel 
 
Fernando Pessoa 
 Quero considerar-me e ver aquilo 
 Que sou, e o que sou o que é que tem 
 
Octavio Paz 
 La poesía ha puesto fuego a todos los poemas 
 
24 Id., p. 22. The symbols ‘⁄’ and ‘∪’ indicate, respectively, a marked (long or accented) 
syllable and an unmarked (short or unaccented) syllable. See ‘Marker’, and ‘Ictus’ in 
Appendix I: Glossary of Poetic Terms. 
25 A paroxytone is a word with penultimate stress, i.e. a word in which the main stress is on 
the next to last syllable. Oxytones have the main stress on the last syllable, and 
proparoxytones on the second to last syllable (i.e. third syllable from the end). 
26 Israeli, Persian and Arabic poetry appear to be an exception. See Percy G. Adams (1993), 
pp. 36-38. 
27 Transliterated, ‘hamartias sphe dei theois dounai diken,/ hōs an didachthē tēn Dios 
tyrannida’; translated, ‘For which the gods have called him to account/that he may learn to 
bear Zeus’ tyranny’ (Prometheus Bound, lines 9-10). 
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and Louise Glück 
 Machine of the family: dark fur, forests of the mother’s body 
 
Consonance, assonance, rhyme, and metrical patterns of numerous kinds are further 
phonetic techniques that are exemplified in the passages above. These techniques are 
not confined to Western traditions, but are evinced around the world in every culture 
with a poetic tradition, as the examples I provide in the next chapter will show. 
Whether or not they still serve the specific mnemonic function they did originally, 
such repetition pattern seem clearly to work in addition to create a rhythm, as in 
metrical verse, and to upset that rhythm to call attention to some words or create an 
onomatopoeic effect, as in metrical substitutions; they may create or reinforce 
parallelisms, as in ‘machine’ and ‘mother’ in the passage by Glück; they may draw 
connections between terms, as in diken (justice), Dios (God) and didachthē (learn) in 
Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound; and in various ways they reinforce the meaning of 
what is conveyed or contribute to a psychological goal, as in ritual song, prayer, 
meditation, or lullabies. 
 The needs of early oral cultures and of our psychology thus gave rise to a 
literary tradition that relied heavily on phonetic and semantic structures such as 
meter, rhyme, form, formulaic phrases, and the many other poetic resources 
developed along their histories. That this tradition preserved its structural patterns 
despite the advent of writing is not surprising, especially given that the tradition of 
oral performance lived on despite the new possibility of creating records of what was 
performed. Poetry remained, for most of its history, primarily a performance and a 
musical art: an art to be heard, even when it could also be read. 
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The lyric in particular was from its beginnings a musical poem. Although 
drama and epic narrative poetry were also accompanied by music, ‘music in dramatic 
and epic poetry was at best secondary to other elements, being mainly a mimetic or 
mnemonic device’—the lyric, by contrast, had a more intimate connection with music 
insofar as it was entirely sung, chanted or melodiously recited, and insofar as singing, 
chanting or reciting was not incidental to what was said but a focus of aesthetic 
attention. The kinds of meters used in the three main kinds of poetry—epic, narrative 
and lyric—in Classical Greece are further evidence of the lyric’s closer and enduring 
kinship with music. Dramatic poetry used iambic meter (generally trimeter) for 
dialogues, for that was considered to be the meter closest to spoken language. Epic 
poetry was entirely in dactylic hexameter, thought to embody an exalted manner of 
speaking (this was also used in the choral odes of dramas), and the unshakable 
eminence of Homer ensured that this was the meter to be used in epic poetry for 
millennia.28 Lyric poetry, which in Greece divided into melic (to be sung with 
musical accompaniment), iambic and elegiac (to be chanted), employed an enormous 
variety of meters, suited to a vast range of subjects, making full use of the rhythmic 
variations the language made possible: 
Although lyric poetry is not music, it is representative of music in its sounds 
patterns, basing its meter and rhyme on the regular linear measure of the 
song; or more remotely, it employs cadence and consonance to approximate 
the tonal variation of a chant or intonation. Thus the lyric retains structural or 
substantive evidence of its melodic origins, and this factor serves as the 
categorical principle of poetic lyricism.29 
28 Modern vernacular ‘equivalents’ were eventually produced in Italian (endecassílabo), 
French (alexandrines) and English (iambic pentameter) (Brogan 1993?, 769). 
29 Johnson 1993, 715. 
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This close kinship notwithstanding, twice in the history of Western lyric 
poetry its verbal and musical aspects became dissociated. The first time occurred in 
Greece around the 5th century B.C., when compositions for professional solo 
performers became the rule. The second time did not occur until the 14th century, the 
end of a period in which the lyric flourished in both the secular songs of the minstrels 
in all their guises—troubadours, trouvères, jongleurs, minnesingers—and in the 
liturgical chants of the Christian church. At this time musical forms that subordinate 
the words to the music (rather than the other way around), such as the madrigal, glee, 
catch, and round begin to establish themselves. We find what are perhaps the last 
explicit links between poetry and music in the very titles of some Renaissance works: 
Petrarch’s sonnet sequence—Canzoniere—and Garcia de Rezende’s anthology of 
fourteenth-century Portuguese poetry, Cancioneiro Geral, or General Songbook. We 
have by now come to a stage in this separation where theorists support and praise the 
severance, as in Wellek (1962, p. 150): ‘we would say today that music sounds best 
without words, and that poetry speaks best without music. Both of them do best 
alone’. And yet a certain nostalgia for the time when poetry was song persists in the 
titles of much later works, as in William Blake’s Songs of Innocence and of 
Experience, Walt Whitman’s Song of Myself, Fernando Pessoa’s Cancioneiro, Anna 
Akhmatova’s ‘Song of the Last Meeting’, and Ezra Pound’s Cantos, to cite only a 
few. Indeed, some poets look reproachfully upon poetry that disregards the more 
musical elements of the craft:  
When I asked [Derek] Walcott about the use of free verse in poetry, he was 
disdainful. “What’s free about it?” he said. “As if the self is enough to make 
a poem. What makes a poem is the discipline inherent in making a poem. 
Trying to fit feelings in the requisite number of syllables and lines, 
disciplining one’s feelings… The concept of song has gone out of 
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contemporary poetry for the time being, and has been out of contemporary 
poetry for a long while. And all those attributes, like rhyme, complexity, or 
rigidity of meter, have gone. If music goes out of language, then you are in 
bad trouble.”30
Poetic tastes varying as they may, the fact remains that poetry emerged and 
blossomed in nearly all cultures. And it emerged as a highly crafted art: an art with 
well-defined techniques which characterize it to this day, in spite—perhaps 
because—of its dissociation from the art of music with which it was born. 
 In light of this history, in the next chapter I will offer a definition of poetry 
that takes linguistic recurrence patterns to be central to the poetic art. I will first 
consider some alternative approaches, and give reasons why I think they are not 
satisfactory. I will then defend a view that combines this history, the formalism it 
evidences, and the intentions of the poet as the only satisfactory account for what 
counts as poetry today. 
 
30 Hilton Als, “The Islander: Derek Walcott is writing a poetry of the Caribbean.” The New 
Yorker, 9 February 2004, p.45. 
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Chapter 3: A Definition of Poetry 
i. Preliminary Remarks Concerning Concepts and Definitions 
 
In the cross-cultural historical overview of poetic traditions of the previous chapter, 
some features emerged that were seen to be prominent around the globe. These 
commonalities will serve as the basis of the definition of poetry I will offer in this 
chapter. But what is it to give a definition? Is it to give an account of what people 
have in mind—the concept they are employing—when they use a given term (say, 
‘poetry’)? Or is it perhaps to give an account of something ‘out there’, i.e., that exists 
and gets its properties extra-mentally? And how should we characterize this 
‘something out there’: as abstract universals, as sets, as the existing practices? Either 
way, are definitions possible? My project here is to define poetry, and poems are 
‘things’ that people make, in thought, orally, in writing. That being so, will it be the 
same to define ‘poetry’ as to define ‘car’, ‘tiger’, ‘square’, ‘justice’, ‘money’, or 
‘unicorn’? 
Without delving into what are profound and difficult questions about the 
nature of concepts and definitions, I will here sketch a very brief and rough picture of 
how I view the definitional part of my project. 
The definition of poetry that follows is presented as the best explanation of 
poetic practices. In other words, my definition will be an attempt to provide the best 
account of the history of poetic practices, as well as the criteria that must be fulfilled 
for something to count as poem, in view of that account. My definition will thus have 
both a descriptive and a normative aspect. It best describes, or so I will argue, a 
tradition that exists in its own right, that is, the set of performances and verbal objects 
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that make it up. This description assumes a normative character inasmuch as, once the 
tradition is established, an author who wishes to insert her work in it must fulfill 
certain conditions: her work must be intentionally linked to that tradition, in ways that 
will become clear in the following sections. 
So, in view of the alternatives above, I am not describing the concept ‘poetry’ 
that people might have in their minds. I think that aiming for such a psychological 
concept of poetry would be problematic for at least three reasons. First, the concept of 
poetry that may be in people’s minds could be wrong—besides, which people should 
we focus on? Secondly, an inquiry of that sort would take us far afield and into 
inquiries about how the people who do have the concept acquired it in the first 
place—via sufficient exposure to prototypical instances? By learning a definition?—
such questions, while fundamental, are fundamental to inquiries about any concept, 
not only the concept of poetry. This in turn leads me to my third reason not to pursue 
that line (and one that will emerge again in what follows). The way people learn 
about how things in the world are, and the way that things in the world are, are two 
independent questions. It could be that we learn about things in the world, or at least 
about some things in the world, by generalizing upon adequate exposure to 
prototypical instances. That, however, does not mean that we could not, with 
sufficient investigation, move beyond the prototypes and ascertain the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for any one thing to be what it is. And things will remain what 
they are even if we fail to achieve that goal. In sum, questions of epistemology are 
one thing, questions of metaphysics another. 
23
A brief note on artifacts. There is a sense (one which I wish to explore in 
future work), in which poems are like artifacts such as chairs and cars, in that both 
involve human intentions to create something of that kind. It has recently been argued 
(Thomasson, forthcoming) that, as a consequence of that intentional connection, ‘the 
metaphysical natures of artifactual kinds are constituted by the concepts and 
intentions of makers’ and that this in turn ‘endows them with some protection from 
certain kinds of ignorance and error about that nature’ (p. 2, her emphases). 
Thomasson thus lays a heavy burden on the intentions of makers, and one I think is 
excessive, in that the intentions of any maker will do, with the consequence that a 
chair could not be made by accident, and that anyone who intended to produce a chair 
would end up with one, even if he were mistaken about what chairs are. Although the 
intentions of makers are crucial to the making of chairs and poems, I think rather that, 
once an artifactual kind is created and established, the conceptual-metaphysical 
connection defended by Thomasson becomes rather weaker than she makes it out to 
be. This is because now there are criteria—functional ones in the case of chairs, 
historical ones in the case of poems—which must inform the intentions of makers. At 
best, that conceptual-metaphysical guarantee will obtain when a given artifactual kind 
is first created. But even so, insofar as some kinds end up being what they are after 
much trial and error, it could be that such a connection obtains only quite minimally. 
Here, incidentally, a distinction emerges between the initial creation of a kind such as 
‘chair’ and the creations of the first poems. Whereas we may presume that the 
creation of the first chair involved intentions to create an object with a specific 
function, the creations of the first poems were rather the result of natural tendencies 
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to pattern language in certain ways. So poems may be artifacts, but artifacts of a 
special sort. 
I will now turn to them. 
 
ii. The Task of Defining Poetry 
In light of the enormous variety of poetic traditions we find around the world and 
across the ages, it would seem that any attempt at finding a defining feature of poetry 
that would encompass all and only poems would be in vain. What can Stabat Mater,
Beat poetry, Shakespeare’s sonnets, Goethe’s Faust and Japanese haiku possibly have 
in common? Attempts to provide positive accounts, with necessary or sufficient 
reasons for what counts as a poem, often meet with the counterexamples that human 
creativity is wont to produce. Consider the following excerpts from two twentieth-
century poems. Are there any commonalities between the Georgian poet Galaktion 
Tabidze’s ‘Without Love’ and the Mexican Octavio Paz’s ‘The Poet’? 
უსიყვარულოდ usiKvarulod 
მზე არ სუფევს ცის კამარაზე, mze ar sufevs ts-is kamaraze, 
სიო არ დაჰქრის, ტყე არ კრთება sio ar dahqris, T-Ke ar krteba 
სასიხარულოდ... sasixarulod...31 
El hombre es el alimento del hombre. El saber no es distinto del soñar, el soñar del 
hacer. La poesía ha puesto fuego a todos los poemas. Se acabaron las palabras, se 
acabaron las imágenes. Abolida la distancia entre el nombre y la cosa, nombrar es 
crear, e imaginar, hacer. 
 
31 ‘Without love/the sun does not shine in the heavenly spheres/neither does the forest move, 
nor does the wind blow/with joy…’ (Freire 2004; transliteration by Robert Tchaidze, my 
translation from Freire’s own into Portuguese). ‘Man is the food of man. Knowledge is no 
different from dreaming, dreaming from doing. Poetry has set fire to all poems. Words are 
finished, images are finished. The distance between the name and the thing is abolished; to 
name is to create, and to imagine, to be born’ (Paz 1976; translated by Eliot Weinberger). 
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Aside from being literary texts, at first glance the similarities are hard to find. Even 
line breaks, a feature we typically associate with poetry, are absent in Paz’s prose 
poem. Neither is there a rhyme scheme in it as we find in the Georgian example 
(abca), which also combines the rhymes with specific line lengths. The passage from 
Paz’s poem is filled with metaphors (‘Man is the food of man’, ‘to name is to create’), 
whereas Tabidze’s has no metaphors (though there is imagery in it: ‘the sun does not 
shine in the heavenly spheres’). In view of such dissimilarities, even those who are 
most familiar with the art form have shied away from drawing any boundaries 
between poetry and other types of verbal art. Thus Robert Pinsky, a former laureate 
poet, says he “will be content … to accept a social, cultural definition of poetry: 
poetry is what a bookstore puts in the section of that name” (1998, p.126). It barely 
needs remarking that such a definition is inappropriate on many levels; I will note 
only that it would likely land us back precisely at the doors of people like Pinsky 
himself, that is, poets, inasmuch as bookstores follow rather than create the categories 
under which they sort their books. But even if that were an appropriate definition, we 
can imagine how misled and confused an unenlightened customer would be who 
headed for the poetry section of a Barnes & Noble and picked up a copy of, say, 
Bryan McGee’s The Elegant Universe, left there by a negligent patron. Pinsky’s 
‘definition’ in fact flies in the face of the very project of his book, which is to 
familiarize the common reader with what he takes to be essential (or at least central) 
aspects of poetry, namely its formal aspects. 
Frequently also when the attempt at a definition is made, the definiens quickly 
turns into a sort of example of what is being defined—in other words, how quickly 
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definitions of poetry turn rather poetic. It is difficult to agree with Shelley when in his 
Defence of Poetry he writes that “a poem is the very image of life expressed in its 
eternal truth,” and that is not only because we might be shy of eternal truths, or 
disinclined to accept any particular art form as holding exclusive rights to providing 
‘the very image of life’ (Abrams 1987, p. 1809). A definition of this sort would give 
us little guidance when it came to sorting poetry from non-poetry—imagine the 
bookstore clerk trying to organize his shelves according to it. 
It is perhaps peculiar that both attitudes—the belief that poetry cannot be 
defined and the attempt to define it sliding into poetic metaphor—can be exemplified 
by the same author. Laurence Perrine first states that ‘there is no sharp distinction 
between poetry and other forms of imaginative literature… The difference between 
poetry and other literature is only one of degree’ (Arp 1997, p.9), only to follow his 
claim, in the same paragraph, with what looks like a definition: 
Poetry is the most condensed and concentrated forms of literature. It is language 
whose individual lines, either because of their own brilliance or because they focus 
so powerfully on what has gone before, have a higher voltage than most language. It 
is language that grows frequently incandescent, giving off both light and heat. 
 
Naturally, one cannot but take all of this metaphorically; but unfortunately the 
metaphors are of little help in this case. For one, even if we accept that the language 
of some poems is metaphorically ‘incandescent’ and in some sense emanate light and 
heat, that is hardly true of all poems, many of which make use of language that is 
entirely mundane, as in William Carlos Williams’ renowned ‘The Red Wheelbarrow’: 
so much depends 
upon  
a red wheel 
barrow  
glazed with rain 
water  
beside the white 
chickens
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Perrine rightly notes that poetry ‘takes all life as its province’ and ‘is concerned with 
all kinds of experience—beautiful or ugly, strange or common, noble or ignoble, 
actual or imaginary’ (id., 8f.). Clearly, the language poets use to depict such 
experiences may likewise be varied, and need to match what is depicted in kind (i.e. 
the ignoble may be depicted in beautiful language). Perrine’s idea is that the language 
of poems somehow differs from ordinary discourse; poetry for him involves ‘a kind 
of language that says more and says it more intensely than does ordinary language’ 
(id., p.3). It is multi-dimensional, whereas ordinary language is one-dimensional. 
Ordinary language’s dimension is the understanding, and poetry adds sensuous, 
emotional, and imaginative dimensions to this—something it achieves by ‘its greater 
pressure per word and its greater tension per poem’ (id., 9f.). But again, this is not the 
case of all poems; moreover, the distinction flounders once we see that this is clearly 
an inaccurate (and outdated) view of ordinary language. Ordinary language has all the 
dimensions that poetry has, if not more. It conveys, daily and easily around the world, 
thoughts of all sorts in language that may be sensuous, emotional, and imaginative. 
While it may not take recourse to metrical patterns or rhyme schemes, it is often filled 
with imagery, simile and metaphor. The understanding or intellect is by no means its 
only dimension, and ordinary language is far from being merely ‘the kind that we use 
to communicate information’ (ibid.). 
 These continuities between everyday language and the language of poetry 
could indeed argue for Perrine’s view that poetry cannot be defined or sharply 
distinguished from other forms of verbal art, and he is not alone in defending such a 
position. A recent defense of this view is given by Robert Pierce, who has revisited 
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Morris Weitz’s approach to the definition of art in general (Weitz 1956) and claimed 
that ‘poetry’ is no more than a ‘family-resemblance’ concept à la Wittgenstein (Pierce 
2003). Surprising as this philosophical line may seem today, given the myriad 
responses to Weitz’s view since his seminal article,32 it is not (as was the case with 
Weitz’s) without its reasons or merits. Essentialism about art in general or any of the 
art forms in particular on the basis of features intrinsic to artworks may well be 
indefensible. Nevertheless, there may still be room for a definition justified by 
relational features, such as connection to a specifiable ‘art world’, the history of art, 
or the intentions of the artist, to cite a few of the well-known theories spawned by 
Weitz’s challenge.33 In any case, we should be careful not to conflate the issue of 
whether art in general may be defined with the issue of whether particular art forms 
may. We may be unable to distinguish poems from novels and yet be perfectly 
capable of separating them from a news article or an academic essay. Conversely, we 
may find it difficult, if not impossible, to specify what separates art in all its 
manifestations from non-art and yet find a way to distinguish poetry from literary 
prose. Naturally, there exists some relationship between defining art in general and 
defining particular art forms. If we are unable to define any of the particular art 
forms, that might count as strong indication that ‘art-hood’ is unlikely to be definable; 
on the other hand, the difficulties inherent in defining art may easily spill over into 
 
32 A representative sample of these includes: Maurice Mandelbaum 1965, Arthur Danto 1964, 
George Dickie 1974, and Jerrold Levinson 1979. 
33 Corresponding more or less respectively to Danto, Dickie, and Levinson in footnote above. 
The family-resemblance conception of art has its most recent revival in Berys Gaut’s ‘cluster’ 
account of art (Gaut 2000, 2005); critics of the view include Thomas Adajian (2003), Stephen 
Davies (2004) and Robert Stecker (2000). 
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the definitions of the specific arts. But there is no entailment one way or the other; 
‘counting against’ and ‘spilling over’ are not logical relations. 
 Just as Weitz before him acknowledged that some subcategories of art may be 
given necessary and sufficient conditions even if ‘art’ in general cannot—for 
example, there are specifiable criteria for a text to be considered a Greek tragedy—so 
does Pierce acknowledge that some poetic forms may be defined, by their intrinsic 
features, even if poetry in general cannot. The English villanelle, for instance, is a 
fixed-form poem of nineteen lines written in tercets and with two recurring rhymes 
that occur in the first and third lines of the first stanza. These two lines alternate in 
third-line position for the remaining tercets, until they meet again as the final two 
lines of the poem.34 To be a villanelle is to be a poem written in this form: ‘All 
villanelles have that pattern, and all poems having that pattern are villanelles’ (153). 
This is half-true of the villanelle, and probably entirely true of other fixed forms such 
as the sonnet. While it is correct that all poems following that pattern are villanelles, 
not all villanelles have that pattern, even in the English language. Poets are artists, 
and artists experiment: some have tried to introduce metrical variations, others did 
away with rhyme. Nevertheless, they were experimenting with the villanelle, and not 
with the sonnet, so Pierce’s point remains apt, even if it must be qualified so as to 
distinguish traditional from experimental versions of the form. 
 
34 I say ‘English’ villanelle because the original French form shows more fluidity of form, in 
particular in the number of lines. Dating back to the 16th century, originally ‘villanelle’ was 
the name given to a rustic song or dance with a pastoral theme and the use of a refrain. By the 
following century it had acquired enough typical features to become standardized, and 
although it has mostly been considered a stanza type in France (hence the variation in the 
number of lines, since this will depend on the number of stanzas), it was imported into 
English as a fixed form. See Clive Scott (1993) p. 1358. 
30
When it comes to defining not a fixed poetic form but poetry in general, many 
intrinsic features emerge as strong contenders for inclusion. Pierce himself considers 
six of them: rhythm, imagery, beauty, unity, strangeness or playfulness, and ineffable 
meaning. None of these, he argues, does the job of separating poetry from other 
literary arts: there is no ‘essential core of meaning’ of the word ‘poetry’, nor a 
‘clearly delimited entity that is poetry’ according to Pierce (151,153). While rhythm, 
imagery, etc. may be typical features found in poems, none of them is necessary or 
sufficient for a text to count as one; conversely, neither does their absence from a text 
exclude it from it being a poem. Rather, he says, ‘What the term ‘poetry’ refers to is a 
group of publicly visible things in the social world that we call poems’ (152). Hence 
all we can do is see what these things are and learn to use the term on the basis of 
how newly encountered texts resemble them. 
 I will consider Pierce’s six candidates for defining poetic features in turn. I 
agree with him that none of the features he considers passes muster as a characteristic 
all and only poems must have. However, as I hope to show, Pierce’s analysis remains 
at a superficial level of poetic features, failing to look into poetry’s more fundamental 
workings, and so it will be instructive to review the features on his list. Moreover, 
even if we fail to find a feature intrinsic to poems that will set them apart from other 
forms of literature, we may still be able to accomplish our definitional goal on the 
basis of a relational feature such as the ones mentioned earlier. I will then argue that 
a historically-grounded poetic intention will provide us with the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a satisfactory definition of poetry. If my definition is right, it 
will in addition provide a partial explanation for what is the ubiquitous characteristic 
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of all poetries of the world—the use of repetition schemes. In the following chapter I 
follow this thread into matters of language and psychology as a way of showing why 
repetition has enjoyed a universality and permanence not matched by formal features 
in any of the other arts. 
 
iii. Pierce’s Family Resemblance Approach to Poetry 
 
Pierce investigates six possible ways poetry could be defined. First, he analyzes five 
features he takes to be typical of poems—rhythm, imagery, beauty, linguistic unity, 
strangeness or playfulness. He dismisses, with good reason, the possibility that any of 
these could by itself make a text a poem: none of them are peculiar to poetry or even 
literature in general. Rhythm is a musical concept; imagery may be used to refer to 
painting; beauty is, of course, not even restricted to art works; linguistic unity may be 
found in novels or essays; and a myriad of things may be considered strange or 
playful. But, while not sufficient, perhaps one or more of these traits are necessary for 
a group of words to be poetry, and so it is this possibility that Pierce analyzes. He 
then considers the defeatist view that the essence of poetry is ineffable, and that we 
just somehow know how to apply the concept when we encounter texts. 
 Consider the rhythm that poetry is apt to produce with line breaks, rhyme 
schemes, and metrical patterns, as in the following stanza from Thomas Wyatt’s 
‘What Should I say’, whose short, rhymed lines in iambic dimeter create a sing-song 
effect: 
What should I say 
Since faith is dead 
And truth away 
From you is fled? 
Should I be led 
With doubleness? 
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Nay, nay, Mistress!35 
Pierce acknowledges that ‘For a text to be a poem, it must be rhythmic’; but, he 
claims, it is not possible to specify the kind of rhythm a text must have to be a poem 
rather than, say, the prose of Dickens or Faulkner or the Declaration of Independence 
(155). Indeed, he says, for any text even to be literary, it must be rhythmic (id.). But 
whether or not we can give specific criteria for a rhythm to be poetic rhythm, the 
claim that texts must be rhythmic to count as literary seems somewhat farfetched, and 
liable to the same sort of criticism that Pierce advances against distinguishing 
between poetic rhythm in particular and literary rhythm in general. For just as we 
may be unable to draw a line in that case, how are we supposed to draw a line 
between literary prose rhythm and the rhythm of non-literary prose and even just 
plain speech? Pierce does not clarify what conception of rhythm he has in mind, but 
at least in some general sense of ‘rhythm’, it will be the case that every linguistic 
utterance has one. Syllables have different weights, lengths, and pitches, and each 
speaker of a language has his or her own speech cadence. Individual differences share 
enough similarity to group together into local, regional, and national accents—the 
rhythms of a people’s speech. The existence of accents is material evidence that there 
are rhythms already at work in plain speech. So it cannot be the case that a text must 
be rhythmic in order to be literary, for a literary text just is rhythmic by virtue of 
being a text. Hence its being rhythmic will not set it apart from non-literary texts. 
 Of course, an author may, and often will, pay attention to how his sentences 
sound when read out loud. Versified poetry in particular adds an entirely new layer of 
cadence to what is already found naturally in language. Some prosodists have viewed 
 
35 Ferguson et al. (1996), p. 119f.
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this addition as an artificial imposition (and the artifice has been viewed as both a 
positive and a negative characteristic of verse); more recently, linguists are taking the 
view that, rather than an imposition, devices such as meter capture phonetic patterns 
already at work in ordinary language. It seems rather that both prosodists and 
linguists are right: meter could not exist unless syllables did in fact vary in weight and 
length when uttered, since it involves alternating strong and weak (stressed/long and 
unstressed/short) syllables in groups of two or more. Moreover, the constructed 
patterns must be possible in the language: that is, there must be words that fit, say, the 
iambic foot, either alone or in combination (‘per-háps’, ‘the crów’), for the poet must 
be able to construct iambic lines. If the stress patterns of the words and sentences in a 
given language tend to be ‘weak-strong’, then the iambic foot and meter will sound 
more natural to speakers of that language (perhaps even go unperceived if it is not 
called attention to) and be easier to produce than alternative types of meter. We 
should also expect its use to be more common. This is one reason why the iambic foot 
has held sway over English verse for centuries—since, indeed, the language itself 
changed its stress system as it lost most of its inflected endings.36 The natural rhythms 
of language notwithstanding, a metrical scheme is a grouping that a writer 
consciously chooses or creates, and as such it involves manipulation and artifice so 
that what is said may conform to a previously selected pattern. 
 Not all poetry, however, is written in metrical verse (which is not to say that 
so-called ‘free verse’ has no rhythmic pattern; it is merely ‘free’ from traditional 
poetic forms). Nevertheless, is it true that we cannot specify criteria for a rhythm to 
count as poetic rather than generally literary? It depends on whether we understand 
 
36 See Kiparsky 1981. 
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this question as requiring a specific rhythm or rhythm in general. Clearly we cannot 
stipulate that for a text to be a poem it must be written in iambic pentameter—or even 
that it be written in metrical verse at all. But perhaps we can say that a poem is a text 
whose rhythm—whatever it is—is borne centrally in mind by the poet during 
creation. This leaves room for rhythmic variation from poem to poem, while 
accounting for line breaks, alliterations, rhyme schemes, and the many other poetic 
devices available to the poet: devices used to create that additional layer of rhythm. 
Moreover, the centrality of this concern seems to be one of the characteristics that 
sets poets apart from novelists, essayists, and other literary writers. While these latter 
may, and indeed often do, concern themselves with the rhythm of their sentences in a 
primary way for parts of their texts, that concern seems to take a secondary role to 
other ones for the greater part of their works. The poet, insofar as she must 
(minimally) have justification to break the line at this word rather than the next, must 
bear that rhythm in mind for the entirety of the poem. Even the prose poet must have 
a rhythmic reason not to break the lines (though these need not be her only reasons). 
 In sum, Pierce is right that rhythm alone won’t make a poem—anyone may 
write metrical gibberish. More importantly, a novelist may well choose to make 
linguistic rhythm a central concern throughout his novel. That will hardly turn his 
novel into a poem, if he intended to write a novel (I will return to the issues of 
intention and rhythm later in this chapter). Pierce nevertheless fails to appreciate the 
nature of language and speech when he claims that a text must be rhythmic in order to 
be literary. Any text just is rhythmic insofar as it is a text, for the same reason that 
any utterance is rhythmic insofar as it is an utterance, and this is because natural 
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languages possess rhythms. If he means that literary texts, by reason of being literary, 
possess an added, artificial layer of rhythm imposed by the author, then indeed it will 
be, at least in principle, a matter of degree how much ‘rhythm per sentence’ has been 
added by the writer. But as a matter of fact, there is as a rule much less fluidity to this 
gradation than Pierce suggests. The ‘poetic novel’ (or poetic prose in general), 
evincing the type of concern with the rhythm of every line that we find in poetry, is a 
rarity. 
 The use of imagery is another characteristic commonly associated with poetry. 
Imagery is often associated with metaphor and simile, as in T.S. Eliot’s comparison 
of the evening, ‘spread out against the sky,/like a patient etherized upon a table’ in 
‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’. But not only: Tabidze’s poem at the opening 
of this chapter moves directly to his images: ‘Without love/the sun does not shine in 
the heavenly spheres’. Pierce rightly notes that ‘frequently prose too uses imagery … 
hence [the use of] imagery is not a sufficient criterion’ for a text to count as a poem 
(155). Besides, as these examples show, the category itself is broad and somewhat 
vague, including both figures of speech and ‘sensuously appealing language’ in 
general (id.). In the case of imagery, it is uncontroversial that its association with 
poetry is a result of more frequent use, and perhaps also more, and more frequent, 
unusual types of imagery, than a result of its being a defining feature of the poetic art. 
We use plenty of imagery in everyday language. On the other hand, a poet may 
intentionally avoid imagery in his writing or inadvertently write a poem that uses 
none. 
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Next Pierce examines whether we should take a Kantian line and declare 
beauty a necessary element in poetry, so that ‘no text is a poem unless it is beautiful’ 
(156). The reason Pierce gives against taking this line is that ‘to give a definition of 
‘beauty’ broad enough to cover all the texts we call poetry would result in a term so 
vague as to convey little meaning’ (id.). That is certainly true, though it is not the 
only problem with choosing beauty as the defining criterion of poetry. Spelling out 
what kind of beauty would be poetry-specific—beauty of imagery, beauty of form, 
beauty of message—would be hard enough, and most likely no description would be 
sufficient to set poetry apart from other forms of literary art. But, more importantly, 
beauty is today hardly a common feature or goal of poetry, literature, or art in general. 
The art of Kant’s time left no doubt that a concern with beauty was of paramount 
importance for artists of all kinds, and so it was natural that he should have seen 
beauty as something crucial to art status. Whether or not we are saddened by the fact 
that beauty has lost its central grip on art, twentieth century artists have made it 
undeniable that art can (and perhaps even should) do more than please our aesthetic 
sensibilities. This makes beauty a weak candidate for a necessary condition for art of 
any type. (This, incidentally, is an example of a de facto relationship between 
definitions of art in general and those of particular art forms. There was no in 
principle reason why a rebellion against beauty should have manifested itself across 
the arts in the twentieth century, but the fact that it did has demoted beauty from its 
place in a definition of both particular art forms and art as a whole. Of course, the 
effect on a general theory of art would have occurred even if this beauty-flouting 
attitude had cropped up only within a single art form.) 
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The unusually comprehensive unity of the elements of language frequently to 
be found in poems may give us more promising grounds to distinguish poems from 
the other forms of literature, and this is the fourth candidate that Pierce explores. It is 
not very clear what Pierce means by such unity, but one may surmise from his 
examples that he has in mind the schemes often used by poets to create parallelisms 
and connections between words and phrases, as in alliteration, assonance, and rhyme. 
These not only have the effect of inviting the reader to explore the semantic relevance 
of the linguistic resonances, but they also create connections among the various 
words, phrases, sentences and lines which contribute to producing an internal 
coherence. In addition to unity underwritten by formal elements, Pierce also seems to 
have in mind a unity of meaning, one evinced by the way in which, for example, what 
is expressed in the various stanzas of a poem is closely and intricately related, or how 
it maintains its tone throughout, as in ‘the meditative coherence of Wordsworth’s 
‘Tintern Abbey’ (157).37 
Unity, however, can be achieved by these and other means, none of which 
holds a claim to setting poetry apart from non-poetic texts, since they may be used by 
prose writers as well. As Pierce acknowledges, ‘alliteration can be significant in a 
passage of prose’ just as well as it typically is in poems; furthermore, he contends, 
‘contributing to meaning is a matter of more or less, not a pass-or-fail test’ (157). 
Sometimes an alliteration can clearly contribute to meaning; sometimes it may be no 
more than a sound effect. More importantly for the view Pierce defends, there are 
many ways in which the elements of a text may hold together, and since none of them 
is essential to a text’s being a poem, we must take them together as a ‘family’ of 
 
37 Please see ‘Appendix II: Poems Cited’ for complete poem. 
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possible traits with typical possible effects, which are found in poetry perhaps to a 
greater degree than in prose, but cannot be used to set these apart in categories in 
virtue of their common usage in prose writing as well: ‘In short, to the extent that this 
criterion for poetry is plausible, it refers to a family of characteristics variously 
important to a family of ends. Hence it is consistent with viewing ‘poetry’ as a 
family-resemblance concept’ (id.). Naturally, the same could be said for four of the 
other criteria he considers, since rhythm, imagery, beauty, and strangeness or 
playfulness may all be achieved by diverse means and be used for different purposes. 
Indeed, a concept’s essence may be ineffable in various ways also. 
 Anyone familiar with twentieth-century poetry might be inclined to invoke 
‘strangeness or playfulness’ as the distinguishing trait of the poetic art. Precisely such 
adjectives might come to mind when one reads Cynthia Zarin’s ‘Song’: 
My heart, my dove, my snail, my sail, my 
 milktooth, shadow, sparrow, fingernail, 
 flower-cat and blossom-hedge, mandrake 
 
root now put to bed, moonshell, sea-swell, 
 manatee, emerald shining back at me, 
 nutmeg, quince, tea leaf and bone, zither, 
 
cymbal, xylophone; paper, scissors, then 
 there’s stone—Who doesn’t come through the door 
 to get home?38 
And playfulness emerges from the very first lines of Gregory Corso’s ‘Marriage’: 
 
Should I get married? Should I be good? 
Astound the girl next door with my velvet suit and Faustus hood? 
Don’t take her to movies but to cemeteries 
tell all about werewolf bathtubs and forked clarinets 
then desire her and kiss her and all the preliminaries 
…
38 Ferguson et al. (1996), pp. 1882 (Zarin) and 1694 (Corso). 
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However, even if it were true that strangeness and playfulness define poetry, defining 
strangeness and playfulness, and those of the poetic variety, would be a challenge in 
itself since, again, things can be strange or playful in a myriad of ways. But this view 
of poetry leaves out much work that is neither playful nor strange. Poems can be and 
often are of a serious, contemplative, romantic, or philosophical nature; the list is not 
exhaustive. Pierce is right to note that this view reflects ‘the Modernist valuation of 
the poet as rebel and iconoclast, a stance that defines Neoclassical poetry out of court, 
as it were’ (157). It is unlikely that anyone would have proposed strangeness and 
playfulness as the defining criteria of poetry prior to the twentieth century. 
 Finally, Pierce examines the ‘ineffable essence’ approach to defining poetry, 
or the ‘I know poetry when I see it’ stance (id.). According to this view, poetry does 
have an essence, but we are simply unable to grasp what that essence is. This does not 
prevent us from recognizing instances of poetry, however. We do just fine, for the 
most part at least, telling poems apart from non-poems, without recourse to a set of 
criteria to guide our judgments. This raises an obvious question: How do we do this? 
For Pierce, there are two possible methods: ‘we could be applying an intuitive grasp 
of what poetry is, matching up something we apprehend in the text with the ineffable 
thing that we recognize as essentially poetic, or we could be responding without 
conscious attention to the presence in the text of an ordinary group of criteria’ (157). 
There are problems with the first alternative which should be evident to anyone 
familiar with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. How do I learn about this 
ineffable essence so that I can use it later when I encounter texts? Pace Fodor, it 
seems clear that the concept ‘poetry’ is not something we are born with, even if we 
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somehow ‘lock’ to it upon sufficient exposure to poems. If we are not born with it, 
then the concept must be learnable (‘lockable’?), and so expressible in some public 
medium: I may see how you apply the concept ‘poetry’, which texts count as poems 
for you, and from there be able to distinguish which texts are poems on my own. If 
instead I had a wholly private criterion, ‘located in my personal consciousness, it is 
not clear how I [could] be mistaken in my intuition that X is a poem’ (158). In other 
words, if the criterion is my own and not something learned from my environment, 
and all I have to do is check a text against it, then I will always be right in my 
assessment of what texts are poems. But we are not always right—sometimes we fail 
to identify the categories to which texts belong—and we find that out by checking our 
assessments against those of others, that is, publicly. So the criterion, like the 
meanings of words in a natural language, cannot be private. Moreover, poems are 
cultural artifacts, and as such social artifacts—artifacts created by other individuals 
that belong to and share in a public culture. It would be strange at best if public 
artifacts could be defined privately in this way. We may perhaps agree with Pierce 
that ‘the ineffable criterion is simply a way of evading one’s responsibility to mean 
something coherent in using the term ‘poetry’’ (id.). 
 I agree that the essence of poetry is not something hopelessly beyond 
description. But I do not join Pierce in concluding from this, and from the analysis of 
his five criteria above, that we ought to accept his claims that ‘poetry’ has no essence 
(a definitional point) and that it is recognized solely by means of family resemblance 
(an epistemological one). Indeed, inasmuch as the notion of resemblance is itself a 
slippery one—things, including poems and novels, resemble one another in 
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innumerable ways—the claim that we recognize x’s by means of it can often seem 
vacuous. But even if we grant that we do make judgments about the various kinds of 
literary texts there are in a family-resemblance fashion, this does not mean that there 
is no definition of poetry to be found out there; as has been noted, the resemblances 
we see may well be underwritten by something we don’t. As noted earlier, how we 
define x, and how we go about, in everyday life, recognizing x’s, are two separate 
questions. We recognize most things just fine without a specialist’s definition, but we 
also expect that, if it came to it, the specialist would have a definition at hand to give 
us. While it is true that even the specialist sometimes may have nothing more than a 
‘working definition’, this still does not make the two questions a single one, nor does 
it do away with the possibility of a definition. 
 Pierce considers several arguments against his pragmatic approach to a 
definition of poetry. According to him, the most telling argument against his view 
consists in the objection that defining poetry ‘takes the numinous out of [it], reducing 
its nature to elements that can be publicly and explicitly expressed’ (158). Properly 
speaking, this is not an argument against Pierce’s family-resemblance view; it is an 
argument against any definition of poetry. That is, however we do it, by defining 
poetry we are stripping poems of their artistic power, which, presumably, can only 
work if the readership is unaware of the workings behind the works. Let us call this 
the ‘magic’ view of poetry. The magic view of poetry turns the poet into a magician 
whose tricks would lose their value, their ‘Ohh!...’ effect, once we knew how the guy 
pulled the rabbit out of the hat or concocted an alternation of masculine and feminine 
42
rhymes.39 It is surprising that Pierce should have thought this to be his strongest 
objection, since the magic view of poetry clearly has little to recommend it. First, it is 
not an established truth, or even a likely hypothesis, that knowing what poetry is 
would make poems lose their ‘numinosity’. Perhaps we should rather find poems 
infinitely more interesting and awe-inspiring by knowing what it takes for something 
to be a poem, and what it takes for something to be a good poem. Here’s an example. 
Baudelaire wrote a poem called ‘Les chats’ in the 1840s: 
1Les amoureux fervents et les savants austères 
2Aiment également, dans leur mûre saison, 
3Les chats puissants et doux, orgueil de la maison, 
4Qui comme eux sont frileux et comme eux sédentaires. 
 
5Amis de la science et de la volupté, 
6Ils cherchent le silence et l’horreur des ténèbres; 
7L’Érèbe les eût pris pour ses coursiers funèbres, 
8S’ils pouvaient au servage incliner leur fierté. 
 
9Ils prennent en songeant les nobles attitudes 
10Des grands sphinx allongés au fond des solitudes, 
11Qui semblent s’endormir dans un rêve sans fin; 
 
12Leurs reins féconds sont pleins d’étincelles magiques, 
13Et des parcelles d’or, ainsi qu’un sable fin, 
14Étoilent vaguement leurs prunelles mystiques.40 
A reader familiar with poetry but unencumbered by the burdens of knowing what a 
poem is may find ‘Les chats’ beautiful, amusing, mysterious; admire the rhymes and 
the images; and ponder the symbolisms involved and whether Baudelaire was really 
 
39 A masculine rhyme ends with a stressed syllable, a feminine rhyme with an unstressed one. 
40 ‘Fervent lovers and austere scholars/Love equally, in their ripe season,/Powerful and gentle 
cats, the pride of the house,/Who like them are sensitive to cold and like them 
sedentary.//Friends of learning and of voluptuousness,/They seek silence and the horror of the 
shadows;/Erebus would have taken them as his gloomy coursers,/If they were able to incline 
their pride to servitude.//They assume in dozing majestic poses/Of grand sphinxes reclining in 
the depths of solitudes/Who seem to be asleep in a dream without end;//Their fertile loins are 
full of magic sparks,/And particles of gold, like fine grains of sand,/Vaguely fleck their 
mystic pupils with stars.’ Translation by Katie-Furness-Lane, revised by Jakobson (1987), p. 
180. 
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talking only about cats. Now she encounters Roman Jakobson’s analysis of 
Baudelaire’s poem: 
In the organization of the rhymes, the poet follows the scheme: aBBa CddC eeFgFg 
(upper-case letters being used to denote the lines ending in masculine rhymes and 
lower-case letters for the lines ending in feminine rhymes). This chain of rhymes is 
divided into three strophic units, namely, two quatrains and one sestet composed of 
two tercets…. The rhyme scheme of the sonnet in question is the corollary of three 
dissimulative rules: (1) two plain (couplet) rhymes cannot follow one another; (2) If 
two contiguous lines belong to different rhymes, one of them must be feminine and 
the other masculine; (3) At the end of contiguous stanzas feminine lines and 
masculine lines alternate: 4sédentaires—8fierté—14mystiques. … All the lines end 
with nominal forms, either substantive (8) or adjectival (6). All the substantives are 
feminine. The final noun is plural in the eight lines with a feminine rhyme, which are 
all longer… whereas the shorter lines, those with a masculine rhyme, end in all six 
cases with a singular noun.41 
The excerpt is from the first of twenty-seven pages in which Jakobson does nothing 
short of laying bare the entire structure of Baudelaire’s sonnet. It is perhaps idle to 
speculate on the basis of my own reaction to this analysis, but it is hard to imagine the 
reader who will not come to the end of it with an increased admiration for 
Baudelaire’s poetic virtuosity, and a deepened understanding of poetry in general 
which can be brought to bear on the readings of future poems. Nothing numinous was 
lost; quite to the contrary, Jakobson’s analysis makes one wonder whether Baudelaire 
was not indeed inspired by a muse to have been able to accomplish such delicate 
intricacy. Defining a kind and coming to an understanding of what it does and how it 
works does not make its instances less special than they were before that knowledge; 
if anything, it is likely to make them more so. The numinosity charge presupposes 
that an artwork’s value is in direct proportion to how shrouded in mystery it is. In 
other circumstances ignorance might be bliss, but not here. 
 
41 ‘Baudelaire’s ‘Les chats’, in Jakobson (1987), p. 181. 
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Not only does a definition not diminish a thing’s value, it does not in any way 
alter what the thing is. This seems to be a concomitant fear in those averse to a 
definition of poetry or art in general. Poems will continue to be poems and have the 
characteristics that they have, and the value that they have, whether we define them or 
not. Human beings have not ceased to be human beings because we found out that we 
are descended from apes. Neither is the intricate history of our evolution any less 
wondrous than the idea of a deity creating us and everything else ex nihilo. A thing is 
what it is and, try as we may, we cannot define its essence away. 
 Following the pragmatic approach that seeks not to find an ‘essential core of 
meaning’ of the word ‘poetry’ but rather to aid the critical enterprise by looking into 
‘the way that people deploy [the term ‘poetry’] in their speaking and writing, the 
work that it does’ (151f.), Pierce now arrives at how he thinks people distinguish 
poems from non-poems: 
If poetry is indeed a family-resemblance concept, then its definition should 
take the form of a list of possible attributes. Such an approach might be 
phrased in this definition: poetry is that form of text that rewards the sorts of 
reading and analysis we normally give to poetry. Of course such a definition 
would be circular unless one goes on to specify the sorts of reading and 
analysis. (159) 
 
It is certainly true that the definition would be circular without such specifications. 
But it remains circular even when Pierce does specify these kinds of readings: ‘When 
a good number of the readerly tools and methods we apply to poems reward our 
approach to a given text, it is a poem’ (159). Some of these tools, he notes, are shared 
with non-poetry, others are peculiar to poetry (id.). If that is so, then how do we know 
which are and which aren’t, so that we know which readerly tools to apply to a text so 
that they will tell us that the text is a poem? That must be known beforehand. And to 
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know this beforehand is to know that tool A is a poetry-identifying tool, and so the 
definition remains circular: to use a tool properly, we must know what it is used for. 
The standard answer to this worry is that we learn from paradigms. But if there are 
paradigms, why not look at them, and into the reasons that made them so, for an 
answer? Works of art do not become paradigms of their art forms accidentally. We 
might note also that we need not import value into our notion of paradigmatic works 
of art. A paradigm may simply be a work that is ordinarily accepted as belonging to 
an art form—regardless of whether it is trite or profound, boring or exciting—perhaps 
simply in virtue of possessing, to a high degree, the features commonly associated 
with that art form. 
 Pierce might argue that this isn’t properly a definition, but rather an 
explanation of our practices. However, what Pierce offers is not simply a description 
of our literary practices. It is rather a guide to these practices. That is, what Pierce 
does is not merely to say ‘this is how we do things’; he tells us instead that defining 
poetry by necessary and sufficient conditions is a vain goal and that we should 
instead, if we want to know what texts are poems, use the readerly tools that in the 
past have been associated with poems. If their use is fruitful, then we would have 
good reason to believe that the text before us is a poem. But as we have seen, this 
practical guide is uninformative. Nevertheless, Pierce’s past-oriented regard is a look 
in the right direction, and I will return to it in my next section. 
 At various times Pierce conflates how we ascribe value to a work of art with 
how we define it. Developing his ‘readerly tools’ approach to sorting out poems 
from other literary texts, he points out that, as readerly tools may vary over time and 
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in different social circumstances, what counts as a poem will accordingly change 
(159). It is a question whether and how readerly tools do change over time and within 
and across cultures. But assuming that they do, and that such a change has an effect 
on what counts as poetry, that is still not the same as having an effect on what counts 
as good poetry. When Pierce, giving examples of ‘shifts over time’ in what we 
consider poetry, notes how T.S. Eliot ‘taught us to find poems among the heaps of 
occasional and pious seventeen-century verse’, and how feminists did the same with 
what earlier were considered ‘oceans of nineteenth-century sentimentality’ he is 
taking changes in how we evaluate poems for changes in how we decide what texts 
are poems to begin with: ‘In a curious way ‘The Exequy’ became a poem when Eliot 
and others taught (or retaught) us how to read it’ (159). But ‘The Exequy’ could never 
have become a poem if it hadn’t been one from the moment it was created. Nothing 
material changed about it when Eliot brought it to our attention. ‘The Exequy’ could 
never have become a novel, just as Moby Dick could never become a poem, no matter 
how well Eliot or anyone else taught us how to read it. What happened to ‘The 
Exequy’, rather, is that Eliot made us see the poetic value in it, taught us how to 
appreciate it. This has nothing to do with changing its categorical status. 
 Pierce recognizes later in his essay that such conflation of value and definition 
in his theory is problematic, for he points out that one may object that his view 
‘equates poetry with good poetry, thus necessitating a category like verse or doggerel 
for failed attempts’ (160). He does not see this is a problem, however: ‘That seems to 
me a justifiable way to use the term ‘poetry’, and one well-established in past usage’ 
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(id.).42 But between doggerel and good poetry there is a vast universe of poems 
which, though not good, are not doggerel either, and provide literary critics and 
editors of literary magazines with enough material for several lifetimes’ worth of 
work. Even if one’s express aim as an author is to write bad poetry, it is bad poetry,
and not bad short stories, that one is writing. And if an author has the more common, 
if not so commonly fulfilled, aspiration of writing good poetry and fails, that attempt, 
again, is an attempt at writing (good) poems, not novels. A failed attempt is a failed 
attempt at some specifiable goal. 
 The following analogy may be illuminating. Imagine that John attempts to 
build a car. John’s attempt might fail for any number of reasons, but that will not turn 
his attempt into a stab at building a paper airplane. Still, we are justified in asking 
whether his botched attempt at car-building is indeed a car. To what category do these 
failed attempts belong? And are they analogous to a failed attempt at art? In the case 
of the car, perhaps the right question to ask is under what circumstances we would be 
disinclined to call the final product a car. A car is a functional kind, and its function is 
to take one or more passengers from point A to point B; all the rest is comfort and 
accoutrements. So if John’s attempt is indeed a failure, it is a functional failure, and it 
is under these circumstances that we would withhold the label ‘vehicle’ from it. 
 Are artworks, and in particular, are poems, functional kinds of this sort? 
Although artworks do perform important functions in a society, they are not, at least 
not necessarily, created with those functions as goals. While John’s primary goal in 
 
42 In view of this disavowal, it is particularly confusing that a few paragraphs later Pierce 
states precisely the opposite: ‘It seems to me dangerous to make the degree of belonging to a 
category like poetry a surrogate for evaluation, not because evaluation is wrong or rationally 
indefensible, but because the category is likely to obscure the actual grounds for evaluation’ 
(161). 
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building his vehicle was that it provided a means of locomotion (even if he had other 
goals concurrently in mind), an author’s goal in writing a poem is not necessarily to 
have that work perform any function whatever in her community, even if in the end 
the poem comes to, say, enlighten its readers about the relative unimportance of 
human troubles. Indeed, not only poems but artworks in general need not have any 
pre-established and specifiable function even if that function relates solely back to the 
artist. For instance, the artist may create so as to express her thoughts and emotions, 
and so the function of the work will be to serve as a means to such expression. But 
that function need not be there either: the artist may simply be bored and wishes to 
pass the time by composing sestinas. So perhaps poems are better not seen as 
functional kinds. What I will propose is that they are best seen as intentional-
historical kinds. In that case, (1) if a text is made with the intention that it belong to 
the category ‘poem’, and (2) that intention is guided by the history of the poetic art, 
then it is a poem, even if a bad one. 
 Pierce hints at an intentionalist stance when he suggests that we ‘could define 
poetry by intent to reward’ (161). This would clear the way to including ‘the failures 
and mediocrities with which libraries are laden’ under the category of ‘poetry’ (id.). It 
could also solve the evaluation/definition conflation just noted. ‘Reward’, Pierce 
clarifies, is to be understood as ‘an indefinite term, pointing to whatever brings us 
back to poems to apply our poetic methods of reading’ (160). But Pierce hastily 
dismisses the viability of an intentionalist approach to defining poems on grounds of 
the general inaccessibility of intentions (161). However, intentions need not be 
directly accessible to a reader for that reader to be able to infer that they were present 
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and causally related to the text at hand. It is true that we rarely have direct access to 
an author’s intentions, where direct access is understood as verbal reports from the 
author concerning his work. In the absence of mind-to-mind cables transferring 
mental events directly from one individual to another, oral or written reports are as 
direct an access as we can get, in circumstances where they are available and we can 
take them at face-value. Such circumstances are unfortunately hard to come by. 
Though their works may live, authors die, often without leaving notes, journals, 
letters, or blogs on the internet where their every comma is discussed and dissected. 
Sometimes, too, authors are not the best source of information about their works: they 
may be mistaken, deluded, or even deceitful about what went on in their minds and 
what they ultimately set down on paper. So if authorial reports were our only route to 
authorial intention, Pierce would be right to pursue a road more fruitfully traveled by. 
However, as the constructive or hypothetical intentionalism defended by Levinson 
and others has proposed in regard to literary interpretation, there are other routes to an 
author’s intentions concerning his or her oeuvre—in particular, the works themselves. 
More to the point, as I noted early in this chapter, we must be careful to 
distinguish (1) how we define poetry; (2) how we identify poems; and (3) how we 
interpret poems. We may define poetry on the basis of authorial categorial intentions, 
and yet recognize instances of poems on the basis of a text’s intrinsic features—or 
vice-versa. If we identify a text as a poem on the basis of categorial intentions, then 
there are different ways of arriving at those intentions, one of them being via the 
text’s characteristics, another being via extra-textual evidence. The first alone, or both 
together, may provide sufficient grounds for settling the issue of whether a given text 
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is a poem or not. Another alternative is that we both define and recognize poems on 
the basis of authorial intentions. In any event, although related, the pragmatic 
problem of identification of particular instances of poetry is distinct from the general 
project of definition, and both of these are distinct from the problems related to how 
we should go about interpreting a work. 
Poetic intentions had a chance of getting their due in Sartwell 1991. Taking 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s comment that the poet ‘considers words as things and not as signs’ 
(246) as his starting point, Sartwell argues that ‘it is the poet’s intentions that 
constitute something as a poem’ (250). Sartre’s comment and Sartwell’s thesis do not 
at first seem connected, but Sartwell brings them together as he sketches his notion of 
poetry-making intention. 
 Sartwell notes that words are abstract entities, and not material objects, as is 
(he says) implied by Sartre’s remark. A poem is an abstract object, a type, not 
identical with its instantiations or tokens: ‘if identical objects cannot have divergent 
properties, then the poem is not identical with any of its particular manifestations’ 
(246). Neither is the poem identical with the collection of all its manifestations: ‘to do 
so would be to identify the poem with a (perhaps massive) repetition of itself’ (id.). 
The poem is rather ‘that which all the manifestations of it have in common’ (247). 
Nevertheless, Sartwell wants to retain the Sartrean insight that there is something 
material about words that is of crucial importance to poetry. This materiality cannot 
inhere in poems seen as types, since these are abstract; but it is precisely what tokens 
are made of. Consider what Dylan Thomas wrote of his first experiences with poetry, 
in the form of nursery rhymes: ‘What the words stood for, symbolized or meant was 
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of very secondary importance. What mattered was the sound of them’ (as cited in 
Sartwell, p. 249). 
Thomas was, then, not concerned with the properties of words as abstract 
types, but with the properties of their concrete instantiations, especially sound, which 
is a perceptible property. This leads Sartwell to propose the following definition, 
where he combines artistic intention with perceptible, physical properties, thereby 
incorporating Sartre’s idea into his view:  
A poem is a linguistic type of which its creator intends that certain 
perceptible properties of its tokens be particularly emphasized in 
appreciation. These properties include the shape of the inscription of the 
poem and the sound of its recitation’ (250, his emphasis). 
 
So what distinguishes the poet from the prose writer is an interest in the physical 
properties of words, an interest in tokens as opposed to an interest only in the abstract 
properties of types (meaning, e.g., should presumably be a type property43). The prose 
writer is concerned primarily with meaning, even if a degree of concern with the 
‘sound effects’ of words and sentences is still present. For Sartwell, the poet, by 
contrast, is the type of writer or speaker ‘who seeks control over the physical 
linguistic object, or at any rate seeks to take advantage of the perceptual possibilities 
inherent in linguistic tokens’ (250, my emphasis). 
Sartwell’s definition thus accounts for the poem’s visual properties as 
presented on paper (and these are particularly important in picture-poems and 
calligrammes) and for its aural properties as presented when it is recited. It does not 
 
43 However, given the contribution of context, it is not clear that meaning should be 
considered a type property, at least not exclusively. This may lead one to wonder whether all 
properties are not token, rather than type, properties. Yet, even if the type/token distinction is 
ultimately indefensible, there remains a distinction between perceptible and non-perceptible 
properties, and meaning will count among the latter. 
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specify what properties these must be, or of what kind, only that they be intended to 
be salient or of note to appreciators. Sartwell’s definition is a three-pronged fork of 
poetic intentions, perceptual properties, and appreciators. To create a poem is to 
create a  verbal art object intended to have particular effects on readers and listeners, 
and this will be achieved by perceptual properties created by means of certain 
established conventions: ‘Poets enforce rhythmical and visual effects with the help of 
the formal conventions of poetry’ (250, his emphasis). Sartwell does not specify what 
kind(s) of visual effects poems should have, but, as the cited passage shows, he does 
specify sound properties to be rhythm-creating properties, rather than, say, sheer 
cacophony. Meter and rhyme, he points out, are aural properties of tokens, and they 
are ‘essentially repetitive devices’ (253). 
As will become clear in the next section, I am in agreement with the spirit of 
Sartwell’s theory, particularly in what concerns the importance of poetic intention and 
the awareness that aural devices rely on repetition. Sartwell’s view would benefit 
greatly from further development, however. Despite his own protestations—he 
‘insist[s] that it is the poet’s intentions that constitute a poem’ (250)—at times it is 
unclear where his emphasis lies: the poetic intention, the audience, or the formal 
elements of the work itself. It is also unclear the role that visual properties play in his 
definition and whether they could not be reduced to another, more general, property, 
one that would encompass both visual and aural elements. Furthermore, Sartwell’s 
insistence on the importance of intention suggests a categorical distinction between 
prose and poetry rather than a difference of degree. But he seems uneasy to draw that 
categorical line between the two, and some of his statements bring the categorical 
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distinction into question. This emerges for example when Sartwell concludes that 
poetry ‘is linguistic music. Poems are lilting, cacaphonous [sic], brash, harmonious, 
and so forth, in ways that prose works, except very poetic prose works, are not’ (253), 
and when he concedes that ‘Of course, writers of prose are very often concerned with 
the sound of the recitations of their productions. But to the extent that they are, their 
writing is poetic’ (255). By this Sartwell cannot mean that prose writers’ works 
become poetry once they concern themselves with the sound effects of their 
sentences. Rather, Sartwell must mean that prose writers are following what are 
typical poetic traditions or rules, rather than prose ones, when they are focusing on 
sound. This again may be taken as blurring the categorial distinctions. However, 
intention is not a matter of degree: a writer does not intend to write something that is 
at one place or another in the spectrum from prose to poetry; a writer intends to write 
a poem, a novel, an essay, a short story. These difficulties might have been 
circumvented with revisions to the poetic intention. As it is, what it most problematic 
about Sartwell’s account is that it would necessarily leave out certain outré avant-
garde poems, some examples of which I will discuss in the sections that follow. 
 These reservations notwithstanding, I think Sartwell’s theory of poetry is on 
the right track for emphasizing the importance of the poet’s intention and of the 
perceptible, especially the aural, properties of poetic texts. In the following section, I 
will defend an intentional-historical approach to a definition of poetry, one to which I 
think Sartwell would be largely sympathetic. 
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iv. An Intentional-Historical Formalism 
 
Of the various definitions of art proposed since Morris Weitz’s challenge in the early 
stages of analytic aesthetics, Jerrold Levinson’s intentional-historical definition 
appears the most promising.44 Briefly, Levinson’s proposal is that we define art on 
the basis of the intentions of an agent as these relate to the concrete history of art 
itself, that is, to preceding artworks. For the object of a creative or proffering act to 
constitute art, its agent must intend the object of that act to be regarded in the ways 
that previous artworks were regarded. He may do this either by intending his work to 
be regarded in the way or ways that some specifiable work or set of works has been 
regarded (whatever those ways of regarding them have been), or by intending his 
work to be regarded in specifiable ways artworks are or were regarded (whatever 
those artworks were); for example, ‘with close attention to form, with openness to 
emotional suggestion, with awareness of symbolism’, etc. (Levinson 1989, p. 21). In 
the first case, which Levinson labels ‘opaque’ or ‘relational’, the artist’s intention 
relates his work to other, particular artworks; in the second, called ‘transparent’ or 
‘intrinsic’, the intention involves particular kinds of regard or treatment, ‘without 
having in mind or invoking intentionally any particular past artworks, genres, 
movements, or traditions (id.). The intentional-historical approach thus shifts the 
focus of definition away from intrinsic features of artworks—a move it has in 
common with institutional theories of art—and toward their relational characteristics. 
It parts ways with the institutional theories, however, in focusing on the intentions of 
artists rather than on the acknowledgement of art world institutions, grounding those 
 
44 The view is defended in Levinson 1979, 1989, 1993 and 2002. Critiques of it include 
Daniel Kolak 1990, Victor Yelverton Haines 1990, Crispin Sartwell 1990, Robert Stecker 
1996, and Stephen Davies 1991. 
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intentions nonetheless on actual works of art and actual treatments of these works. 
Levinson’s theory thereby avoids the pitfalls of intrinsic essentialism about art 
brought to light by Weitz (most notably, that it cannot accommodate the ever-
changing nature of art), and has the additional advantage of not relying upon 
institutions such as the ‘art world’, whose conception is itself hazy, and whose 
existence follows rather than precedes that of works of art.45 
Defining art in general and defining particular art forms are two independent 
projects, however. We may be unable to agree on an intrinsic feature that is essential 
to all art insofar as it is art, and yet find a trait that, whenever present in an object, is 
sufficient condition to identify it as, say, a sculpture. Nevertheless, the two projects 
are naturally related, insofar as they both involve defining objects that belong in 
overlapping categories. 
Levinson’s intentional-historical definition carries over fruitfully from a 
theory of art in general to a theory of poetry in particular. I will argue that, given the 
substantial changes the poetic art has undergone in the past century and a half 
(particularly in the Western tradition), it is primarily by their being intentionally 
connected to preceding poems that some texts count as poems today. This is not to 
say that the theoretical transition from defining art in general to defining poetry in 
particular in an intentional-historical fashion is completely smooth; some changes 
will be required. They are, I think, changes in a good direction: a direction that brings 
more concrete features of this art form to the fore. For while we may be unable to 
specify any concrete features for an object to count as art in general (e.g., we cannot 
 
45 Defenders of the institutional theory of art include, most preeminently, Arthur Danto 
(1964) and George Dickie (1974, 1983). 
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say, to be an artwork, an object must be made of marble), for certain art forms a given 
medium, at the very least, may be a necessary feature. For an object to classify as a 
piece of music, for instance, it must be made up of sounds rather than paint.46 
Analogously, it would seem that poems must, at a minimum, be made up of words, 
since poetry is a verbal art. But this is minimal and largely uninformative (except, 
perhaps, to aliens on a first visit to our planet); moreover, some avant-garde artists I 
will be discussing presently have challenged even this seemingly innocent 
requirement. We must delve further if we are to distinguish poems from other types 
of verbal art. 
 How, then, can Levinson’s definition of art translate into a definition of the 
poetic art? In one of its versions his definition reads as follows: 
to be art is, roughly, to be an object connected in a particular manner, in the 
intention of a maker or profferer, with preceding art or art-regards: the agent 
in question intends the object for regard (treatment, assessment, reception, 
doing with) in some way or ways that what are acknowledged as already 
artworks, are or were correctly regarded or done with. (1993, p. 411) 
 
As I have noted, this definition eschews the requirement of intrinsic features for 
something to belong in the category of art. It is purely relational: something is an 
artwork by virtue of its connection to preceding art via the intentions of an agent. The 
definition therefore remains at a very abstract level; no concrete traits of a formal, 
material, or functional sort are required to make something art today, even if in the 
past such types of traits were part of a definition of art (Levinson 1993, 412). 
 What I propose to do in transferring the intentional-historical definition of art 
over to the realm of poetry is to revise the kind of intention involved in poetry-
 
46 As John Cage has famously shown, these sounds need not have been produced by musical 
instruments. I will return to this example later. 
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making and to enrich this intention with concrete features. This will not be to the 
exclusion of an over-arching art-intention, either of the kind defended by Levinson or 
of some other kind. Insofar as she is producing art, a poet may intend her work to be 
regarded in the way preceding art (including poetry) has been regarded, or she may 
intend to present it as a candidate for appreciation, or she may have some other art-
intention. In what follows I will assume that the Levinsonian art intention is the kind 
successfully to fill the ticket, but we need not choose among the available possibilities 
for our purposes, so long as we bear in mind an overarching art intention. In other 
words, we need not decide which theory of art is correct, only that the work is 
intended to be art, or to be regarded as such. The importance of this overarching 
intention will emerge when we consider some unlikely contenders for inclusion in the 
poetic set. Insofar as she is producing a specific kind of art, namely poetry, a poet’s 
intention will be characterized differently from however we choose to characterize 
her art-making intentions. Here, then, is my first pass at a definition of poetry: 
To be a poem is to be a verbal art object intended by its writer or discoverer47 
for membership in the poetic tradition48 or, in other words, in the category 
‘poetry’. 
 
The first difference to notice is that the intention in the case of poetry moves away 
from the regards of art appreciators back to the artworks themselves. The agent’s 
poetic intention with respect to her verbal object is directed at the object, not at the 
 
47 Just as there is ‘found art’, there is ‘found poetry’. In the case of found poetry, it is the 
intention of the discoverer (in addition, sometimes, to some manipulation, as in the insertion 
of line breaks) that counts as the poetic intention. 
48 For purposes of the definition, ‘tradition’ is meant to refer to the history of poetry or, more 
accurately, to the poems that make up that history, conceived globally (rather than, say, the 
German Romantic tradition). In other instances, which should be clear from the context, 
‘tradition’ may be read in the narrower sense of a given culture’s poetic tradition but, in any 
case, understanding the term in the definitional sense should not interfere with the argument. 
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ways in which that object is to be regarded or treated (even if her overall artistic 
intention is to be so characterized). This in turn requires further elucidation. Without 
such elucidation, it would seem that the bare intention that a verbal object be a poem 
would suffice for it to count as one, even if it consists of pure gibberish. More 
seriously, the definition would be appear to be circular. Naturally, this would be an 
unwelcome consequence. It is not, however, a consequence we should fear: for the 
proposed definition requires that the poetic intention be grounded in the poetic 
tradition—and in that respect it retains the historical spirit of Levinson’s definition of 
art. To count as a poetic intention, then, an agent’s intention must somehow relate to 
that rich and vast tradition. A writer’s work must be intentionally connected to 
preceding poems in order for it to be a poem as well. How is that connection to be 
characterized? 
 Extending the analogy with the Levinsonian art intention, we may 
characterize the poetic intention as either opaque/relational or transparent/intrinsic. 
But, continuing my move away from the regards of art appreciators back to the works 
themselves and their features, I suggest that a writer may intend her work to be a 
member of the poetic tradition either by intending that it be ‘like those other texts’, 
without being able to pinpoint exactly in what ways her own work is meant to 
resemble those texts (relational poetic intention), or by intending her work to be a 
poem by intending it to have certain intrinsic features, features that, as happens to be 
the case, have been central to the poetic tradition wherein she wishes her work to 
belong (intrinsic poetic intention). It is important to note that, regardless of the 
opacity or transparency of the intention—that is, regardless of whether the poet’s 
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intentions are directed to a set of works or to a set of features—the poetically 
determinative features of her work need not (indeed, ideally should not) vary 
accordingly. This will be the case if there is a feature shared by all poems such that 
intending one’s work to be ‘like those literary works called ‘poems’’49 and intending 
one’s work to have that feature will amount to the same thing. 
 In view of this distinction, it seems that opaque poetic intentions are more 
susceptible to failure than transparent ones. Imagine a wannabe writer who 
encounters poems for the first time. As chance would have it, all the poems he 
encounters happen to be about love and all use symbolisms involving the care and 
growth of plants. In every other respect, the poems in this set vary considerably: some 
are prose poems, some are verse poems, some rhyme, and some do not. Our wannabe 
writer now intends, ‘relationally’, to write a text eligible for membership in this select 
group. In intending his verbal artwork to be like the ones he has encountered, he 
intends that it be about love and that it involve plant imagery and symbolism. Given 
how varied these poems are in every other respect, he is unable to move beyond the 
topical surface to the general features that the poems do in fact share (even though he 
does not see that). Two outcomes are possible. One, his work, although made with no 
intentional concern for any centrally poetic features, may accidentally exhibit them; 
two, his work exhibits no concern for these features at all. In the first case, it seems 
uncontroversial that this author composed a poem. But I would claim that he wrote a 
poem even in the second case, since his intentions are still linked to poems (and not, 
say, to novels or newspaper articles). 
 
49 As will become clear later, ‘like’ here is not to be understood as some unspecifiable 
resemblance notion, but rather more strongly as the intention that one’s work belong in the 
poetic tradition. 
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Must an author be aware of having those intentions as poetic intentions,
however, for her work to count as poetry? Not necessarily. Levinson’s taxonomy of 
art-making intentions may be illuminating here. Distinguishing among specific art-
conscious, nonspecific art-conscious, and art-unconscious intentions, Levinson allows 
for cases of naïve art activity, that is, the production of artworks when agents are 
unaware that art is what they are producing (Levinson 1979, p. 39). A specific art-
conscious intention is an art-making intention whose agent is aware of the work or 
class of works he wishes his own creation to be regarded as: for example, ‘intending 
for regard in the way wire sculptures are to be regarded’ (id., p. 38). An intention is 
nonspecific art-conscious when the artist intends her work to be regarded ‘in 
whatever ways any past artworks have been correctly regarded, having no particular 
ones in mind’ (id.). Finally, an art-unconscious intention is an intention that one’s 
work be regarded in some specifiable ways, and these are ways in which artworks 
have been or are correctly regarded, but the agent is unaware of this fact; for example, 
‘intending for listening with attention to timbre’ (id.). 
 Bearing in mind that intentions may also be either opaque or transparent 
(relational or intrinsic), we may combine the taxonomies for an exhaustive table of 
possible art-making intentions, using this table to shed light on the array of possible 
poetic intentions. Opaque intentions, we may recall, are directed at a work or set of 
works, however these may have been correctly regarded, while transparent intentions 
are directed at the ways in which a work of set of works are or were correctly 
regarded. Opaque intentions therefore satisfy specific art-conscious and nonspecific 
art-conscious intentions. They cannot satisfy art-unconscious intentions, since an 
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opaque intention is guided by previous artworks, and so an awareness of these works 
as works of art is presupposed.50 Transparent intentions most easily combine with art-
unconscious intentions, since a transparent intention—an intention that one’s work be 
regarded in certain ways, which, unbeknownst to the art-maker, are ways artworks 
have correctly been regarded—is the only possible avenue of explanation for art-
making that occurs without the notion of art figuring in the maker’s intentions. On the 
other hand, a transparent intention cannot be at the same time a specific art-conscious 
intention, since the one does not invoke any particular past artworks or genres, while 
such an invocation is precisely what characterizes the other. Transparent intentions 
not only combine but in fact do so redundantly with nonspecific art-conscious 
intentions, though, since both are generic types of intention, not connected with 
particular artworks or specific art forms, genres, traditions, or movements. 
 How will this taxonomy transfer over to a theory of poetry? It would seem 
that a poetic intention, insofar as it is poetic, cannot be art-unconscious or nonspecific 
art-conscious. However, this would violate not only the Levinsonian intentional-
historical definition but also the facts. If it is possible to create art, of whatever type, 
naïvely, then it must be possible to create art of a particular type naïvely. And it is 
possible that one should write poetry without knowing it was poetry one was writing. 
Under a transparent reading of poetic intentions, revised to specify a concern for 
poetic features rather than ways in which certain types of texts—namely, poems—are 
or were correctly regarded, a naïve writer may intend to create a verbal art object with 
 
50 This is Levinson’s line of argument, but we may question this assumption. I may intend my 
creation to be regarded in the way a set of objects A has been correctly regarded, without 
knowing that all members of A are artworks and correctly regarded as such. The scenario, 
though unlikely, is possible, and should count as a case of naïve artistic activity as well. 
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attention to certain features without being aware that concern with such features 
(whatever these are) characterize the poetic tradition. A different kind of naïve poetic 
activity may also occur when a luckier wannabe writer intends opaquely that his work 
be ‘like those other texts’ (where these are all poems) and, unbeknownst to himself, 
makes use of precisely the features that are central to the poetic tradition he intends 
his writing to be a part of. We may therefore revise the initial definition of poetry 
given above to accommodate such unusual cases: 
A poem is a verbal art object intended by its writer or discoverer, relationally 
or intrinsically, to belong in the poetic tradition. 
 
The revised definition now allows for writers at all levels of awareness of 
their activity to produce poems, from the writer fully embedded in her poetic tradition 
and aware of all the poetic possibilities at her disposal to the naïve writer whose 
creativity chances upon an established art form. As it is, however, this definition 
remains thin relative to the incredibly rich tradition it is meant to explain and 
encompass. To enrich the poetic intention, we must now make good our promise to 
move away from the regards of art appreciators to the features poetic works actually 
have. The poems from the various traditions exemplified in chapter two have revealed 
that the history of poetry is one of texts whose universal and enduring feature is the 
use of repetition devices. So to intend that my text belong in that tradition is to intend 
that it be made with a concern for, or an awareness of, those repetition devices.51 This 
concern can be evinced by following the tradition (say, writing in traditional forms), 
transforming the tradition (using repetition but altering forms or creating new ones, 
etc.), or rejecting that tradition (avoiding traditional forms, avoiding certain types of 
 
51 As should be clear from the opaque/transparent distinction, this need not be awareness in 
the sense of being able to expostulate, e.g., on what kind of meter or rhyme one has used. 
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repetition techniques—say metrical patterns of any sort—or, most radically, avoiding 
repetition altogether). The next section will be devoted to explaining what I mean by 
repetition devices, why I have chosen them to characterize the poetic art (rather than, 
for example, Pierce’s many options in the second section of this chapter), and how 
these three ways of intending poetically are exemplified in the various poetic 
traditions around the world. 
 
v. Repetition Schemes 
 
Recalling the historical overview of the second chapter, and the examples given there 
of poems from our earliest historical records to contemporary publications, we will 
see the emergence of a pattern that is peculiar to poetry among the literary arts. 
Rhyme schemes, stanza forms, meter, alliteration, anaphora, parallelism, and the 
numerous other poetic devices are all patterns of recurrence52 that began with 
literature but have remained central to poetry alone. These patterns serve various 
aesthetic and semantic functions: they create rhythm (meter, rhyme), emphases and 
connections (rhyme, anaphora, assonance), and comparisons and contrasts 
(parallelism, stanzas, alliteration). Indeed, of the several features Pierce reviewed for 
candidacy in a definition of poetry—rhythm, imagery, beauty, linguistic unity, 
strangeness or playfulness—perhaps rhythm had the greatest chance of prevailing 
(although Pierce himself placed it at the bottom of his list). This is because many 
 
52 I will use the expressions ‘repetition schemes’, ‘patterns of recurrence’, ‘recurrence’ and 
‘repetition’ more or less interchangeably. When I use these terms, I will be referring to the 
kinds of repetition specified in this section and not just any sort of repetition. For example, 
the repetition of the definite article has not been a type of recurrence that marked the history 
of poetry, while the repetition of initial consonant sounds closely enough to affect the ear 
(alliteration) has. As will be made clear in the following section, this will not prevent a poet 
from writing a poem with types of repetition that have not been prevalent in that history. 
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repetition devices function in such a way as to create rhythm in a poetic text. 
However, repetition is a more encompassing feature, since the creation of rhythm is 
not the only function of repetition techniques. 
Repetition has been a central aspect of every poetic tradition from its 
beginnings, and it is only for the past 150 of its more than 5,000-year old history that 
it has relented a little in its hold on the poetic art. Repetition is at the core of religious 
chants, ancient and contemporary; it is crucial to the oral traditions of the epic; it is 
the musical element in the lyric; and it is present too in poetic drama. Again, what is 
repeated in poetry varies: it may be an abstract structure, as in meter, line length, or 
stanzaic form; or it may involve specific sounds, as in rhyme or alliteration, or entire 
words or linguistic units such as phrases or sentences, as in anaphora. So repetition 
can manifest itself in a text in a variety of ways. What is remarkable is that, despite 
the enormous variety of poetry around the world, and despite the dramatic changes 
that poetry, and Western poetry in particular, has undergone since the nineteenth 
century, repetition remains a central characteristic of poetry. To intend to write a text 
eligible for membership in this tradition is, therefore, tantamount to intending it to 
acknowledge this central feature in some fashion, be it by following, transforming, or 
rejecting it. All other features commonly associated with poetry—profundity of 
subject matter, beauty, imagery, etc.—though they may be typical and even desirable 
ones, are not crucial to the poetic intention. This is not to say that they are not 
important: if a feature is typical, we will often read poems with attention to it. For 
instance, we often look to the symbolic significance of imagery and metaphors, since 
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these are common poetic traits. This, incidentally, reflects the way in which a 
tradition guides our experience of a work and the expectations we bring to it. 
 Since there are many kinds of repetition devices, it will be useful to sort these 
into categories or levels. I will sort them into two different groups, the first ‘abstract’ 
and the second ‘concrete’.53 Abstract types of repetition consist in patterns which can 
be filled in by any syllable, word, or lexical structure, so long as they satisfy the 
criteria for that type. Concrete types of repetition involve concrete sounds, from 
phonemes to entire words and sentences. Repetition at the abstract level may be of 
five kinds. There is repetition organized by foot patterns, so that, for example, a 
marked syllable recurs after an unmarked syllable (as in the iambic foot, whose 
marker in English is syllable stress, or accent). Foot structures are combined with 
repetition at the level of the line, which specifies how many times a foot recurs and 
thereby specifies line length54—in the iambic pentameter, the iamb recurs five times, 
creating a line of ten syllables (though elision and other poetic techniques allow line 
length to vary55). Lines in turn recur a certain number of times and thereby contribute 
to producing a stanza type (e.g., a ballad quatrain) and/or a poetic form (e.g., the 
haiku). Line structure repetition need not involve meter, however; it may consist, e.g., 
 
53 While there is nothing new in what I say here—we’ve long known what a foot is, for one—
I mean to bring to light the distinctions in kind among the various types of repetition that 
occur in poetry. Interestingly, it is mainly abstract types of repetition that have been 
transformed or abandoned in modern times. 
54 Of course, we talk about line length today, but this is a consequence of writing. We should 
think of the poetic line more abstractly than that, if we are right to speculate that such breaks 
were originally (in oral traditions) meant to signify greater pauses during performances; line 
breaks are therefore their written equivalents. 
55 In elision, syllables that could be counted separately are counted as a single syllable, as in 
‘prisoner’ (two rather than three syllables). Naturally, insofar as this is so, one may argue that 
a line that makes use of one elision still has ten syllables—ten poetic syllables, one might say. 
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in the repetition of a phrasal structure, as when each line must consist of a complete 
clause. 
Repetition at the concrete level, involving specific linguistic sounds rather 
than higher-level structures, may be of three kinds. It may be word-terminal, as in the 
repetition of sufficiently similar linguistic sounds at the end of a word and/or of a line 
at specified intervals that creates rhyme. The Spenserian sonnet, for example, has the 
rhyme scheme abab bcbc cdcd ee, where three interlocking quatrains are followed by 
a final couplet.56 There is also word-initial repetition, occurring at the beginnings of 
words, as in the repetition of consonant sounds (alliteration) and the repetition of 
vowel sounds (assonance). Finally, concrete-level repetition may involve the 
recurrence of specific words or phrases. The scheme below summarizes the various 
kinds of repetition I have noted here.57 
Abstract level: 
1. Foot (iamb, trochee, dactyl, bacchic, etc.). 
2. Meter (foot x # of recurrences = line length, as in dactylic hexameter). 
3. Line structure repetition (metrical and/or of a syntactic element, as in 
parallelism). 
4. Stanza (quatrain, tercet, couplet, etc.). 




i. Word-initial (alliteration, assonance). 
ii. Word-terminal (consonance, rhyme). 
 
56 The varieties of sonnet allow for different ways of conceiving of the stanzas. The original 
Petrarchan sonnet breaks the form down into an octet and a sestet, which in turn are divided 
into two quartets and two tercets respectively. 
57 I take it for granted that the reason why these kinds of repetition, and not others, have 
marked poetic cultures across the globe, is based on our psychology: how we process and are 
affected by sounds. But however cognitive psychology explains these facts, what matters for 
purposes of the definition I am offering is that, when we look at the history of poetry, what 
we see emerge everywhere is not the repetition of (again) the definite article, but rather the 
types of repetition catalogued here. Since this is what history shows us, and the definition 
calls for an intentional link to that history, then these are the relevant types of repetition, and 
not others. 
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6. Lexical or phrasal (anaphora, epistrophe, ploce, symploce, epanalepsis,
anadiplosis58). 
 
Given these varieties of repetition, I will distinguish poems as formally dense 
and formally sparse. I will call poems formally dense when they make use of 
repetition at most or all of the levels specified above. I will call poems formally 
sparse when they make use of repetition at only some of the levels specified. 
Consider the following two passages: 
When to the sessions of sweet silent thought The great thing 
I summon up remembrance of things past, is not having  
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,59 a mind. Feelings:60
The first three lines of Shakespeare’s thirtieth sonnet are as formally dense as a poem 
gets. At the abstract level, there is an accentual-syllabic metrical structure which 
specifies both how many syllables each line has (ten), how often the marked syllable 
recurs (every other unmarked syllable), and how end-line repetition is patterned (aba
rhyme). At the concrete level, there is the sibilant alliteration on ‘s’ three times in the 
first line, and recurring in the second line once and in the third line twice; alliteration 
also occurs on ‘th’ in every line (thought, things, thing); there is consonance and 
assonance in ‘thought’ and ‘sought’; and the first syllable of ‘silent’ in the first line is 
echoed by ‘sigh’ in the third. The predominantly sibilant sound of these first three 
lines is itself reminiscent of the sound a sigh makes, and so the poet makes us sigh 
with him upon reading the poem out loud. A closer reading is clearly rewarded by the 
 
58 The terms denote some of the ways in which words and phrases may be repeated at the 
beginning and/or end of a sentence or clause. I remind the reader that poetic and technical 
terms are highlighted when they first appear in the text to indicate that they are defined in the 
Glossary of Poetic Terms (Appendix I). 
59 Shakespeare, Sonnet 30. 
60 Louise Glück, ‘The Red Poppy’, from The Wild Iris (The Ecco Press, 1992). 
68
recognition of such a technique and its relation to the meaning conveyed as well as to 
its effect upon the reader. 
 In the first three lines of Glück’s ‘The Red Poppy’ we immediately notice the 
consonance on ‘ing’ at the end of each line, though the repetition does not echo as 
much as a rhyme traditionally does because of the short and enjambed lines; we read 
past the rhymes rather than stop at them, and so see here a poet working against 
tradition. We notice also that each line has only three words, and so are invited to 
look for the significance of that choice—for a thing so great, the line is unusually 
short—but one may presume that, not having a mind, one will perhaps have less to 
say! There are three nouns, ‘thing’, ‘mind’ and ‘feelings’, where the two ‘things’ are 
opposed to one another, although they are mentioned right next to one another in the 
same line. There are also two stressed syllables per line, in the first instance making 
up a regular bacchic meter ( ∪ ⁄ ⁄ ), but in the second and third lines a weak extra 
syllable at the end in ‘ing’ and ‘ings’ takes away that regularity. However, none of 
these things recur in the following lines of the poem—all the remaining lines are 
longer by at least one word, and the bacchic meter is dropped. Glück’s lines are 
formally sparse in comparison with Shakespeare’s; there is correspondingly less to 
work with in relating technique to poetic meaning and effect. This is not to say that 
Glück’s poem is less satisfying than Shakespeare’s (I, personally, like it a great deal); 
my point was to exemplify formal density and sparseness and how the different levels 
of repetition work on a reader and relate to poetic meaning. Glück evidently writes in 
a style that is her own and does not conform to traditional norms. A reader’s 
experience of her poems is enriched by that awareness, which may lead the reader to 
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seek out Glück’s own way of producing meaning in her works. Nevertheless, as I 
have shown, the use of repetition is still present in that work. 
 The Western poetic tradition has undergone considerable changes since the 
mid-nineteenth century. It was around that time that poets began to let go of 
traditional poetic topics (classical myths, religious stories and experiences, bucolic 
love) and explore new ones (personal and national identity, the consequences of war 
for society and the individual, issues of abuse, oppression, and social conventions). 
Notably, poets at the same time began to move away from closed forms and 
traditional formal devices, which were now viewed as arbitrary impositions serving 
only to stifle personal artistic expression. We now begin to see poems written in 
nonce-forms created to suit particular poetic purposes, and poems that avoid line-
terminal rhyme schemes. Indeed, we even begin to see poems that avoid line-breaks 
altogether, as in the somewhat oxymoronic ‘prose poem’ made famous by Charles 
Baudelaire.61 
All these changes notwithstanding, one thing has not disappeared entirely 
from poetry: repetition. Even in the prose poem, where line breaks themselves are 
absent, internal rhyme remains, and alliteration and assonance predominate—perhaps 
to make up for the absence of explicit end-line rhymes. In early free verse, 
spearheaded in the English-speaking world by Walt Whitman, anaphora, or the 
repetition of words and phrases at the beginnings of lines becomes a marked feature. I 
 
61 The story goes that Baudelaire’s friend Aloysius Bertrand invented the prose poem with the 
express intention of contradicting the strictures of French neoclassicism, whose criteria to 
distinguish poetry from prose included, most centrally, its being written in verse, i.e., with 
line breaks( Mary Ann Caws (1993) 977f). 
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have highlighted the alliterations and the lexical and phrasal repetitions in the 
passages below, from Baudelaire and Walt Whitman respectively: 
Sous un grand ciel gris, dans une grande plaine poudreuse, sans chemins, 
sans gazon, sans un chardon, sans une ortie, je rencontrai plusieurs hommes 
qui marchaient courbés.62
Illustrious every one! 
Illustrious what we name space, sphere of unnumber’d spirits, 
Illustrious the mystery of motion in all beings, even the tiniest insect, 
Illustrious the attribute of speech, the senses, the body, 
Illustrious the passing light—illustrious the pale reflection on the new 
moon in the western sky, 
Illustrious whatever I see or hear or touch, to the last.63 
These techniques remain present in contemporary poetry, as in this passage from 
Susan Wheeler’s 2003 poem, ‘In Sky’: 
The girl presses out, inhales, still fills her seat not. 
The seat is an ink room, not-girl, apprehension.
The girl is mottled with self, with indecision.
The girl’s amethyst earrings window her eyes. 
The girl twirls her cape before the bull.64 
We see from the examples given in this section how Shakespeare was both following 
and helping cement a tradition with his sonnets; how Baudelaire and Bertrand were 
rejecting some aspects of their tradition while retaining others; how Whitman, as Ezra 
Pound wrote of him, ‘broke new wood’, which Pound himself and many others, 
including Glück and Wheeler, have been carving anew ever since. We have reached a 
stage where ‘following the tradition’ consists in doing what revolutionaries such as 
 
62 ‘Chacun sa chimère’ in Charles Baudelaire, Petits poèmes en prose et ouvres critiques 
(Paris:Librairie Larousse, 1965) p. 17. Ploce, or the repetition of the same word without 
change of meaning or grammatical category, with one or two words in between, is also 
evident in this passage with the word ‘sans’. 
63 ‘Song at Sunset’ (Songs of Parting) in Walt Whitman, The Works of Walt Whitman 
(Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1995), pp. 443. 
64 The Best American Poetry 2003, edited by Yusef Komuniakaa, Series editor David Lehman 
(New York: Scribner Poetry, 2003), p. 174. Note that both Whitman and Wheeler use 
repetition also at the abstract level of line structure, since each line is composed of a complete 
phrasal unit (in other words, there is no enjambment). 
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Whitman and Baudelaire were doing over a hundred years ago, so that what the 
poetry of writers such as Glück and Wheeler shows both a rejection of what came 
before these modern pioneers and a conformity to what they have established since. 
However we look at it, what has remained constant is a preoccupation with making 
language do more than its ordinary daily job by adding semantic and aesthetic 
dimensions to what is said by means of repetition devices. 
Remarkably, we find repetition schemes of the kinds catalogued in all poetries 
of the world, ancient and contemporary. One need not speak the languages in the 
following excerpts to see that all these poems include abstract patterning (line breaks, 
syllable-counting) and concrete repetitions (rhymes, alliteration, anaphora). There are 
also several types of parallelism, from interspersed matching line lengths to matching 




 (Opening lines of the Epic of Gilgamesh, in Sumerian65)
Llaxtay mana mama quchayux 
Rit’I Antin muyurisqa 
Q”apax Illimanin q”awarisqa 
Manatax surk’anniyux 
Manatax mama quchayux 
 (‘Mama qucha’ by Eustaquia Terceros ; in Quechua66)
Dhamiri imenifuga shingoni. 
Nami kama mbuzy nimefungwa 
Kwenye mti wa utu. Kamba ni fubi 
Na nimekwishachora duara. 
Majani niwezajo kufikia yote nimekula. 
 
65 D.D. Jones, ‘The Pulse of Creation: The Poetics of the Prologue to Ud-ri-a’. 1998-99 
Proceedings of the Red River Conference on World Literature Vol. 1,1998-99. North Dakota 
Sate U, Fargo, ND. Available online at http://www.ndsu.edu/RRCWL/V1/Creation1.html. 
66 Quechua is the ancient language of the Incas, spoken today by about eight million people in 
Peru, Bolívia and Ecuador. It is the most widely spoken Amerindian language. This and the 
following two excerpts are from Freire, Babel de Poemas, pp. 150, 144 and 132 respectively. 
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Ninaona majani mengi mbela yangu 
Lakini siwezi kuyakia: kamba, kamba. 
 (‘Dhamiri Yangu’, by Euphrase Kezilahabe, in Swahili) 
 
Aku ini binatang djalang 
Dari kunpulannja terbuang 
Biar peluru menembus kulitku 
Aku tetap meradang meradang menerdjang 
 (‘Aku’, by Chairil Anwar, in Indonesian) 
 
There are, as one might expect, variations from culture to culture, and over 
time within the same poetic tradition, in terms of what types of repetition 
predominate. Alliteration, for instance, is a significant feature in most poetries of the 
world, but it is not a marked feature of Arabic poetry. These variations are the result 
of many factors, perhaps the most important of which is the prosodic structure of the 
language in which they are written. Clear evidence of this connection is the change 
from alliterative verse to accentual-syllabic verse in English poetry, a change 
consequent upon the transition from Old English (Anglo-Saxon) to Modern English. 
It is important to note that the list given here is not meant to be exhaustive. Other 
types of recurrence patterns have emerged, and other may still emerge. The kinds 
listed, however, predominate; a contingent, though not accidental, circumstance ( I 
will return to this in the following sections). 
The ubiquity of repetition in poetry across millennia and around the globe is 
considerable evidence for the claim that a concern with repetition is integral to the 
poetic intention. So, I propose, to intend that my text belong in that tradition is to 
intend that it be made with a concern for those schemes; this may occur directly 
(transparent or intrinsic intentions), indirectly (opaque or relational intentions), or 
both (mixed intentions). (Again, note that composing with repetition schemes in mind 
does not mean one ought to be able to expostulate, e.g., on what kind of meter or 
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rhyme one has used.) Concern with repetition can be shown by following the tradition 
(say, composing in traditional forms), transforming the tradition (using repetition but 
altering forms or creating new ones, etc.), or rejecting that tradition (avoiding 
traditional forms, avoiding certain types of repetition techniques—say metrical 
patterns of any sort—or, most radically, avoiding repetition altogether). Alternatively, 
in cases of verbal art created outside and without awareness of any poetic tradition 
(‘naïve’ poetry), a poem will be a  verbal art object made with the use of repetition 
schemes; in such cases only intrinsic intentions involving recurrence are needed for a 
poem to obtain. We can now revisit the definition of poetry given earlier, and expand 
the poetic intention: 
A poem is either (1) a verbal art object relationally or intrinsically intended 
to belong in the poetic tradition, by following, transforming, or rejecting the 
repetition techniques that have characterized that tradition (non-naïve poetry-
making), or (2) a verbal art object intrinsically intended to involve use of 
repetition schemes (naïve poetry-making). 
 
Naturally, a poetic text, like any text, is intended to be and do other things as well: be 
about the plight of urban laborers or move readers to joy; be composed in colloquial 
language or show erudition of vocabulary. But whatever its characteristics in these 
and other regards, whether a text is formally structured or in free verse, whether its 
repetition patterns occur at the abstract level of meter or the concrete level of lexical 
recurrence, a text is poetic insofar as it is intentionally linked to previous poems 
directly (relational intentions), indirectly (intrinsic intentions) or, more typically, 
both. Moreover, intentions that are transparent or intrinsic—which will be formal 
intentions focused on repetition—may also be ‘naïve’, that is, lack awareness of the 
poetic tradition (or of the existence of poems as such). This will account for instances 
such as those of the pioneer poet in a culture where the art does not yet exist and of 
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which there is no knowledge, and those of the Ur-poets of antiquity (I will return to 
this in the next chapter). Note that even the child’s first verses, unless the child has 
never been exposed to poetry, should count as at least minimally opaque. On the other 
hand, a child who simply answers with ‘Cool’ a teacher who asks ‘What rhymes with 
pool?’ is not thereby creating poetry, since he is not thereby creating art. That is, 
although one may argue that there is at least a minimal concern with a certain type of 
repetition scheme in such a situation (namely, rhyme), there is no overarching artistic 
intention at work; there are communicative, rather than art-making intentions. So 
naïve poetry making intentions may be of two sorts: general art conscious, or general 
art conscious. In the first case, I intend x as art, but am unaware that I am also 
creating poetry, via intrinsic poetic intentions. In the second case, I intend x to be 
regarded in ways that, as it turns out, art has correctly been intended to be regarded 
(assuming a Levinsonian art-intention) and, again, x is created by means of intrinsic 
poetic intentions. 
In most cases poetic intentions will be a mixture of opaque and transparent 
ones, since in most cases they will occur within the context of a culture that has a 
poetic tradition. On the other hand, instances of purely opaque intentions where the 
author fails to zero in on the properties of the works that guide her creation (e.g. she 
fails to see that what they all have in common is the use of recurrence schemes) will 
nevertheless result in the creation of a poem, since her intentions are guided by poems 
and her work is thus intentionally linked to them. In other words, relational intentions 
trump intrinsic ones, and relational intentions always involve awareness of a 
(historically constituted) set as a set, even if that awareness does not involve 
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(accurate, comprehensive) knowledge of the properties that make its members, 
members of that set; nor, naturally, need it involve acquaintance with all of its 
members. 
 This also explains the right of iconoclastic poets to claim, for instance, that the 
next twenty words they utter will be a poem. We should note, first, that their 
intentions are internal to the poetic tradition—they could not be revolutionary 
otherwise—and, second, that they are mixed with intrinsic intentions to reject that 
tradition in specific ways. Even if the acceptance of such ‘poems’ rubs against our 
pre-theoretical intuitions and makes little claim on our appreciation, their rejection 
would come only at the cost of theoretical consistency. Revolutionary poetic 
intentions such as these are fully accountable by the intrinsic and relational varieties 
of poetic intention, and as such they stake a claim to acceptance, however marginal 
their position in the poetic set may be. 
In the interests of exploring these and other difficult cases, in the following 
section I will consider (1) whether repetition of the sorts outlined is the prerogative of 
poets; relatedly, (2) whether its boundaries are not blurred when, in other literary 
practices, writers make use of repetition devices; (3) whether a concern with 
repetition must be part of poetry; and (4) whether some other typical feature of poetry 
could not (or even should not) have done the job. 
 
vi. Challenges 
I have been arguing that the poetic intention centrally involves the concern 
with repetition techniques, and I have shown that such techniques mark the 
development and history of poetry in every culture that has a poetic tradition. We 
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must be careful to note that this does not prevent the use of such techniques by writers 
of stories, novels, and essays; by journalists, advertising copywriters, and, indeed, by 
all the speakers of a language. Language is the prerogative of all its speakers and they 
may use it as they will. There are countless examples of typically poetic devices 
being used in TV commercials and prose fiction, in news articles and philosophical 
essays. Alliteration, for one, is a constant feature in commercial advertisements and, 
in English at any rate, more or less regular iambs emerge everywhere, as in the 
mundane but perfectly regular ‘I’ll go and fetch the keys’; but that does not make us 
walking Shakespeares. A small sample should suffice to make this salient: 
Dunkin’Donuts (brand name; alliteration, troche) 
 
Verizon Broadband: Richer. Deeper. Broader. (web advertisement; rhyme, parallelism, 
iamb to trochee) 
 
‘U.N. Report on Zimbabwe Slams Slum Destruction’ (New York Times news article, 
7/22/05; alliteration) 
 
‘A word, a smile, a tender touch, / little things that say so much. 
The thousand little thoughtful things / you do each day to please,  
the way you rub my shoulders / or give my hand a squeeze...’ (Hallmark greeting card; 
iambic tetrameter followed by trimeter, initial couplet followed by alternate rhyme) 
 
‘But oh, those Polaroid babies / taking chances with rabies, 
happy to tear me to bits— / well, I’m calling it quits’ (‘Calling it Quits’, song by Aimee 
Mann; heptameter couplets) 
 
‘Ao passar pela Glória, Camilo olhou para o mar, estendeu os olhos para fora, até onde a 
água e o céu dão um abraço infinito, e teve assim uma sensação do futuro, longo, longo, 
interminável.’ (‘A Cartomante’, short story by Machado de Assis; syntactical parallelism, 
lexical repetition) 
 
‘Pour moi, je n’ai jamais présumé que mon esprit fût en rien plus parfait que ceux du 
commun; même j’ai souvent souhaité d’avoir la pensée aussi prompte, ou l’imagination 
aussi nette et distincte ou la mémoire aussi ample ou aussi présente, que quelques autres.’ 
(Descartes’ Discourse on Method, Part I; alliteration, parallelism, lexical repetition)  
 
The appearance of repetition patterns in non-poetic language does not efface 
the important intentional-historical difference between poetry and everyday language, 
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advertisements, and other forms of writing, literary and otherwise. Consider the 
various examples above. Although the intention to create a catchy brand name or 
advertisement, a saccharine birthday card, or a literary or philosophical prose piece 
may involve the intention to use repetition devices typical of poetry, it need not do so. 
The greeting card ‘tradition’, for instance, is parasitic on several other pre-existing 
practices, such as aphorisms and jokes; moreover, some greeting cards are blank. 
There is nothing unusual in blank, aphoristic, or humorous cards where no repetition 
device is present. The fact that there is nothing unusual in these alternatives tells us 
something important about these and the other practices exemplified in these 
passages, and about the intentions involved in the creation of these works. In other 
words, it is not a necessary condition of greeting cards (or advertisements, or novels, 
or philosophical essays) that they be made with repetition schemes. Nevertheless, 
when they do so, are they a fortiori poems? According to the present view, no: the 
categorial intention in such cases—a relational intention—is to create a greeting card 
(an advertisement, a novel, a philosophical essay), not a poem. Recall moreover that 
poetic intentions are embedded within an overall artistic intention, however we may 
wish to construe it (and I am assuming a Levinsonian kind of art intention). In light of 
this constraint, greeting cards, advertisements, and philosophical essays are 
automatically excluded. The presence of an overarching art intention is nevertheless 
perfectly compatible with the idea of using one’s art as a means to fulfill a non-
artistic goal. Let us assume, for instance, that when Milton wrote Paradise Lost he 
intended his epic to work (also) as a treatise and influence his readers’ religious 
views. In a case such as this, the writer intends his work as art and also as a religious 
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treatise. What distinguishes Milton’s epic from a greeting card written in verse is the 
presence of an art intention in the former case but not in the latter. Whereas every 
poetic intention is also an art intention, every verse intention is not: it may, for 
instance, be an advertisement or a  
greeting card intention. 
Novels, however, are also art. Consider a writer who intended to be writing a 
novel, but wrote the entire text in iambs. This author, in my view, indeed wrote a 
novel. His non-poetic categorial intention overrides the evident concern with 
repetition which might mislead us to identify the work as a poem.67 This, again, 
relates to the historical traditions different literary forms belong to. A concern with 
repetition is not a feature central to the tradition of the novel (or of the short story, or 
of the literary essay), and so an intention to write a novel need not be one in which 
the use of that feature figures prominently. Moreover, as was the case with the 
greeting card, appreciators would not be surprised not to find iambs in a novel. 
 Recalling the three ways in which poetic concern with repetition may manifest 
itself (following, transforming, or rejecting a tradition) may be illuminating in this 
regard. Consider an early twentieth-century English-speaking poet who avoids the 
type of repetition involved in, say, meter and rhyme. Now compare a contemporary 
novelist who does the same. Clearly these two writers are engaged in very dissimilar 
artistic projects. We would rightly see the poet as subverting an established tradition 
of metrical lines and rhyming schemes. In the case of the novelist, there is absolutely 
 
67 However, if there were line breaks, even if uneven ones (line breaks may be governed by 
syntactic integrity, number of syllables, etc.), readers would be right to call it an epic poem, a 
narrative written in verse. This author should not be surprised if his readership failed to 
categorize his work correctly. But it may also be that this author is attempting to invent a new 
literary category. 
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nothing subversive in his avoidance of repetition schemes, and readers would not 
notice the absence of such patterning. That is because repetition devices are not 
central features of that category, and so are irrelevant in the construal of intentions to 
follow, transform, or reject it, being also typically of no concern in appreciation. We 
may find prose writers ‘appropriating’ what are typical poetic devices and perhaps 
even metrically perverse ‘iambic novelists’ (or filmmakers: the entire dialogue in 
Sally Potter’s ‘Yes’ (2005) is in iambic pentameter68). As a rule, however, we do not 
find in prose (or film) the attention to those devices evinced in every line of their 
work: they are occasional. In a poem, by contrast, concern with repetition techniques 
typically is present in every line, and is often down to the phonemes. The poetic 
intention makes that concern central and constant, not secondary and occasional, and 
appreciators would be right to attend to their presence as much as to their absence. 
 These differences being granted, how are we to handle song lyrics such as 
Aimee Mann’s above? Here, and in most lyrics, a concern with repetition appears to 
be central. It will not help to say that in lyrics the types of repetition are generally 
hackneyed and uninspired, invariably involve end-rhymes, and ones that a listener 
can often guess in advance (though occasionally a songwriter such as Mann will 
come around and conjoin babies and rabies). Not all poetry is innovative and inspired. 
What we must note is rather that lyrics are written for songs—the intention behind 
them is to write song lyrics, not poems. There is a musical dimension that not only is 
always present, it often is what guides the songwriting as well. It is true that 
 
68 Anthony Lane delivers a delightful critique of it—entirely in verse—in the 27 June 2005 
issue of the New Yorker.
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sometimes a text originally written as a poem will be set to music. Still, in such cases 
what we have is a poem set to music, not a song lyric. 
 Must repetition be part of poetry, nevertheless? Some poets have taken their 
rejection of the poetic tradition to such extremes that fitting their works into the 
category of poetry becomes a challenge. This is especially true of the literature of the 
various avant-garde modernist movements of the early twentieth century, such as 
futurism, surrealism, Dada, and concrete poetry. Surrealism and Dada championed 
automatic writing, thereby challenging the idea of a conscious poetic intention. A yet 
more irreverent Dada recipe for composing a poem was to ‘cut up a newspaper piece, 
shake the words in a bag, and reassemble them in the order they are removed’.69 More 
typically, ‘writers’ of the objet trouvé or ‘found poem’ left aside the shaking and 
simply broke the found prose passages into verses, as in the following excerpt from 
Daniel Langton’s ‘What We Did’, whose words are from the January 1967 report of 
the San Francisco Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals: 
22 cases involving 
22 large animals 
reported to the office 
or located by officers 
 
Horses: sick or injured, 5; 
stray, 2; 
overridden, 15.70 
As is generally the case with free verse, found poetry exploits the natural rhythms of a 
language; what this often amounts to are lines whose length corresponds to complete 
 
69 Anna Balakian, ‘Dada’, The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, edited by 
A. Preminger and T.V.F. Brogan (New York: MJF Books, 1993), p. 269. 
70 Barbara Drake, Writing Poetry. Second edition (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1994), 
p. 157. 
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phrases or clauses, as seen in Langton’s reconstruction.71 As is the case with found art 
objects, in the case of found poems it is the intentions of the finder that establish the 
text’s status as a poem. 
Concrete poetry and futurism emphasized the visual aspect of typography and 
championed pattern poems and poem-pictures respectively, the latter perhaps a 
genuine hybrid art form (in ‘Il pleut’, one of his calligrammes, Apollinaire placed the 
lines almost vertically on the page, each letter placed as the typographic symbolic 
equivalent of a raindrop). Futurism also promoted onomatopoeia and sound-poems, 
which could consist of made-up words, declared in advance to have no meaning (so 
that all that mattered was how they sounded), or sometimes entirely of vowels, as in a 
couple of poems by the Russian futurist Aleksej Kručenyx.72 Yet no one is likely to 
outdo Vasilisk Gnedov, another Russian futurist, whose ‘Poema konca’ (Poem of the 
End) consists ‘of a blank page performed with a silent gesture of resignation’.73 
For all their revolutionary zest, the modernists have all intended to write or 
perform poetry, and repetition remains a frequent feature of modernist poems. In 
Dada and Surrealism, for example, the call for automatic writing does not entail that 
the stream of words will be one where no word is repeated, as is evident in André 
Breton’s 1922 ‘Lâchez tout’: 
71  Notice also how Langdon breaks the lines so as to ‘create’ patterns of recurrence, as in ‘22’ 
in the beginning of the first two lines, ‘office’ and ‘officers’ at the end of the third and fourth, 
and adjectives followed by numbers in the remaining three. The first two lines are each 
composed of three words, totaling eight and seven syllables respectively, while lines three 
and four are composed of four words each, with seven and eight syllables respectively; this is 
a variation on the ballad stanza. There is, in addition, parallelism in ‘reported’ and ‘located’, 
and in ‘injured’, ‘stray’, and ‘overridden’. 




Lâchez tout. Drop everything. 
Lâchez Dada. Drop Dada. 
Lâchez votre femme. Drop your wife. 
Lâchez votre maîtresse. Drop your mistress. 
Lâchez vos espérances et vos craintes. Drop your hopes and fears. 
Semez vos enfants au coin d'un bois. Scatter your children in a corner of the 
woods. 
Lâchez la proie pour l'ombre. Drop the prey for the shadow. 
Lâchez au besoin une vie aisée, Drop if necessary the easy life, 
 ce qu'on vous donne pour  What is presumed to be a life with a 
promising 
 une situation d'avenir. future. 
Partez sur les routes. Hit the road. 
 
One may, and with good reason, balk at poems such as those of Gnedov and 
Kručenyx, however. In the case of Kručenyx, how can a text with nonsense words 
count as a poem at all, or even as literature? It seems clearly to flout the ‘verbal’ 
object criterion stipulated in my definition. Works such as these are, admittedly, at the 
fringe. But I think the intentional-historical formalism offered here is still capable of 
accommodating them. Kručenyx’s meaningless-word- and all-vowel-poems may not 
be in any intelligible language, but I would not say that they are not verbal. The 
symbols he uses are, after all, linguistic and not, say, geometric or logical. They are 
letters that could be uttered, even if they mean nothing in any existing language. That 
they can be uttered is a fact of importance in the construal of Kručenyx’s poetic 
intentions. His poems are, undoubtedly, subverting a tradition. But inasmuch as he 
eschews everything, including meaning, in his poetry, and holds on only to repeated 
sounds, we may read his works as an attempt to distill poetry to what he takes to be 
its essence—patterned linguistic sounds (perhaps this is the closest poetry can get to 
absolute music!). In the process, one might argue, Kručenyx also shows us that the 
types of repetition he rejects, those involving meaningful sounds, are the ones worth 
preserving. 
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Gnedov’s ‘Poema Konca’ poses a yet greater problem for a definition such as 
mine. Imagine a writer who intended to write a poem by following Gnedov’s piece 
(i.e. by means of an opaque/relational intention, guided by the work to which it is 
linked). What properties would she have to follow? A blank page—how is that a 
poem, and one that can inform the writerly intentions of those guided by it? If a writer 
is to intend her work to belong to a tradition by intending it to be ‘like those works 
called ‘poems’’ when the poems guiding her intention have already rejected 
everything that characterized that tradition, then won’t the properties that once 
centrally characterized that tradition no longer inform her intentions, and likewise 
those of the writers who follow her? If that is the case, then repetition will play no 
more than a contingent role in a definition of poetry.74 Indeed, even the use of words 
would seem to be nonessential: an aspirant poet could change the oil in her car, call 
that activity ‘Symphony #4’, and claim it is a poem, one guided by Gnedov’s ‘Poem 
of the End’.75 At least two avenues of response are open. 
 The first is to place ‘Poema Konca’ in another category, claiming that it is a 
performance about poetry, but not itself a poem, in the way that John Cage’s ‘4’33”’, 
though about music, is not music.76 This would remove Gnedov’s work from the set 
of poems and enable the historical link to remain undisturbed. It would, in addition, 
make the hypothetical works above not poems, insofar as they would bear no 
intentional connection to any poems. This does seem to resolve the problem, but in 
 
74 I thank Berys Gaut for bringing this difficulty to my attention. 
75 I thank an anonymous referee of the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism for this 
example. 
76 I thank David Davies for calling my attention to the possibility of adapting a position 
defended by Stephen Davies in ‘John Cage’s 4’33’’: Is It Music?’, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 75 (1997): 449-62. 
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my view it does so at the cost of arbitrariness and inconsistence with the theory as it 
stands. If what grounds the definition of poetry is the intention to make one’s work a 
poem, then on what basis do we discard Gnedov’s intention (and those of his 
followers)? True, Gnedov is, we may assume, trying to tell us something about
poetry, perhaps even about what he takes to be its essence. But that is not what makes 
his poem different from other, more traditional poems. Many poets have written about 
poetry. Gnedov is rejecting a tradition, but inserting his work in it in the process. He 
did not call it ‘Painting of the End’, or ‘Song of the End’, but ‘Poem of the End’: i.e., 
he was aware of the tradition to which he was responding. 
 The other alternative is to acknowledge that Gnedov’s work is, indeed, a 
poem, since connected to poems via Gnedov’s relational and intrinsic poetic 
intentions, and to note that a writer whose poetic intentions are guided by his ‘Poema 
Konca’ would be guided by this work as it belongs in and is connected to the history 
that made it possible: they would consequently be creating poems as well. This 
enables us to do justice to Gnedov’s poetic intentions and to insert it in the tradition 
wherein it belongs. Poets guided by his work would not be guided by it as if it existed 
in a vacuum, but as it exists in its historical context; arguably, one could not even 
recognize Gnedov’s work as a poem outside of it. They may therefore choose to 
follow Gnedov in his radicalism—which, again, cannot be understood as such outside 
of its context—or choose to reclaim some or all of the features he himself rejected. 
The proposal to define poetry on the basis of an intentional-historical formalism, 
together with the various ways in which the poetic intention can manifest itself, is 
thus capable of accommodating such extreme cases, along with the traditional ones. 
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It is true that this approach is a liberal one, and that relational poetic intentions 
virtually cannot fail on this view. But this is as it should be, if we are to leave room 
open for novel ways of belonging to a tradition or a category. We may wish to create 
a subcategory of ‘performance poems’ to accommodate ‘Poema Konca’ and the 
hypothetical ‘Symphony #4’, if we want to highlight the differences between those 
and more traditional poems. However we choose to proceed, it is important to note 
that, insofar as intentions, in general, may fail to be realized, poetic intentions may 
fail as well. The hypothetical poet could, for instance, fail to realize her intention to 
perform a poem by changing the oil in her car (she could, for instance, accidentally 
drop the can of oil just before her intended performance). Gnedov could have 
forgotten what kind of gesture he wished to use to symbolize finality, or he could 
have been inebriated and tripped on his way to the stage. So we should rather say that 
successfully realized poetic intentions have a virtual guarantee of resulting in the 
production of a poem (or a performance poem, in some cases).77 The result may be 
ephemeral, and appreciators may find the poetic endeavor pathetic and aesthetically 
unsatisfying, or ingenious and witty. However, even if such borderline works are to 
be placed on the fringe of the category, we should recall that they are still intended as 
art, and as such, however minimally, will still bear an intentional connection to the 
type of art under which they are conceived. 
 Nevertheless, when we think about poetry we also rightly think of similes, 
metaphors, imagery, and the several other characteristics Pierce considered and 
rejected in the essay mentioned earlier in this paper. Why should the poetic intention 
not be guided by these, also prevalent, features? Although a concern with tropes may 
 
77 See Livingston (2005) for a discussion of successfully realized intentions. 
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and often does accompany poetic intentions, this concern is not, I would argue, 
properly called poetic, but rather literary. The reason for this is that, although tropes 
and other literary devices may occur more frequently in poems, they are also relevant 
traits of other types of verbal art, and so cannot perform the role I have here accorded 
to repetition. They are relevant in the creation of other types of literature (that is, they 
will inform literary intentions), and they are also relevant in the appreciation of other 
types of literature (that is, they will inform the interpretation and the evaluation of a 
literary work). It is equally noteworthy for a poet to avoid metaphors, or to use only 
cliché ones, as it is for a novelist to do so. So while it is true that, typically, an 
author’s poetic intentions will involve concern for imagery, symbolism, metaphors 
and other tropes, and so on (even if it does so by avoiding the use of these rhetorical 
devices altogether), this will not characterize her work insofar as it is poetry; it will 
characterize her work insofar as it is verbal art in general. Concern with all those 
features characterizes literary intentions; concern with repetition devices characterizes 
poetic intentions. Poems can and have been made without imagery, without 
metaphors, and so on. As A.E. Housman has noted, ‘Simile and metaphor [are] things 
inessential to poetry.’78 The same may be said of the other tropes. So what I have said 
about poetic intention and repetition cannot likewise be said of those other features 
commonly found in poetry. 
 
vii. Identification and Evaluation 
 Inasmuch as poems may be written with or (rarely) without repetition devices, 
and with or without similes and metaphors, the question of how we identify poems in 
 
78 A.E. Housman, The Name and Nature of Poetry (New York: The MacMillan Company, 
1933), pp. 10f.
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practice naturally emerges. This question, it is important to note, is to be 
distinguished from the issue of definition.79 Readers or listeners may hypothesize that 
a text was intended to be a poem on the basis of textual evidence. This evidence may 
come in the form of use of repetition devices or any other typical poetic features. 
Perhaps line breaks are the only clue a reader needs, or the only one she finds to 
justify her categorization. Perhaps there are striking metaphors and imagery; perhaps 
there are rhymes. Appreciators may hypothesize to categorial poetic intentions on the 
basis of many features besides concern with repetition devices and correctly identify 
poems. But this does not mean that a reader will always sort the poems from the non-
poems infallibly. Identification can be tricky and we can be mistaken in very radical, 
novel or borderline cases. There is room for misidentification, and that reflects the 
way things are—as in the case of the janitor who mistakenly cleaned away an 
installation piece in an art gallery. This incident is amusing but clear evidence that 
what defines x and how we recognize instances of x are two different issues. A poem 
does not cease to be a poem because we fail to identify it as such. Perhaps others in 
the future will be more attuned to its poetic properties—perhaps others in the past 
have been. On the other hand, a poet may fail in various ways and for various 
 
79 This is not to say that they are not related. See, e.g., Gregory Currie, ‘A Note on Art and 
Historical Concepts’, British Journal of Aesthetics 40: 1 (2000), pp. 186-190, as well as 
Jeffrey T. Dean, ‘The Nature of Concepts and the Definition of Art’, Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 61:1 (2003), pp. 29-35 and Thomas Adajian, ‘On the Prototype Theory of 
Concepts and the Definition of Art’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63:3 (2005), pp. 
231-236. My attempts here are not to offer an account of our psychological concept ‘poetry’ 
(which would involve how we identify, correctly or incorrectly, poems), but to offer a 
definition of poetry. See also Georges Rey, ‘Concepts and Conceptions: A Reply to Smith, 
Medin and Ripps’, Cognition 19: 3 (1985), pp. 297-303, reprinted in Concepts: Core 
Readings, ed. Stephen Lawrence and Eric Margolis (MIT Press, 2000) and ‘Philosophical 
Analysis as Cognitive Psychology: The Case of Empty Concepts’, chapter 3 of the Handbook 
of Categorization in Cognitive Science, edited by Henri Cohen and Claire Lefebvre (Elsevier 
Science, 2005). 
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reasons; we may accordingly either identify her text as ‘not a poem’, or even not a 
piece of literary art, or recognize it as a poor instance of one. 
Given the central role I have accorded to repetition, one may naturally ask 
what consequences my definition might have for how we understand our experience 
of reading or listening to poems and the related question of how we evaluate them. 
For instance, given this view, would a poem with just one repetition be necessarily 
aesthetically deficient, and a poem with many repetitions necessarily aesthetically 
superior? I think such a conclusion would be misguided for two reasons. First, 
consider an analogy with painting. Color is essential to painting, but it is not because 
it has more or fewer colors that we find a painting more or less rewarding 
aesthetically. Examples of paintings that are nothing but monochromatic squares 
abound, and that so many instances of them exist may be taken as evidence 
(admittedly not conclusive) that aesthetic rewards are to be gained from them. The 
situation is the same with poetry. One repetition (say, an alliteration) well-placed is 
worth more than many repetitions poorly chosen. Bear in mind the different levels at 
which repetition may occur: poems written in closed forms are typically more 
saturated with repetition, so they have (at least in principle) more levels at which to 
promote and reward aesthetic attention. So the definition offered, while not value-
based, provides a criterion for evaluation: a critic may evaluate the quality of a poem 
on the basis of (among other things) how repetition devices were handled in it—skill 
in handling a stanzaic form, novelty in creating new ways of manipulating a metrical 
structure or in creating new ones, and so on. Repetition is indeed something we 
typically attend to as readers of poems, and it partly explains why second and third 
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readings are rewarded: expectation of (richer, different) aesthetic reward. That we 
take a distinct attitude toward poetic texts, in contrast to the attitude we typically take 
to other kinds of texts such as literary narratives and journalistic essays, has been 
corroborated by studies on metaphor. Gerard Steen (1994: 64-75) has shown that the 
same text yields more metaphors to readers who are previously told it is a piece of 
literature than to those who are told it is a journalistic piece. In an informal 
experiment, I have found this to be true of repetition as well: the same passage, 
categorized for one group as poetry and for another as prose, yielded a greater 
number of instances and kinds of repetition for those readers who were told it was a 
poem than for those who were told it was a prose passage.80 But formal density and 
skill alone will not make a poem more aesthetically pleasing (or a better poem) than a 
non-formal poem. This brings me to my second reason why we should not subscribe 
to that conclusion. 
 On pain of stating the obvious, repetition is only one aesthetic dimension of 
poetry: a formal dimension. Insofar as it is verbal art, poetry is naturally more than 
form. Interesting, illuminating metaphors and similes are another source of aesthetic 
pleasure, as are the choices of words in general and what the poem conveys as a 
whole, whether it could be captured in a proposition, or is instead a general feeling or 
state of mind that could not be so captured. The debate over whether what a poem 
 
80 As I acknowledge, this was an informal experiment and I do not claim my results to be 
‘scientific’. I conducted the experiment via e-mail with two groups of ten people, half male 
and half female, half native speakers of English and half non-native but fluent speakers. I e-
mailed them the following passage from J.D. McClatchy’s ‘Jihad’, taking away the line 
breaks for the prose passage readers: ‘A contrail’s white scimitar unsheathes/Above the tufts 
of anti-aircraft fire./Before the mullah’s drill on righteousness,/Practice rocks are hurled at 
chicken-wire//Dummies of tanks with silhouetted infidels/Defending the nothing both sides 
fight over/In God’s name, a last idolatry/Of boundaries. The sirens sound: take cover.’ In The 
Best American Poetry 2003, p. 120. 
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conveys or evokes can be paraphrased is immaterial to the present point. So a poem 
with many instances of those features which inform the poetic intention—repetition 
schemes—and few or no instances of what characterizes literature in general—
interesting diction, imagery, symbolism, the use of tropes—is unlikely to have any 
claims to aesthetic superiority over another composed in the opposite manner. 
What is not immaterial is the historical development of poetry since the 
various modernist movements just discussed. It is remarkable how the spirit behind 
these movements has endured, even if the movements themselves have faded into 
history. The new formal possibilities that Dada, surrealism, and futurism opened up 
for poetry, literature, and the arts in general, together with the revolutionary idea of 
art as a means of individual expression and a force for societal change, a source of 
novelty and a means to explore the unknown, were unthinkable prior to the late 
nineteenth century and yet today they pervade the way we think about art. On the less 
salutary side, however, modernism also created the misguided impression that in art 
‘anything goes’. But a blank page backed up by a manifesto has substance to it—even 
if it is to be found in nothingness— whereas a blank page offered in no awareness of 
its artistic purpose is unlikely to count as anything. 
Still, after a blank page, where can poetry go but back? There is a reason why 
these movements were ephemeral even if the spirit behind them has lived on. Once all 
the radical possibilities were explored, poets had to go back to grappling with their 
medium: meaningful sounds. And this has meant a return to grappling with the 
possibilities of repetition. It is perhaps not a coincidence that, in poetry as in music, 
those who have been trained in the classical tradition have been as a rule the most 
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successful in breaking new ground. As W.H. Auden remarked, free verse requires ‘an 
infallible ear’, and a well-trained ear is less likely to fail. So while repetition is not the 
only aesthetic dimension of poetry, it is a central one, and a poet is a writer who, 
among other things, is attuned to the possibilities of linguistic sound. Most likely, a 
poem that avoided repetition of any sort would turn out to be aesthetically deficient—
a poem that would offer readers fewer aesthetic rewards. This is not to say that we 
should measure the aesthetic value of a work solely by the aesthetic pleasure it may 
produce in those who engage with it, or even aesthetic pleasure solely by the quantity 
and quality of formal devices. But surely aesthetic value and aesthetic pleasure, and 
likewise aesthetic pleasure and the formal dimensions of an artwork, are related, 
difficult as it may be to specify the particularities of those relations. 
 
viii. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I outlined the difficulties involved in arriving at a satisfactorily 
encompassing definition of poetry and considered two recent attempts to define the 
poetic art (Pierce 2003, Sartwell 1991). In view of the shortcomings of those theories, 
I have suggested a new approach to defining poetry. This approach adapted the 
intentional-historical definition of art proposed and defended in Levinson 1979, 1989, 
1993 and 2002. Having sketched an outline of that view, I then proposed some 
modifications to it in order to accommodate its transfer from a definition of art in 
general to a definition of poetry in particular. In view of the history of poetry, the 
crucial revision I argued for is that the poetic intention be also grounded in an 
intrinsic feature of a candidate poem rather than solely in relational ones. The one 
feature seen to mark poetic traditions over time and across cultures is the concern 
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with repetition devices, or patterns of recurrence. For that reason I argued that an 
intentional-historical definition of poetry must make a reference to such devices. I 
therefore argued for an intentional-historical formalist view of poetry according to 
which a poem is either a  verbal art object relationally or intrinsically intended to 
belong in the poetic tradition, by following, transforming, or rejecting the repetition 
techniques that have characterized that tradition (non-naïve poetry-making), or a  
verbal art object intrinsically intended to involve use of repetition schemes (naïve 
poetry-making). Various examples were given to show that non-naïve poetic 
intentions may take the form of following an established tradition, transforming it, or 
rejecting it in order to create something new. 
 I then considered some difficulties one could raise for my view. These center 
around the possibility that some other poetic feature might better deserve the role I 
accorded to repetition and the challenges created by poets who avoid repetition (or 
words!) altogether and prose writers who make extensive use of it. Recalling that this 
is ultimately an intentional, and not a purely formalist view, and that other poetic 
features are categorically and critically relevant to verbal art forms in general and not 
only to poetry, I showed objections of this sort to be without force. 
An intentional-historical view is a backward-looking one and, as such, it 
naturally raises the question of the very first poems, just as it raised the issue of the 
very first artworks in general for Levinson. I have argued that naïve poets and first 
poets would be poets only by means of transparent intentions to create  verbal art 
objects where the use of repetition schemes is paramount, inasmuch as one cannot 
follow, transform or reject traditions of which one is not aware, or which do not yet 
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exist. This moves us in the direction of a pure formalism to characterize Ur-poems. 
To put it briefly and somewhat simplistically, I suggest we may characterize Ur-
poems as versified language made to serve various purposes: religious rituals, war 
songs, histories, and so on. Gradually, artistic purposes came to predominate. It is 
orthogonal to this proposal how such artistic purposes are characterized—whether in 
terms of expression, art-regards, the promotion of aesthetic experiences, or something 
else. While a pure formalism would be philosophically problematic in explaining 
poetry today, it is a matter of historical fact that it characterized the beginnings of 
poetry. We may recall that poetry and music emerged together, and that the early 
words for poetry in various languages indicate ‘making’ or ‘artifice’ (e.g. poiesis, in 
Greek) or ‘song’ (shi, or word-song, in Chinese; mele, air or melody, in Greek, 
besides, of course, ‘lyra’, one of the instruments that often accompanied performance 
and that gave us ‘lyric’). 
Such historical facts about the earliest poetic creations naturally invite the 
question ‘Why repetition?’ Why should the first poets have zeroed in on repetition 
devices, and on the repetition devices that they did, and not others? Why should this 
have been the feature that endured, even in the face of great cultural changes such as 
the one brought about by the invention of the printing press? I think these questions, 
are best answered by looking into our psychology and the way we process language. 
Pinsky has suggested that ‘the technology of poetry, using the human body as its 
medium, evolved for specific uses: to hold things in memory, both within and beyond 
the individual life span; to achieve intensity and sensuous appeal; to express feelings 
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and ideas rapidly and memorably’.81 I think there is much to these ideas, and that the 
literary pioneers of antiquity did not arrive at the poetic techniques they did by mere 
chance. The psychology behind how we process sounds and develop our language 
skills, a psychology to be explained by the needs of oral cultures, made schematic 
repetition the inevitable feature of early poetry. So whereas poetry is defined by an 
intentional connection to a tradition, Ur-poetry may be defined by a psychological 
propensity to pattern language in certain ways—ways that are memorable, both in the 
cognitive sense that they are more easily remembered, and in the evaluative sense that 
they are pleasing. If repetition is also a way of adding levels of information without 
adding words, this would further speak for its cognitive advantages and consequently 
for its universality and endurance. I will explore these hypotheses in the following 
chapter. 
I have argued that what makes a text or performance a poem is an author’s 
intention to connect her work to pre-existing poems, and that such an intention will 
amount to intending to make use of, transform or reject the repetition techniques that 
came to mark the history of poetry around the world. Let me draw a final point of 
analogy with the Levinsonian intentional-historical definition of art. Levinson noted 
that the concept of art itself has changed, and what counts as art today would not have 
counted as art in, say, the eighteenth century.82 Criteria of beauty, for instance, have 
since been discarded. But while the eighteenth-century conception of art cannot 
accommodate some twenty-first century artworks, the twenty-first century concept of 
art should encompass all that has counted as art to this day and, ideally, future 
 
81 Pinsky, The Sounds of Poetry, p. 9. 
82 Levinson, ‘Extending Art Historically’, p. 411. 
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artworks as well. Levinson defends his concept as having distilled ‘arthood’ to its 
bare (relational) essentials in such a way as to fulfill that demand.83 Likewise, the 
concept of poetry at work in the eighteenth century would hardly include much that 
goes by the name today. Poetry has changed, and our concept of it must reflect those 
changes. The intentional-historical formalist conception I have defended here has, I 
think, the analogous merit of distilling the poetic art to the one feature that has 
remained constant throughout its history and that should accommodate all future 
poetry as well. The eighteenth-century poet, to write poetry, had to use meter, but 
today’s poet must only take some stand or other toward metrical regularity. Poetry 
will, in all likelihood, change further in the future. But inasmuch as this is the 
tradition poets must contend with, their poetic intentions are unavoidably bound up 
with the artistic concerns of their predecessors. 
 
83 Levinson, ‘Extending Art Historically’, p. 412. 
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Chapter 4:Repetition and Poetic Effects 
 
i. Reasons For Repetition: First Poets 
 
In his search for a feature that would link together the vast number of incredibly 
diverse objects, concrete and abstract, that go by the name of ‘art’ in the world, 
Levinson concluded that ‘the common thing going on is the right sort of intentional 
connection to preceding art’ (1993, p. 411). Of course, preceding art eventually has 
nothing to precede it except non-art. The intentional-historical definition of art 
therefore has to contend with the problem of what Levinson called ‘Ur-art’, those first 
works created by virtue of something other than an intention that they be regarded in 
ways that previous artworks had been regarded. Levinson offers a couple of 
alternatives for handling this problem. While the Ur-artworks are not, strictly 
speaking, artworks—there are no prior artworks to which they can be connected via a 
maker’s (or profferer’s) intention—they can nevertheless either (1) be granted art 
status for different reasons, or (2) remain as non-art that is nonetheless the progenitor 
of the ‘first arts’, which in turn will be defined by reference to them. If the first, the 
Ur-arts will be considered art ‘not because modeled on earlier art, but rather because 
later, unquestioned art has sprung from them’ (1993, p. 422). So whereas art is 
defined in a backward-looking manner, Ur-art is defined in a forward-looking way. A 
danger of circularity seems to lurk behind the prospects of defining Ur-art on the 
basis of (later) art, and art on the basis of preceding art that is traceable back to Ur-art 
(even if the definition is not recursive). Levinson claims this is not a real risk insofar 
as progenitor and descendant relations are characterized differently. Whereas the 
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relationship of art to previous art is characterized intentionally, the relationship of Ur-
art to what follows it is characterized historically. 
The other alternative withholds art status from the Ur-arts, and has therefore 
to create a new, intermediate category, that of the ‘first arts’, in order to avoid the 
result of no art ever being made, since the intentions relevant to art-making relate to 
previous art, not to previous Ur-art (id., 421). The first arts are arts, differently 
defined: ‘their arthood consists in being projected for regard that some preceding Ur-
art object (rather than some preceding art object) was correctly accorded’ (id., 422). 
While both approaches have their merits, it seems to me that the first one is the better 
of the two. The second approach, that of creating a new category (that of ‘first arts’) 
seems both unnecessary and problematic. It is unnecessary because the first approach 
seems sufficiently to account for Ur-art, and problematic in that it seems simply to 
push the problem of Ur-art a little further back by creating a new category that itself 
calls for explanation. 
However one chooses to account for the relationship between our earliest, 
‘proto-art’ (as a whole) and art (as a whole) as an established phenomenon and 
category, it is clear that the historical component of the definition of poetry (in 
particular) I have offered raises the analogous problem of ‘Ur-poems’, the first, 
‘proto-poems’ which, naturally, were not created by an intentional connection to 
preceding ones, since there were no preceding poems. So how are the first poems to 
be defined? Is their situation analogous to that of the Ur-arts? Although Ur-poems 
cannot have been created with the intention that they belong in a poetic tradition, 
since there was no tradition yet to which they could belong, yet they were created by 
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means of the same features which became central to that tradition. For that reason, it 
seems that defining Ur-poems in a forward-looking fashion as the progenitors of all 
future poems is also the better option, in this case, of the two offered by Levinson. 
This in turn might land us in a purely formalist conception of Ur-poetry, according to 
which an Ur-poem would be a string of utterances held together by means of 
repetition devices. A formalist conception of Ur-poetry in turn raises at least two 
questions, one philosophical and one empirical. The philosophical question is: If Ur-
poems can be defined in purely formalist terms, why not poems in general? The 
empirical question is: Why did the first poets choose these devices and not others? 
Why repetition? The philosophical question has already been answered in the 
previous chapter: poems cannot be defined solely as texts evincing concern for 
repetition techniques, because (among other reasons) other verbal art forms may 
make use of these techniques as well. Once the tradition had been started, the 
intention behind the creation of new poems became essential. 
The empirical question therefore holds greater interest, even if not, on the 
surface, of a purely philosophical kind. However, if we find (empirically) that the 
devices the first poets used could not have been other than the ones they did, then we 
will have added a modal dimension to our definition of Ur-poetry and, by extension, 
to our definition of poetry. If, given our psychology, our language faculty, natural 
language, our respiratory tract, etc., we simply naturally manipulate and respond to 
language the way we do, then, it would seem, poems could not have been other than 
what they are. A related question is: if that is so, then what underlies our natural 
propensity to repetition? Two obvious possibilities are (1) cognitive usefulness and 
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(2) aesthetic pleasure. In other words, we should expect that repetition techniques 
emerged not simply ‘for the fun of it’, but were rather an important cognitive tool in 
the oral cultures where they made their first appearance. However, the fun of it, I will 
argue, was also an important reason why they worked as cognitive tools in the first 
place, and why they have endured to this day even in the face of their no longer being 
needed as tools of that sort. 
Why, then, were our earliest poetic practices the way they were, and how did 
they spawn an art form? To answer these questions we must recall that when human 
beings first began creating literary works more than five thousand years ago,84 
literature was a purely oral activity. Without the benefit of writing, the transmission 
of culture amongst the members of a group, across groups and communities, and from 
one generation to another, was done primarily by speaking and listening. This placed 
a heavy load on our memory. It is difficult for us today to imagine what it must have 
been like to have to rely on one’s memory for everything; but if we look around us 
and take note of the large number of means of recording data that we have created 
over the course of our history so that we can free up memory space (for… other types 
of data?), that should give us some idea: stone engravings, wax tablets, parchment, 
papyrus, paper, books, paintings, photographs, computers disks, CDs, DVDs, USB 
keys, cellular phones, one-touch dialing, ‘remember my password’ shortcuts in web 
sites, automated reminders, and the good old ribbon around the index finger. We will 
take anything that will help us remember, or that (preferably) will do the 
remembering for us. As is the case with other human activities, when it comes to 
 
84 More accurately, what occurred at around 5,000 years ago was the beginning of recording 
those works; this speaks to a much earlier purely oral literary tradition. 
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speech—as children’s educators, psychologists and book writers know well—nothing 
aids memory better than repetition. 
So, once we had language, and before we had recording media, we had to 
invent ways whereby our otherwise ephemeral utterances would gain some sort of 
permanence and be made more useful. And that is how, in time, much that needed 
remembering was composed in such a way as to conform to a repetitive structure, 
from legal documents to medical treatises. 
In this chapter I will explore the question of how and why the first poems 
invariably relied on patterns of recurrence. I will do that by discussing (1) empirical 
studies on the effects of rhyme and alliteration on literacy development in children, 
and (2) the poetic practices of the illiterate troubadours of Northeast Brazil. I will 
then argue that there is a double-sided ‘memorableness’ to formal poetic devices: 
both in the sense that they aid memory and cognition, and in the sense that they are 
pleasing. I will also argue that the fact that they are thus ‘memorable’ can best be 
explained by the relevance theory in pragmatics developed in Sperber and Wilson 
1986,1995. After providing a summary of that theory, I will explore its application to 
the issue of how poetry achieves its cognitive and affective effects. 
I will preface my exposition in this chapter with a caveat: what follows is 
largely exploratory of what might best explain the prevalence and universality of 
repetition schemes in the poetic traditions of the world. Insofar as what I claim here 
relies on empirical studies, it is contestable at least to the extent that those studies 
may themselves be open to objections. The same goes for my reliance on relevance 
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theory. I will nevertheless proceed on the assumption that those studies and that 
theory are largely correct. 
 
ii. Repetition Schemes and Literacy Development. 
 
In this and the following section I will focus on two non-literate groups. The 
first group consists of pre-literate children under the age of 6. The second group 
consists of the adult illiterate popular oral poets of the Sertão region of Northeast 
Brazil, called ‘trovadores’ or ‘repentistas’. What I hope to show is that we see in both 
cases what I suggest is a natural attunement to several types of linguistic repetition 
structures. In the case of pre-literate children, exposure to nursery rhymes (which 
have a predictable structure and abound in certain types of concrete repetition, 
particularly rhyme and alliteration) is shown to correlate with earlier and better 
linguistic competence, as evidenced in literacy development rates (Lyon 1995, Wood 
and Terrell 1998, Burns 2000, Wood 2000). Of course, that exposure would be of no 
use unless children possessed some rhyme detection mechanism. I would like to 
suggest that this phenomenon exemplifies what I will call a functional natural 
attunement to certain types of repetition schemes in language. By this I mean the 
attunement that we seem naturally to have to these linguistic phenomena, and that 
appears to be there for a reason: in the case of the children, for the developmental 
function it performs. 
What we see in the case of the trovadores is an oral culture at work—one that 
cannot rely on the written word (since the population is largely illiterate) and must 
therefore rely on repetition techniques to transmit and preserve its traditions. 
Contrasting the functional natural attunement of the trovadores with that of pre-
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literate children, we could say that in the case of children, that attunement is internal, 
or inward-oriented, insofar as it has its effects on the linguistic development of the 
individual, whereas in the case of the trovadores the attunement is external or 
outward-oriented, inasmuch as it is externalized by the individual as a social practice: 
one that (as the trovador seems naturally to know) must rely on repetition if it is to 
achieve its goal. 
To show how this natural attunement to certain kinds of repetition schemes is 
exhibited in pre-literate children, I turn now to some studies in child psychology that 
assess the relationships between types of phonological awareness during pre-literacy 
and later literacy development rates. 
Some terminological clarification is required before we proceed. Phonological 
awareness is the ‘broader awareness of sound structures in speech’ (Wood and Terrell 
1998: 1). There are various levels of phonological awareness: awareness that 
sentences can be broken down into words, that words can be broken down into 
syllables, that syllables can be broken down into phonemes. Making a child touch a 
series of squares for each word in a sentence she heard as she repeats it is a way of 
seeing if the child is aware of word boundaries. Testing for phonemic awareness is 
slightly more challenging. Phonemic awareness is the knowledge of the phonemic 
structure of words, that is, of their smallest sound units that make a contribution to 
meaning. It is, for instance, the knowledge that ‘cat’ can be broken down into /k/ /a/ 
/t/. One method of testing for phonemic awareness is that of phoneme deletion. If a 
child can recognize a new word when a phoneme is deleted, as in ‘a-way’ = way, ‘c-
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ar’ = are, and ‘s-chool’ = cool, that is taken to be evidence of phonemic awareness 
(id., 4-7). 
Current studies suggest that children’s phonological awareness develops from 
the larger linguistic units (sentences and words) to the smaller ones (syllables and 
phonemes). Indeed, some psychologists have suggested that phonemic awareness is 
too sophisticated a skill to develop as ‘part of the natural progression of phonological 
awareness’, requiring deliberate instruction, and thus occurring only when the child 
begins attending school. Others, however, have argued that formal instruction merely 
‘promotes conscious understanding of normally implicit procedures’ (id., 2). The 
latter view seems more sensible, and serves to underline the fact that what is meant by 
phonemic ‘awareness’ or ‘knowledge’ in these studies is a knowledge how, rather 
than a knowledge that.
Several studies have shown that phonemic awareness can indeed develop 
before formal instruction, and that pre-literate phonemic awareness strongly 
correlates with literacy development.85 Specifically, the kind of phonemic awareness 
that most strongly correlates with later literacy is rhyme awareness, followed by 
awareness of alliteration: 
[Our results] support a growing literature which shows that rhyme awareness 
significantly contributes towards literacy (Goswami, 1994), discriminates 
between poor readers, reading age and chronological age matched control 
groups (Wood and Terrell, in press), and children who are less sensitive to 
onset-rime boundaries are at a risk of reading difficulties (Bradley 1988).86 
Rhyme awareness is therefore an important phonological skill, one without which a 
child’s linguistic and cognitive development may be seriously affected. For instance, 
 
85 See Wood and Terrell 1998, Wood 2000 and Burns 2000 for sources. 
86 Wood and Terrell (1998), 13. 
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rhyme detection ability is the skill thought to underlie orthographic analogy use,87 
where a child infers to the spelling of a word on the basis of another she already 
knows and that sounds like the first one (e.g. from ‘fool’ to ‘cool’). So if a child 
cannot detect sound similarities between words her ability to learn to read will be 
compromised. Wood and Terrell (1998) speculate that rhyme and rhythmic awareness 
may be connected: 
both these skills require an awareness of vowels in speech … It may be that 
rhyme awareness is an index of the successful development of infant 
phonological awareness … If this were the case, then its ability to predict 
literacy development during the first year of school may have more to do 
with a fundamental perceptual skill, than with the exploitation of any 
analogous strategies88 
Other studies have shown that exposure to nursery rhymes correlates with 
phonemic awareness and consequently with reading ability.89 As it happens, the most 
salient features of nursery rhymes are—surprise!—rhymes, followed by alliteration 
and a particular syllable-stress pattern. 
A nursery rhyme is typically made up of one or more four-line stanzas, each 
with two to four marked syllables per line, an aabb, abba, abab, or abxb rhyme 
scheme (where the ‘x’ indicates that this line does not rhyme with the others), and, 
frequently, plenty of alliteration. This, the ballad stanza, can safely be said to be the 
most popular stanza type around the world, and possibly the most ancient.90 Below 
are some examples in Russian, Hungarian, Maori, Portuguese, and English (with 






89 See Burns (2000). 
90 See Worthington (1993), pp. 846-7. 
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не ложися на краю ne lozhisya na krayu 
прийдет серенький волчек priydet seren'kiy volchok 
и укусит за бочок. 91 i ukusit za bochok. 
 
Hungarian Maori 
Boci, boci tarka, E tangi ana koe 
se füle, se farka, Hine e hine 
oda megyünk lakni,  E ngenge ana koe 
ahol tejet kapni.92 Hine e hine93 
Portuguese English (one for the adults…) 
O cravo brigou com a rosa Johnny was a chemist 
Debaixo de uma sacada: But Johnny is no more 
O cravo saiu ferido For what he thought was H20
E a rosa despetalada.94 was H2S0495
The universality of nursery rhymes, sharing as they do such structural 
features, speaks to a natural attunement to structured linguistic sounds, and one that 
performs important developmental functions. Exposure to rhymes would have no 
effect on phonemic awareness if children did not possess what psychologists call a 
‘rhyme detection ability’. That we have such an ability, and that we exploit it for the 
more aesthetic purposes of play as well as the more cognitive ones of language 
learning and reading skills goes some way toward explaining the emergence of poetry 
as verse. This inclination to rhyme, and to attend to what is rhymed as being of 
significance, performs a function at the individual level. But it also performs a 
function at the social level, and I will now turn to that. 
 
91 Translated: Shush, shush/do not lie down on the edge of your bed/because a little grey wolf 
will come/ and will bite your hip. I thank Elena Volochay for this nursery rhyme. 
92 Translated: Calf, colorful calf/having neither ear nor tail/ we're going to live there/where 
milk is sold. I thank Father Gergely Bakos for this rhyme. 
93 Translated: You are weeping/(Little) girl, (little) girl/you are weary/(Little) girl, (little) girl. 
Available online at http://www.mamalisa.com/world/newzeal.html#hine (accessed 6 July 
2006). 
94 Popular Brazilian cantiga. Translated: The carnation fought with the rose/Under a 
porch:/The carnation ended wounded/And the rose without its petals. Unless noted otherwise, 
any translation from the Portuguese is my own. 
95 From http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A288966 (accessed on 6 July 2006), which informs 
us that the last line is “a very useful mnemonic device to remember what the formula is for 
sulphuric acid.” 
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iii. Repetition Schemes in the Practices of Illiterate Troubadours. 
 
In this section I will discuss the poetic practices of the trovadores or 
repentistas of Northeast Brazil’s drought-ridden backlands, the Sertão region. The 
Sertanejos, as the residents of the area are called, remain at the margins of Brazil’s 
development in many ways, and that is evident in their literacy level, which, at an 
estimated 40%, lags considerably behind the country average of 87%.96 The rural 
Sertão region has the lowest literacy level within Northeast Brazil. Yet a thriving 
troubadour culture exists in the region.97 These Brazilian trovadores perform various 
functions: they form a particular kind of story-tellers, conveying news as they create 
mythological heroes out of real individuals (local and national politicians, for 
example—not unlike what ‘Homer’ made out of Agamemnon, Achilles, Odysseus, 
and others); they are entertainers, engaging in improvised poetic duels;98 and they are 
instructors of the local population, insofar as they provide information about social 
and political events, language instruction (speech, not writing), and performance 
training to the new generations (not necessarily directed training but indirect, i.e. 
spectators learn by hearing their stories and debates). 
 
96 Sources vary on exact numbers: ‘Literacy levels vary regionally and between rural and 
urban areas. Illiteracy is highest—around 27 percent—in the Northeast, which has a high 
proportion of rural poor’ (http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761554342_4/Brazil.html). 
Indeed, according to more recent studies that refine their survey with four different levels of 
literacy, only 26% of Brazilians are fully literate. See data on the internet site of the Paulo 
Montenegro Institute, http://www.ipm.org.br. 
97 Please note that not all repentistas are illiterate. Some, typically those who either come 
from or moved to the cities are educated, and even travel abroad for performances. But most 
of those from the rural areas are illiterate, and often those who are literate have learned to 
read in adulthood, having long since been oral poets. 
98 ‘Repentes’, from the word for ‘sudden’ or ‘unexpected’, as the ripostes from one’s 
opponent tend to be. 
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These popular entertainers arrive without any instruction at sophisticated 
levels of recurrence patterning, both abstract and concrete. Indeed their rusticity is 
often the subject of their verses, as in the stanza below: 
Meu verso rasteiro, singelo e sem graça My verse, low, naïve and without frills 
Não entra na praça, no rico salão, Doesn’t enter the piazza or the rich salon 
Meu verso só entra no campo e na roça, My verse only enters the country and field 
Nas pobre paíça, da serra ao sertão.99 The poor houses, from mountain to sertão.
This ‘low’ verse turns out to be packed with sophisticated poetic devices. All 
lines have four stresses and follow an abab rhyme scheme. Lines one and three, with 
twelve syllables each, both end in feminine rhymes (last syllable unstressed), whereas 
lines 2 and 4, both shorter by one syllable, end in masculine rhymes; this makes the 
last stressed syllable always fall on the eleventh syllable (by poetic conventions, a last 
unstressed line syllable does not count, so all lines have eleven poetic syllables). 
Every line has a medial caesura, that is, a break in the middle of the four stresses, 
something that is made salient by the commas in lines 1, 2, and 4. The meter is 
strictly dactylic throughout, every line being ‘headless’ (missing the first syllable of 
the foot). 
The world of the Brazilian trovadores is a window onto what is a long-lost 
past for most cultures. Unable to read, as was the case with the early poets, and 
performing for a people likewise illiterate, the trovador must take recourse to the 
techniques that will make his chanting memorable to his audience. In the case of 
poetic duels, a popular form of entertainment in the region, the poet’s performance 
must indeed appeal to his audience, insofar as he earns his money by his verse. The 
following lines speak to the popularity of such events, and what is expected at them: 
 
99 Debs (1997), 10. 
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Umas trezentas pessoas About three hundred people 
Em pouco tempo afluía In a short time gathered 
Cada qual mais desejosa Each one more desirous 
De assistir a cantoria To watch the singing 
Cada um interrogava: All of them asking 
Qual dos dois apanharia?100 Which one will get beat up? 
Trovadores amuse their audience by putting the most creative insults about their 
opponents into verse form, and as one chants, the other plays the viola. Some of it 
involves goat tails, smelly mustaches, and other such physical disparagements, but 
much of the assault is directed at the verse-making of the other, and how unskilled it 
is in comparison with that of the speaker. (Such gatherings, incidentally, are not 
unlike American rap contests in form.) The only subjects off-limits are the opponent’s 
family; sadly, on occasion such lines are crossed, and violent fighting may ensue. 
(Again, not unlike rap contests!) Besides duels, trovadores also earn their money by 
performing at restaurants, except in such cases they typically sing the praises of the 
patrons until some money is thrown into their strategically placed hats; stingy 
customers, however, get insulted too. Trovadores are widely respected as the local 
sources of knowledge as well as artistic talent, since they also go from town to town 
bringing news. 
 The Brazilian Trovadores can thus be seen as a contemporary version of some 
of the first poets. That they set their news, stories, praises and insults to verse can be 
seen as also showing a natural attunement to patterning language in certain ways, one 
that they direct outward as a means of providing information and entertainment to 
their communities. The reception they receive from their audience in turn functions as 
a reinforcement of their poetic choices and a stimulus to improve their craft—the 
 
100 ‘Literatura Popular’, Encyclopedia Brittanica do Brasil. (2005). 
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duels in particular can be seen as performing that function, since the better poet will 
earn more. So to the spontaneous creation of verse is added the incentive of the 
community. It is to initial circumstances such as these, in addition to those involving 
religious rituals, that I think we owe the emergence of poetry, and the development of 
ever more complex verse forms. The attention to and use of repetition schemes can 
thus be seen as contributing to language learning, as an aid to memory, and as a 
source of aesthetic pleasure. 
 
iv. Relevance Theory: Synopsis 
 
I have been arguing that ‘memorable-ness’ in its two senses is largely 
responsible for the central role repetition plays in Ur-poems. Repetition contributes to 
making lines and poems memorable both in the sense of making them easy to recall 
and in the sense of making them pleasing to the ear, and these senses exploit one 
another. So the key technical feature of poems appeals directly to our psychology; 
specifically, to our memory and aesthetic sensibilities. But poems also communicate 
messages intended by the poet. As is the case with artworks in general, poems are 
works which we strive to understand and which also frequently move us. I will now 
argue that the structured repetition of linguistic sounds and syntactic units also (1) 
facilitates both our understanding of what poems say and (2) helps promote our 
affective responses to them. There are thus two interrelated facets of these 
experiences to which repetition techniques contribute directly and which can be 
teased apart for analysis: the cognitive and the affective. 
The claim that poetic features such as rhyme, meter or alliteration aid in the 
understanding of poetic messages and arouse feelings in listeners or readers is not 
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new. Roman Jakobson and the Russian Formalists all emphasized the ‘functional role 
played by structural parallelisms and contrasts’,101 and their close analysis of poetic 
traditions led to the observation that ‘various aspects of poetic form all involve some 
kind of recurrence of equivalent linguistic elements’.102 However, as Pilkington 
(2000) argues, the Russian Formalists were unable to go beyond the analysis of poetic 
form and the claim that it must have some effects on the reader to the analysis of how 
those effects are actually obtained. The intuition, while eminently plausible, had not 
been given a firm explanatory foundation, and without such a foundation, there 
seemed to be no clear way whereby one could show it to be true or false. This was not 
due to a theoretical inability to provide such an analysis, but to the fact that there was 
at the time no pragmatic theory that could ground it and no psycholinguistics that 
could test it.103 
The developments in linguistics in the latter half of the twentieth century 
created the possibility of such a foundation. The move from conceiving of language 
as a social code to conceiving of it as a psychological code and a system of mental 
representations heralded by Chomsky (1957) made possible a new kind of 
pragmatics—a cognitive pragmatics. It is here, as Pilkington (2000) and Kiparsky 
(1987) have argued, that a foundation may be secured for a theory of poetic effects. 
The cognitive pragmatic theory that could fulfill that role emerged with the ‘relevance 
theory’ of Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1986, 1995).104 
101 Pilkington (2000), 16. 
102 Kiparsky (1981), 11. 
103 Pilkington (2000), 18. 
104 Hereafter ‘S&W’; page references given in text. 
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Relevance theory is a theory of communication that takes H.P. Grice’s work 
in the philosophy of language (Grice 1989, particularly ‘Logic and Conversation’) as 
its point of departure. Grice had originally proposed that linguistic communication 
was a cooperative affair that extended beyond interlocutors’ sharing a language and a 
context. They had also to abide by the same communicative principles, the most 
important of which was the ‘cooperative principle’: ‘make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which your are engaged’.105 Under this 
general principle Grice recognized several conversational maxims, falling under the 
categories of (1) quantity, (2) quality, (3) relation, and (4) manner, as follows: 
1.a. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the purposes of the 
exchange) 
1.b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
 
2.a. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2.b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
 
3. Be relevant. 
 
4. [‘supermaxim’] Be perspicuous. 
4.a. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
4.b. Avoid ambiguity. 
4.c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
4.d. Be orderly.106 
For Grice, such maxims helped make salient an important distinction between what is 
said and what is ‘implicated’ by means of words, where the former is a matter for 
semantics and the latter a matter for pragmatics. Besides a common language and 
context, then, Grice adds an intentional dimension to communication, referring back 
to the minds of interlocutors; as Sperber and Wilson note, ‘Grice put forth an idea of 
 
105 Grice (1989), 26. 
106 Grice (1989), 26-8. 
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fundamental importance: that the very act of communicating creates expectations 
which it then exploits’ (S&W 37). One way in which a communicator may exploit 
common communicative expectations is by flouting one or more maxims. One could, 
for instance, flout maxim (4.a.) by being deliberately obscure, so as to avoid 
communicating something undesirable. We can see the flouting of maxims as 
evidence that, in normal circumstances, they are at work. 
By asking the basic question ‘What is the rationale behind the cooperative 
principles and maxims?’ and proposing that they all reduce to the maxim of relation 
(‘be relevant’), Sperber and Wilson developed the Gricean insight of explaining the 
communicative process by reference to the minds of speakers and hearers rather than 
to any shared social codes (S&W 36). Whereas social codes are learned, the 
presumption behind relevance theory is that minds are ‘pre-wired’ to work in a 
certain fashion, and that communication operates in an analogous manner.107 We 
could say that the main idea behind Sperber and Wilson’s theory is that what is true 
of life in general remains true in linguistic communication: we want to get as much as 
we can for as little work as possible. And, whenever we are made to work a little 
harder, we expect that there should be reasons for it and that we shall be rewarded for 
it: overtime work means extra pay. Thus there is, in every communicative exchange, 
an assumption of relevance: I expect the linguistic string I am required to process to 
result in contextual effects—it should tell me something: ‘The assessment of 
 
107 Although Sperber and Wilson put forth their principle of relevance as a communicative 
principle rather than (more broadly) a cognitive one, as many have thought, they also believe 
that an analogous principle is at work at that more general level. According to the cognitive 
principle of relevance, human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance; 
i.e., ‘cognitive resources tend to be allocated to the processing of the most relevant inputs 
available’. According to the communicative principle of relevance, ‘every act of ostensive 
communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance’ (S&W 260-1). 
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relevance, like the assessment of productivity, is a matter of balancing output against 
input: here contextual effects against processing effort’ (S&W 125). 
There are many details to relevance theory, and here I will outline only what 
is pertinent to the discussion that follows. One important idea in relevance theory is 
that minds ‘store’ concepts in various interconnected ways. Concepts in turn collect 
information (as an ‘address’ in memory) lexically, logically, and denotationally, and 
they appear as constituents of logical forms when they are accessed. A concept’s 
lexical entry indicates the word or phrase in natural language corresponding to that 
concept. The denotational or encyclopedic entry ‘contains information about the 
extension and/or denotation of the concept: that is, about the objects, events and/or 
properties which instantiate it’; finally, the concept enters into logical forms, and thus 
there must be rules governing its behavior within those forms—the logical entry 
contains a set of deductive rules (S&W 86). 
 According to Sperber and Wilson, what is fully shared by speakers are the 
logical entries attached to a conceptual address and, when speakers share a language, 
the lexical entries as well. The encyclopedic entry, however, is peculiar to an 
individual, containing all that the individual believes to be the case about that 
concept. Naturally, encyclopedic entries, while they vary from person to person, must 
still overlap to an extent sufficient for communication, and may overlap considerably. 
If speakers shared only the information available at the logical and lexical entries 
attached to the concepts they have stored in memory, it is unlikely that their 
exchanges would result in the exchange of much information. While the logical entry 
provides (deductive) rules for the use of the concept, and the lexical entry the 
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linguistic tag that will be used for it, information from the encyclopedic entry 
provides the contextual information that will particularize the inferences drawn with 
it: ‘stereotypical assumptions and expectations about frequently encountered objects 
and events’ (S&W 88). For instance, the encyclopedic entry for ‘cow’ for a Hindu 
Indian and a person from most other countries will be very different. For the Hindu, 
the encyclopedic entry for ‘cow’ will involve the idea of a sacred animal, one whose 
meat ought not to be consumed (at least not by those who hold it sacred), and one 
who freely roams the streets in urban areas.108 None of these three is likely to be part 
of the encyclopedic entry for, say, a person in most Latin American countries. 
 Thoughts, on this view, are ‘conceptual representations (as opposed to sensory 
representations or emotional states)’ (S&W 2). What Sperber and Wilson call 
assumptions are thoughts represented by an individual as representations of the actual 
world, as opposed to fictions, desires, or representations of representations (id.). This 
does not mean that an assumption may not be, in fact, a fiction—it only need not 
seem so to the individual. An assumption, then, is ‘a structured set of concepts’ 
(S&W 85). An assumption may be relevant or irrelevant in a context; it is relevant in 
a context ‘if and only if it has some contextual effect in that context’ (S&W 122). The 
fundamental insight of relevance theory is expressed in the extent conditions which 
determine the degree of relevance of a given assumption: 
Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its 
contextual effects in this context are large. 
 
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that 
the effort required to process it is small. (S&W 125) 
 
108 Acording to PBS, 40,000 of them share the streets with the 13 million in habitants of New 
Delhi. See http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/holycow/hinduism.html. 
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The most relevant assumption is the one with the most optimal ratio of extent 
condition 2 to extent condition 1, that is, of effort to contextual effects. 
In view of these distinctions, what is important for communication to occur is 
not that there be mutual knowledge about the subject of conversation between 
interlocutors, but rather that there be what Sperber and Wilson call ‘mutual 
manifestness’. A given fact ‘is manifest to an individual at a given time ‘if and only if 
he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation 
as true or probably true’; a set of facts manifest to an individual constitutes a 
cognitive environment (S&W 39). As Pilkington notes, on the relevance theory 
account ‘it is the communicator’s responsibility to judge what contextual assumptions 
are manifest to the addressee. Where she judges them not to be manifest she must 
make them available through further utterance’.109 Communication occurs within 
such a sufficiently shared cognitive environment, and it involves an initial decoding 
phase (phonemic or graphemic representations are decoded into semantic 
representations and incomplete logical forms) and an inferential phase (filling in the 
gaps in the logical form so that, from the resulting propositional forms, conversational 
implicatures and propositional attitudes may be derived). 110 
In everyday communication, individuals address particular interlocutors, and 
so must be attuned to what may or may not be manifest to them so as to ensure the 
success of conversational exchanges. In the case of literary communication, an author 
does not have a particular individual, but a general readership. It may be thought that 
in such cases the burden lies entirely with text to provide a cognitive environment: 
 
109 Pilkington (2000), 63. 
110 Pilkington (2000), 67; see S&W 12-13. 
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In the case of literary communication this detailed attention to the needs of a 
particular addressee does not apply. The text is carefully shaped by the 
author with a view to the effects it will have upon a reader, but this reader is, 
in the term familiar from literary theory, an implied reader. The context 
needed by the implied reader must be determined by the text itself.111 
Yet that requirement is too strong. It is true that, typically, an author does not have a 
particular addressee in mind (though lyric poems are frequently written for specific 
individuals, as are occasional poems such as eulogies and epithalamia, and a novel 
may be a message in disguise). But even if this were not so, no readership is 
altogether ‘general’. An author must have an idea of who will read her work (who 
else will ‘imply’ the reader?) and, as rule and at a minimum, writers write for their 
contemporaries.112 If this is so, and if writers also assume that their readership will be 
familiar with particular uses of language (say, slang, which is invariably local) and 
with specific cultural cues (say, what life is like in 21st century Porto Alegre), then it 
is also true that a myriad of contextual assumptions are left unspoken (unwritten), 
assumed to be manifest to the targeted readers. Just as no conversation could take off 
if every assumption had first to be made explicitly manifest between conversational 
partners, so no literary work could ever end, or begin, if everything had to be 
contextualized for the reader. The interpretation of works from different cultures or 
earlier times is difficult precisely because such contextual assumptions are not 
available to us and must be retrieved by research beyond the literary text. Texts, like 
conversations, obtain their meaning within a contextual environment. 
 Literary works tend to differ from everyday linguistic exchanges, however, in 
that they often require more cognitive effort from their readers than is usually the case 
 
111 Pilkington (2000), 63. 
112 Even Borges’ fictional Pierre Menard did. But naturally he, and any author, may intend to 
write for a distant, past, or future audience. 
117
in conversation. Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory predicts that any ‘greater 
effort involved in accessing the intended contextual assumption is repaid by an 
increase in contextual effects: a wider range of implicatures being communicated’.113 
How does this occur, and is it always the case that greater effort results in greater 
reward? With regard to the second question, it is a sad truth that communication may 
and often does fail in spite of great efforts being expended by both parties. So we 
should rather add a modal dimension to Sperber and Wilson’s idea: it’s perhaps more 
accurate to say that greater processing effort generates the possibility of greater 
reward in the form of more contextual effects: were one’s efforts to be successful, the 
rewards would be greater. This revision runs the risk of vacuity, however, if ‘success’ 
simply means ‘greater rewards’. We may pursue the reverse situation as well: can 
there be lots of contextual effects with little cognitive effort? Perhaps such is the 
effect of puns and jokes—perhaps too of poems. We thus return to the first question, 
regarding how literary, and in particular poetic, works produce their effects. This will 
be the concern of the following section. 
 
v. Relevance Theory and Cognitive Effects 
 
It is a fair question why poets should choose to repeat concrete sounds and/or 
abstract structures when conveying their poetic messages After all, it would seem that 
repetition devices tend to slow down the comprehension process and require greater 
cognitive effort. I think the key to understanding the rationale behind these devices 
(as Pilkington 2000 has argued) is the communicative principle of relevance. If it is 
true that speakers seek to make their contributions as relevant as possible, and hearers 
 
113 Pilkington (2000), 79. 
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assume the contextual relevance of what they hear, then when something unusual 
occurs—say, a word or sound is repeated—hearers will assume that optimal relevance 
is still at work. If those repetitions require more processing effort, on this view 
hearers should tacitly assume that the effort will be repaid with greater contextual 
effects. This is precisely what poetic techniques are meant to produce. Without stating 
anything explicitly, merely by using words that sound alike (for example), a poet may 
lead us to consider ways in which the concepts signified by those words relate to one 
another, or novel ways in which to consider the concepts themselves. A lovely 
example is the following stanza from Ezra Pound’s Mauberley, discussed in Fussell 
1979 (p. 110): 
 The ‘age demanded’ chiefly a mould in plaster, 
 Made with no loss of time. 
 A prose kinema, not, not assuredly, alabaster 
 Or the ‘sculpture’ of rhyme. 
 
Fussell’s analysis of these four lines is masterful and exemplifies precisely how form 
is contributing to content in this case, so I will indulge in a lengthy quotation and only 
add that ‘kinema’ above is further contributing to the meaning of ‘plaster’ as 
something that is not real and substantial, but merely an image of reality: 
Here plaster and alabaster ‘sound alike’, all right, just as time and rhyme do. 
But when we inquire why they have been disposed so that their sound 
resemblances will organize the stanza, we perceive that their relationships are 
not only logical but witty as well. Plaster and alabaster are total opposites as 
materials for plastic art: plaster is squeezed or molded into some 
predetermined shape; it often mimics some other material—most often 
stone—and it is conspicuously fragile and impermanent. Alabaster, on the 
other hand, must be worked from the outside: it must be incised, and incision 
implies a sharpness in both the cutting tool and the intelligence that 
commands it. The shape of a figure cut in alabaster cannot be wholly 
predetermined, for it will depend in part on the unique texture of the stone. 
And finally, no one works in alabaster without some aspirations toward 
permanence. 
 By rhyming the words which represent these two rich symbols of 
technical, aesthetic opposition, the stanza appears to compare them while 
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ironically it actually contrasts them. That is, the sound similarity ‘says’ that 
they resemble each other, while the rhetoric of the stanza asserts their 
difference. We are moved in two directions at once, or we are abused only to 
be disabused: irony is the result. A similar sort of irony results from the 
rhyming of time and rhyme—or actually no loss of time with ‘sculpture’ of 
rhyme. The sound similarity implies a semantic similarity between fast 
manufacturing and permanent beauty. And again, our perception that the 
implied comparison is really masking a significant contrast produces our 
experience of irony. (pp. 110-1) 
 
What Fussell notes regarding a reader’s expectations when words sound alike can be 
accounted for by Sperber and Wilson’s principle of relevance. If a listener’s expects a 
speaker’s contribution to be aimed at optimal relevance, then that listener should 
expect that when words are matched in position and sound, as they are in Pound’s 
stanza, that this was done for a reason and attention is thereby being called to them. 
So here I will expand upon Pilkington’s (2000) proposal that relevance theory can 
explain poetic effects, focusing particularly on the role repetition structures play in 
aiding our understanding of what poems say, and in promoting affect.  
 According to Sperber and Wilson, a ‘speaker aiming at optimal relevance will 
leave implicit everything her hearer can be trusted to supply with less effort than 
would be needed to process an explicit prompt’ (S&W 218). This occurs frequently in 
everyday conversation, as when someone says ‘I’m cold’ with the intention not 
(merely) to inform another of that state, but also to inform that other that she is 
uncomfortable and to request that the window be shut. Literature in general and 
poetry in particular exploit this aspect of linguistic communication. Poets take 
advantage of various poetic devices so as to say more with fewer words. This is one 
reason why paraphrasing a poem is so problematic, and typically involves 
considerably more words to express a presumed poetic message than were used in the 
poem itself. We need only consider Pound’s dense stanza above in contrast with 
120
Fussell’s insightful analysis of it. We can say that one of the things left implicit by 
Pound, and that he expected his readers to bring to the interpretative table, was 
something like ‘compare and contrast words that sound alike and are placed in 
parallel positions in their respective lines’. In relevance-theoretic terms, we can say 
that techniques such as this are invitations to readers or listeners to explore the 
encyclopedic entries of the concepts involved; they are ‘ways of encouraging readers 
to explore memory more thoroughly, to combine memories stored at different 
conceptual addresses in order to increase the range of cognitive effects’.114 
Are such techniques, then, cognitive facilitators or are they hurdles we must 
jump over on our way to understanding what is being said? The picture above 
suggests that passages such as Pound’s follow the economic spirit of relevance 
theory, since they convey more with fewer words. But both Pilkington and Sperber 
and Wilson view the use of such techniques as requiring greater processing effort 
than passages that do not have them. 
Within our framework, the task of the hearer faced with these utterances 
[where repetition occurs] is to reconcile the fact that a certain expression has 
been repeated with the assumption that optimal relevance has been aimed at. 
Clearly, the extra linguistic processing effort incurred by the repetition must 
be outweighed by some increase in contextual effects triggered by the 
repetition itself. (S&W 220, my emphasis)
There is an assumption in the theory that sentences where repetition occur do require 
more linguistic processing than sentences where no repetition is used. It is not clear to 
me that this is always the case. But in light of that possibility we would do well to 
distinguish between a lexical economy (fewer words used) and a cognitive economy 
(less processing effort required). Clearly, an economy of words does not entail that 
 
114 Pilkington (2000), 77. 
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less effort will be required to process them. Indeed, more effort may be required, as in 
cases where there aren’t sufficient contextual assumptions mutually manifest to the 
participants in a conversation. Still, where sufficient assumptions are mutually 
manifest, it could be that repetition saves rather than demands more effort on the part 
of a listener. 
 Sperber and Wilson consider in particular the technique of epizeuxis, the 
repetition of words. The use of epizeuxis, they argue, is no guarantee of poetic 
effects. The effects of epizeuxis, Sperber and Wilson claim, vary from merely 
expressing propositional content (‘Here’s a red sock, here’s a red sock, here’s a blue 
sock’), to expressing a speaker’s attitude toward a given propositional content (say, 
that of being committed to what it expresses, as in ‘I shall never, never smoke again’) 
to exhibiting a speaker’s attitude, in a non-propositional manner, to a given 
propositional content (‘My childhood days are gone, gone’). The difference between 
the last one and the first two is that the first two could be paraphrased without loss of 
content (‘Here are two red socks and one blue sock’ and ‘I am truly committed to 
never smoking again’), whereas the last one could not. Utterances such as ‘My 
childhood days are gone, gone’, according to Sperber and Wilson, ‘as it were exhibit 
rather than merely describe the speaker’s mental or emotional state: they give rise to 
non-propositional effects which would be lost under paraphrase’ (S&W 220, my 
emphasis). Epizeuxis in the last utterance, then, produces a poetic effect, whereas its 
use in the first two does not. How does it do this? In such cases, ‘the repetition should 
yield an increase in contextual effects by encouraging the hearer to extend the context 
and thereby add further implicatures’: 
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the repetition in [‘My childhood days are gone, gone’] cannot be accounted 
for by assuming that the speaker’s childhood days are longer gone, or more 
definitely gone, than might otherwise have been assumed, so if the 
presumption of relevance is to be confirmed, then the repetition of ‘gone’ 
must be interpreted as an encouragement to expand the context. … In other 
words, the hearer is encouraged to be imaginative and to take a large share of 
responsibility in imagining what it may be for the speaker to be way past her 
youth. (S&W 221) 
 
The distinction between logical implications and conversation implicatures becomes 
important in this context. Implications are logically derived consequences; 
implicatures involve what is suggested. A hearer may derive equally many logical 
implications from ‘My childhood days are gone’ as from ‘My childhood days are 
gone, gone’. What Sperber and Wilson claim is that the second sentence has more 
implicatures; that is, ‘more contextual assumptions and implications which receive 
some degree of backing from the speaker’ (id., 222). It is important to note that for 
Sperber and Wilson such implicatures still involve propositional effects: ‘What look 
like non-propositional effects associated with the expression of attitudes, feelings and 
states of mind can be approached in terms of the notion of weak implicature’ (id., 
222). In this manner, it seems that Sperber and Wilson want to reduce all that may be 
transmitted by a linguistic utterance to cognitive effects. This seems to me to be 
excessively reductivist, and not phenomenologically accurate. Even if it is true that all 
affective states involve propositions—something that even a cognitivist about the 
emotions need not agree to—that is not all there is to them. Perhaps there is no 
change in an affective state which does not involve a change in a cognitive state, but 
that does not mean that the affective state just is the cognitive one. 
 Sperber and Wilson contend that poetic effects, which they understand as the 
‘peculiar effect of an utterance which achieves most of its relevance through a wide 
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array of weak implicatures’, ‘are typically, but wrongly, attributed to syntactic or 
phonological constructions of the sentences in which they occur’, inasmuch as ‘a 
repetitive syntactic pattern [in their ex., epizeuxis] does not invariably give rise to 
noticeable stylistic effects. The same is true of all the figures of style identified by 
classical rhetoric’ (S&W 222). Rather, they argue, everything reduces to the principle 
of relevance: when there are syntactic, semantic, and/or phonological parallelisms, 
these ‘reinforce the hearer’s natural tendency to reduce processing effort by looking 
for matching parallelisms in propositional form and implicature’ (id.). Again, the 
claim strikes me a too strong. Does the fact (if it is a fact) that, say, epizeuxis, does 
not create poetic effects every time it is used entail that poetic effects should never be 
explained by adverting to them? Can’t weak implicatures be explained solely by the 
workings of syntactic and phonological structures sometimes? It is not clear to me 
that phenomena in language are an all or nothing affair. 
I think this difficulty is connected with the one above, concerning affective 
states. It seem to me that it is because Sperber and Wilson view poetic effects as at 
bottom cognitive effects that they cannot accept that syntactic and phonological 
constructions do, sometimes, promote affective states independently of any 
propositional content. Consider some of the examples given by Sperber and Wilson: 
(1) ‘Here’s a red sock, here’s a red sock, here’s a blue sock.’ 
(2) ‘We went for a long, long, walk.’ 
(3) ‘There were houses, houses everywhere.’ 
 
According to them, in all three cases, though there is repetition, there is no poetic 
effect. That is because in all three cases what is said may be paraphrased without loss 
of content. We have already seen a paraphrase for (1); (2) could be paraphrased as 
‘We went for a very long walk’, and (3), they say, as ‘There were a great many 
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houses’. I think the paraphrases offered for (2) and especially (3) in fact do result in a 
loss of content, and I think that even (1), in a particular context, could be used to 
mean more than ‘Here are two red socks and here’s blue sock’. I will leave (1) aside, 
however, and focus on (2) and (3). I think that, if we assume the principle of 
relevance, we should expect a speaker to make the choice of saying ‘We went for a 
long, long, walk’ rather than ‘We went for a very long walk’ for a communicative 
reason. We can easily imagine a scenario in which one utters that sentence to convey 
the fact that, during that long walk, the walkers had a serious conversation. With the 
right emphases, that could perhaps also be conveyed by the alternative paraphrase. 
But it seems to me that the repetition in the first one does away with the need for 
expressive emphasis; we can see the repetition as substituting for it. So the repetition 
in this case is not a meaningless choice, and the sentence is not paraphrasable without 
loss of content. Moreover, again, it seems that the theory itself should predict such 
choices to be meaningful. 
The same goes for example (3). There is an expressiveness in ‘There were 
houses, houses everywhere’ that is absent in ‘There were a great many houses’. The 
paraphrase again falls flat, and would require extra-linguistic contribution in the form 
of emphases and intonation, to achieve the expressive character of the original. Notice 
that this character could be of different, even opposing, sorts. We can imagine a child 
from a rural area excited to see the overabundance of houses in a particular urban 
area, as we can imagine an adult environmentalist utter those words with regret as he 
recalls that an area that was previously home to a virgin forest is now occupied by a 
125
large housing development. Switch their sentences to ‘There were a great many 
houses’ and the contextual effects are considerably altered. 
It is also worthy of note that epizeuxis is the only figure that Sperber and 
Wilson discuss. So it could well be that, even if what they claim for it is true—and I 
hope to have given enough reasons to cast that into doubt—it could still fail to apply 
to the many other poetic devices I have discussed in the previous chapter. 
I think Sperber and Wilson are right that the use of repetition in language does 
not flout the principle of relevance but rather its use can be explained by it. And it 
seems plausible to say that the presence of repetition is no guarantee of poetic effect, 
although it seems equally plausible that its use is not random and contributes to the 
production of contextual effects, poetic or otherwise. Nevertheless, the notion of 
poetic effect with which Sperber and Wilson are working seems unduly cognitive-
based. I will now explore that notion further by considering in more detail how 
relevance theory accounts for our affective responses to linguistic utterances. 
 
vi. Relevance Theory and Affective Responses 
 
As I have noted above, for Sperber and Wilson the affective responses promoted by 
poetic techniques are reducible to cognitive effects: 
How do poetic effects affect the mutual cognitive environment of speaker 
and hearer? They do not add entirely new assumptions which are strongly 
manifest in this environment. Instead, they marginally increase the 
manifestness of a great many weakly manifest assumptions. In other words, 
poetic effects create common impressions rather than common knowledge. 
Utterances with poetic effects can be used precisely to create this sense of 
apparently affective rather than cognitive mutuality. What we are suggesting 
is that, if you look at these affective effects through the microscope of 
relevance theory, you see a wide array of minute cognitive effects. (S&W 
224, my emphasis) 
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It may well be true that affective effects consist, in part, of cognitive effects, and even 
that some consist entirely of them. However, some affective responses to poetry in 
particular are engendered by phonological devices that arguably promote responses 
that are not cognitive. The underlying musical dimension of most poetry, especially 
formally dense poetry, may be seen as promoting particular moods in the listener or 
reader, and those moods need not be understood propositionally. 
 If we recall the nursery rhymes exemplified earlier in this chapter, with their 
typical three and four beats or stresses per line, and two-rhymes rhyme scheme, we 
will see that their sing-songy and playful effect frequently occurs irrespective of what 
is being said. Consider, for instance, this popular English rhyme: 
Ring-a-Ring-of-Roses  
A pocket full of posies  
Atchoo! Atchoo!  
We all fall down 
 
This rhyme, sung joyfully by countless English-speaking children, seems 
incontrovertibly playful, although its words do not, of themselves, seem to make 
much sense at all. As it turns out, what they refer to is not the sort of thing a parent 
would encourage a child to sing about, since, literary scholars contend, they refer to 
the bubonic plague that ravaged Europe in the 14th century.115 In this centuries-old 
rhyme, the first line refers to the first signs of the disease—red, bruise-like marks—
while the ‘pocket full of posies’ refers to a practice commonly followed by doctors as 
a means to ward off the bad smells believed to be its cause. The sneeze of the third 
 
115 ‘Nursery Rhymes’, posted at http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A288966. 
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line was a sign that the disease had entered an advanced stage, and not long after one 
would indeed ‘fall down’ for good.116 
Interestingly, it seems to be a typical characteristic of nursery rhymes that 
they either do not make much sense, at least on the surface, or that they reflect 
relatively unpleasant subject matter. The Hungarian rhyme cited in section (ii) starts 
out telling of a colorful, ear-less and tail-less calf, and moves on to a statement that 
the speaker will live where milk is sold. Nothing seems to matter much beyond the 
syllable stresses, the alliterations, and the rhymes. The Russian and the Brazilian 
rhymes are not particularly pleasant, the one being about scaring a child by 
threatening her with a biting wolf, and the other about a fight between two flowers. 
Lullabies, of course, are not expected to be understood by their target listeners; they 
are rather simply expected to work. 
 Some patterning schemes seem more ‘directly perceptible’ than others, and 
for that reason their effect seems stronger. Rhymes can be made more or less obvious, 
and they are more obvious when they come at the end of a line rather than within it. 
Anaphora, the repetition of words at the beginning of a line, gives a very forceful and 
indeed somewhat coarse effect, as in many of Whitman’s poems, as contrasted with 
poems that do not make use of that technique. Some patternings seem considerably 
less available to conscious perception: Jakobson went so far as to note the 
symmetrical distribution of adjectival participles in the odd stanzas of one of 
Baudelaire’s Spleen poems117. Naturally, if a patterning is not directly perceptible it 
 
116 The alternative third line, ‘Ashes! Ashes!’ is presumed to refer to the burning of plagued 
bodies; that theory, however, founders on the historical fact that diseased bodies were buried 
in mass graves and not burned. See footnote above for source. 
117 Pilkington (2000), 17, discussed in Culler (1975). 
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becomes extremely difficult to assess what effects it might have on the reader or 
listener. 
 There may be a worry, moreover, that a given pattern should, in principle, 
produce the same effects regardless of its instantiation, and an account that worked on 
such an assumption would provide ‘a greatly impoverished’ view of aesthetic 
effects.118 But this is an unfounded worry. First, there is some justification, beyond 
the nursery rhyme scenario just discussed, to think that certain patterns do typically 
produce certain aesthetic effects, and effects that are below the cognitive threshold. 
Many closed verse forms have become associated with certain types of subject-
matter—imagine an elegy written in limerick form—and it is perhaps more sensible 
to hypothesize that such long-lived associations are not random than to expect that 
they are. Secondly, although there may be a form-association at a broad, general level 
(say, amusement with the limerick), each poem fills a pre-established pattern with a 
distinct set of words. So there is an inescapable particularity, which will relate to 
particular effects of each poem, despite the commonality of form. To succumb to 
such worries is tantamount to fearing that all of Shakespeare’s sonnets should have 
the same effects, since they’re all written in sonnet form. We can at best expect that, 
in general, sonnets will be more serious, whereas limericks will be more light-
hearted. The association is not so much of form to topic but of form to a general 
mood or tone. Poems that in subject-matter go against the tone promoted by the form 
typically produce an effect of irony. That they produce such an effect is, I think, some 
evidence that the association has some basis. I will return to this in my concluding 
remarks. 
 
118 Pilkington (2000), 18. 
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A final note on relevance theory. It is perhaps ironic that Sperber and 
Wilson’s theory, which sheds a needed light on some fundamental workings of poetic 
form, also explains why poetry tends to be less popular than novels, even though 
novels are as a rule considerably longer than poems and so (in principle) take up a lot 
more time from a reader’s day. Relevance theory would predict that readers should 
find that poems do not satisfy the optimal balance of cognitive effect to processing 
effort. In other words, there may be a presumption on the part of the average reader 
that poems are generally not worth the effort. Naturally, this presumption is precisely 
what poetry lovers challenge. And yet both parties may agree that poetry, like most 
art worthy of the name, is often difficult. 
 
vii. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to show two things. The first was that we have a natural 
functional attunement to repeated sound structures, particularly at the concrete level 
(e.g., rhyme and alliteration), but also at the abstract one (e.g., meter). Such 
attunement was seen to be functional in the early stages of language learning in that it 
promotes the development of phonological awareness; that awareness in turn is 
correlated with the development of literacy. This attunement was also seen to be 
functional and to arise naturally in the largely oral culture of the trovadores of 
Northeastern Brazil, who, without any formal instruction, pattern language in highly 
intricate ways in the performance, often impromptu, of their poems. The trovadores 
in particular open a contemporary window onto the likely world of the earliest poets, 
but both groups provide some empirical support for the idea that an art form that 
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relied on language and emerged in an oral culture would naturally involve recurrence 
patterning so as to convey messages in a memorable and economic fashion. 
 The second goal of this chapter was to show that this fashion is indeed 
economic, and for that I enlisted the relevance theory of Sperber and Wilson. 
Retaining their insight that interlocutors communicate on the assumption that what is 
being said is relevant within the communicative context, I further develop their idea 
to include the relevance of how things are being said, which accounts for poets 
creating a pattern for a pragmatic, communicative reason, and for their readers or 
listeners assuming the contextual relevance of the patterns presented and so seeking 
out contextual effects on the basis of them. This, I argued, involves accessing their 
encyclopedic entries for the concepts presented, and results (or at least is assumed to 
be intended to result) in an expansion or a reevaluation of those entries. Contra 
Sperber and Wilson, I also argued that syntactic and phonological constructions may 
also make a contribution both to what is being said and to the communication or 
promotion of an affective state. I defended in addition an expansion of their model 
beyond the purely cognitive, on the grounds that, although affective states may 
involve beliefs, propositions and implicatures, that is not all there is to them, and 
some moods may be promoted by an underlying linguistic rhythm without having any 
propositions or implicatures associated with them. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion: Further Avenues of Inquiry 
For reasons having to do with both the ubiquity of repetition techniques such as 
meter, alliteration, and rhyme in poetic traditions around the globe, and with the trend 
to transform and reject many of those techniques begun at the turn of the twentieth 
century, I have proposed that the only defensible definition of poetry must now be an 
intentional-historical formalist one. If my definition is right, then it is clear that 
poems and (e.g) novels belong in different categories, rather than differing merely by 
degree. For the tradition of the novel is not at all marked by a concern with repetition 
techniques of the sorts that have marked the history of poetry, and so an intention to 
create a novel is not one where a concern with those techniques will be of definitional 
or evaluative significance. In other words, a novel will not be one because a writer 
intends to use repetition schemes or intends to avoid them, and a reader or literary 
critic will not find anything unusual in a novel that is not written in, say, iambic 
pentameter. But the opposite is not true, and this is significant: a reader or literary 
critic will find it indeed unusual if a novel is written in iambic pentameter, and rightly 
so, because that is not a feature associated with the novel. 
There are a few philosophical issues that I think may be illuminated if we take 
a closer look at poetry as a distinct type of verbal art. I will here discuss three of 
them, namely: (i) the intentionalism debate; (ii) the nature of aesthetic properties; and 
(iii) the critical evaluation of poems. Although I could not explore these topics fully 
here, I hope to pursue them in future work. 
The first issue concerns the role of an author’s intentions in the interpretation 
of an literary work. From the initial debate between E.D. Hirsch and Monroe 
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Beardsley, who defended actual intentionalism and anti-intentionalism respectively, 
to contemporary views such as Jerrold Levinson’s hypothetical intentionalism and 
Noël Carroll’s conversationalism, the actual intentions of an author have been 
deemed determinative of meaning (intentionalism), irrelevant to it (anti-
intentionalism), hypothesized to on the basis of the evidence available to an ideal 
reader (hypothetical intentionalism), and arrived at in a manner analogous to that in 
which we infer the intentions of our interlocutors (conversationalism). Interestingly, 
Hirsch and Beardsley both appealed to examples from poetry in their works, while in 
the contemporary debate philosophers typically take their examples from prose 
literature. In both cases, authorial intentions are presumed to play the same role in the 
writing of novels, short stories, essays, and poems, so that whatever answer one gives 
to the intentionalism question, it should be applicable across the board. 
My question is: could it perhaps be the case that our intentions are differently 
realized in different kinds of art forms and, perhaps consequently, differently 
construed from the perspective of an appreciator? Consider a difference between 
painting and photography. Typically in the case of painting, most everything that we 
see on the canvas is there because a painter intended it to be there, and in just such a 
way: yellow here, red there, here the eyes, there the cypress tree, and in just this 
thickness of paint, with just this perspective (again, this is the typical scenario; we 
need only think of painters such as Pollock. We may say that in the case of paintings, 
intentions are ‘richly realizable’. Now compare the case of photography. There may 
of course be a good deal of control on the part of the photographer as to what makes it 
onto the photographic film (or the digital image): the angle, the light, the focus, the 
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distribution of the elements photographed, and however many other variables are 
under the photographer’s powers to manipulate. However, there seem to be several 
variables that are not under a photographer’s control, depending on the object being 
photographed. If it is a landscape photo, natural light is not under her control; she is 
rather at its mercy. If it is a person, facial expressions are not entirely under her 
control and arguably even under her subject’s (say, if he’s tired or upset with his 
girlfriend he may have a hard time looking cheerful, no matter how skillful the 
photographer’s directorial efforts). Moreover, no matter how attentive, something 
may enter a photographer’s frame without her noticing it—flies have a way of 
showing up unannounced. 
The general problem to which these variables point in the case of photography 
is that photographic objects exist apart from and before the event of being 
photographed. Inasmuch as they may interfere with a photographer’s intentions, we 
may characterize photographic intentions as relatively ‘poorly realizable’. (Indeed, 
the fact that objects exist prior to their being photographed or filmed was used in the 
early theoretical discussions of these media to argue against the possibility of creating 
artworks with them: they reproduce rather than create, and thus leave no room for 
artistic expression.119) Now, if this is a real difference in the degree of realization of 
artistic intentions, should this difference not be reflected in the role we accord those 
intentions in the interpretation of paintings and photographs respectively? Perhaps we 
cannot have a ‘one size fits all’ answer to how we should go about our interpretation 
of artworks. 
 
119 For a contemporary discussion of these views, see Scruton (1983) and Lopes (2003). 
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Does an analogous situation emerge in literature? Consider the difference in 
particular between lyric poetry (that is, excluding the epic or drama) and fictional 
works such as novels. Most poetry is, in fact, lyric, non-narrative poetry—and this 
has been true from the beginnings of poetic literature. Lyric poetry is typically devoid 
of characters with whom we could empathize and of a narrative that would structure 
the events of their fictional lives. Rather, in the lyric, what we find is a poetic 
persona, projected in one way or another by the poet. But this persona is not the same 
as a fictional character. For one, it is typically not placed in a context, given a 
background from which we may judge its actions, understand its plight, appreciate its 
joys. Its being written in the first person is indeed one of the defining characteristics 
of the lyric. Novels, on the other hand, are the domain of characters whose ups and 
downs concern and move us, whose motivations puzzle and intrigue us, and, even 
when they are on the whole framed from a first person perspective, typically move in 
and out of a third-person descriptive mode. Also importantly, novels are not generally 
written in verse. 
What I would like to suggest is that we might need different interpretative 
models to handle lyric poems and novels. It may, for instance, make more sense to 
adopt either an actual intentionalist or a conversationalist perspective with lyric 
poems, in virtue of their being written in the first-person. While we cannot and should 
not always identify the author with the poetic persona, in cases such as those of 
confessional poetry (think of Sylvia Plath), such an identification seems not only 
unavoidable but perhaps also expected. The connection between the reader or listener 
and the poet seems to be more direct and unmediated—almost like a conversation. If 
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what we have in such cases follows indeed a conversational model, and if in actual 
conversations we are ‘actual’ intentionalists, perhaps the appropriate model of 
interpretation for lyric poetry is an intentionalist one. In the case of novels and story-
telling in general, what an author wishes to say is mediated by the actions of her 
characters, the narrative plot, the descriptions of things and places. It is perhaps more 
appropriate to adopt a hypothetical intentionalist, or perhaps even an anti-
intentionalist, stance in such cases, and construe an interpretation of the work on the 
basis of textual and extra-textual evidence without an eye to ascertaining the 
intentions of a specific speaker. 
 Another important issue in aesthetics is that of aesthetic properties and how 
they depend, or do not, on lower-level perceptual properties. For example, is a 
painting made entirely in primary colors—red, yellow, and blue—necessarily vibrant 
and lively? In a classic article, Frank Sibley (1955) answered that question with a 
resounding ‘no’: 
Whatever kind of dependence this is, and there are various relationships 
between aesthetic qualities and non-aesthetic features, what I want to make 
clear in this paper is that there are no non-aesthetic features which serve in 
any circumstances as logically sufficient conditions for applying aesthetic 
terms. Aesthetic or taste concepts are not in this respect condition-governed 
at all.’120 
So, for Sibley, we are never warranted in inferring an aesthetic property on the basis 
of descriptions of purely perceptual properties—we must see the work and exercise 
our faculty of taste to ascertain what aesthetic qualities a work has. At best, Sibley 
says, we may infer what aesthetic properties a work does not have from a description 
of its non-aesthetic features. If a friend tells us of a painting consisting entirely of a 
 
120 Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’ (1955) In Lamarque and Olsen (2003), p. 128, (his 
emphases). 
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pale blue rectangle, for instance, we may correctly infer that it is neither bold nor 
fiery. While aesthetic properties are not positively condition-governed, they may be 
negatively condition-governed. 
 Many reams of paper have been spent on Sibley’s thesis. It is not difficult, 
upon reading Sibley’s paper, to find oneself with a nagging intuition that some 
counterexample must exist and that aesthetic properties must be, sometimes, 
positively condition-governed. It is widely agreed that some relationship exists 
between perceptual and aesthetic properties. The difficulty is in ascertaining the 
nature of that relationship. Must a change in aesthetic properties always involve a 
change in lower-level perceptual properties? Various kinds of supervenience theses 
have been proposed to explain this relationship. I will not delve into that here. I will 
simply point to a few examples that I think may call Sibley’s theory into doubt. 
Consider, for instance, the limerick. It follows a particular poetic form, and if you 
have forgotten you can ask your mother: 
A: What is a limerick, Mother? 
A: It's a form of verse, said brother 
B: In which lines one and two  
B: Rhyme with five when it's through  
A: And three and four rhyme with each other. 
 
Now here are two somewhat similar limericks: 
There was a young woman named Bright 
Whose speed was faster than light: 
She set out one day 
In a relative way 
And returned on the previous night. 
 
——————————————— 
There was a young man named Bright 
Who got into a very bad fight: 
They stabbed him with a knife 
And raped his wife 
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And killed him with all their might. 
I think we can say without controversy that the first one is light and funny. 
‘Light’ and ‘funny’ are aesthetic properties. Are they dependent entirely on the 
content of the limerick, or is there something about that sound structure, with its short 
lines of two and three beats, its three end-rhymes, and the two shorter lines in 
between that contribute to its light humor? What is our reaction when we listen to the 
second, alternative limerick? Do we find ourselves wanting to smile or chuckle and 
then check ourselves upon registering the meaning of the words? My question is: can 
we have unfunny limericks? Why are certain poetic forms generally thought 
appropriate to certain subjects–is it a matter of convention that the limerick is for light 
fun and mockery, or is there something in that metrical and rhyming scheme that 
affects our ‘auditory imagination’ in a manner that defies seriousness? At least on the 
surface level, there is much in poetry that is indeed a matter of convention. But even 
where convention is the overt reason a form is chosen for a subject-matter, we may 
inquire how that convention came to be. Can it be a matter of convention alone that 
most nursery rhymes and children’s poetry, for example, are written in three- or four-
stressed lines, in couplets or four-line stanzas rhyming abab? Such a structure, as I 
have noted, tends to create a light sing-song effect. But now consider this iambic 
trimeter quatrain by Emily Dickinson: 
I like a look of agony, 
Because I know it’s true; 
Men do not sham convulsion, 
Nor simulate a throe.121 
121 Emily Dickinson, Collected Poems, (‘Time and Eternity’ section, No. XII, p. 186). 
138
The subject is hardly a light one, and yet the form goes right against it, thereby 
creating an effect perhaps of sarcasm. Despite its subject-matter, I think it is easy to 
imagine children singing and clapping to these lines without a thought to their 
meaning and having a ball. 
 We do not need to confine ourselves to form alone to argue, against Sibley, 
that sometimes aesthetic properties are positively condition-governed. For the 
subject-matter of a poem may also be described in non-aesthetic terms. And if it may 
so be described, then that plus a description of its poetic form may well be sufficient 
to warrant an aesthetic ascription. 
 Finally, attending to poetry as a literary form with distinctive features—
namely, the treatment of certain kinds of repetition devices—has consequences for 
how we evaluate poems. If we attend to poems not as poems but as works of literature 
in general, I think that much will be left out in our assessment of their aesthetic 
properties and aesthetic value. At any rate, it is hard to think what it would be like to 
attend to a work as a piece of literature in general rather than as a novel, short story, 
essay, lyric poem. Perhaps it is possible to attend to and evaluate a work simply 
insofar as it is a literary work. But that attention and that evaluation will leave out 
much that is of central value. Once we know that a given kind of verbal art is what it 
is in virtue of certain properties—for example, that it is intended to belong in a 
tradition wherein metrical variations are means of poetic expression—then we have a 
criterion to help us judge how it responds to that tradition. 
Contemporary philosophers of music have argued for the need for different 
ontologies of classical, jazz, rock, and other types of music. When it comes to the 
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notion of aesthetic experience, one need not be a philosopher to know that the 
experiences of these types of music varies greatly. So it does not seem to be an 
aberration to say that we can have, in some sense, a philosophy of rock, a philosophy 
of jazz, a philosophy of classical/instrumental/absolute music. This need not do away 
with a philosophy of music that investigates the elements of commonality among the 
musical arts, just as there may still be a philosophy of art in general. I think the same 
is the case with poetry and literature. I think there is still good reason to investigate 
and analyze literature qua literature, in all its forms. But I hope to have shown that, in 
some sense, a philosophy of poetry would be a fruitful addition to contemporary 
analytic aesthetics. 
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Appendix: Glossary Of Poetic Terms122 
Accentual meter. Meter whose marker (q.v.) is syllable accent or stress.   
 
Accentual-syllabic meter. Also called ‘syllable-stress’ or syllabo-tonic verse, 
accentual-syllabic meter counts both stresses and syllables, and in iambic (two-
syllable foot with the second syllable accented) pentameter (five times the foot, so ten 
syllables given that the iamb is a two-syllable foot). 
 
Aeolic verseforms. [Sapho, Alcaeus] “The name usually given to a class of ancient 
Greek lyric meters, so called because first attested in the poems of Sappho and 
Alcaeus, which were composed in the aeolic dialect” (PEPP, 9).  
 
Alliteration. “The repetition of the sound of an initial consonant or consonant cluster 
in stressed syllables close enough to each other for the ear to be affected” (AHD1, 
36). 
 
Anadiplosis. “Rhetorical repetition at the beginning of a phrase of the word or words 
with which the previous phrase ended” (AHD2, 64). 
 
Anaphora. “The repetition of the same word or words at the beginning of successive 
phrases, clauses, sentences, or lines. Conversely, epistrophe (q.v.) (also called 
epiphora, e.g. Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice 3.3.4.) repeats words at the ends of 
clauses, lines, or stanzas; so Tennyson repeats ‘the days that are no more’ at the end 
of each stanza of ‘Tears, Idle Tears.’ Synonyms for epistrophe are epiphora and 
antistrophe” (PEPP, 73). 
 
Anceps. “Any position in the metrical pattern which permits either a long or a short 
syllable. This is simply to say that some positions in the meter are not important to 
perception of the pattern, hence are not regulated strictly . . . it is not the syllable 
which is anceps but the position in the metrical pattern it fills” (PEPP, 73-74). 
Assonance. Correspondence or resemblance of repeated vowel sounds (AHD1, 42). 
 
Cadence. A progression of chords moving to a harmonic close (AHD1, 97). 
 
122 Unless otherwise noted, all entries are quoted or adapted from The New Princeton 
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, edited by A. Preminger and T.V.F. Brogan (New York: 
MJF Books, 1993) referred to as (PEPP), The American Heritage Dictionary, based on the 2nd 
College Ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983) referred to as (AHD1), and The 
American Heritage Dictionary, based on the 4th Ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., c2000) 
referred to as (AHD2). Page numbers to the Princeton Encyclopedia and both American 
Heritage Dictionaries are given in parenthesis at the end of each entry. The glossary is only 
meant to provide a basic explanation of these terms; the reader is encouraged to consult the 
Encyclopedia and/or the Dictionaries for further information. 
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Caesura. “A pause in a line of verse dictated by sense or natural speech rhythm 
rather than by metrics” (AHD2, 260). 
 
Chant. “A short, simple series of syllables or words that are sung on or intoned to the 
same note or a limited range of notes” (AHD2, 310). 
 
Colon (pl. cola). “A section of metrical period in quantitative verse, consisting of two 
to six feet and in Latin verse having one principal accent” (AHD2, 364). 
 
Consonance. “A repetition of terminal consonant sounds of words, as in rain & tone”
(AHD1, 150). 
 
Couplet. “A unit of verse consisting of two successive lines, usually rhyming and 
having the same meter and often forming a complete thought or syntactic unit” 
(AHD2, 419). 
 
Dactyl. “A metrical foot consisting of one accented syllable followed by two 
unaccented or of one long syllable followed by two short, as in flattery” (AHD2, 
456). 
 
Dirge. “A mournful or elegiac poem or other literary work, or a slow, mournful 
musical composition” (AHD2, 512).  
 
Dramatic poetry. “Western critics have interpreted the phrase dramatic poetry in 
three main ways: (1) lyrics or short poems that imply a scene; (2) plays that are 
valorized with the adjective ‘poetic’; and (3) dramas whose dialogue is calculatingly 
rhythmed—in rhythms that are often regularized into meters and that are usually 
presented as discreet lines on the page” (PEPP, 304).  
 
Elegy. (From Gk. elegeia, ‘lament’) In its modern sense, a short poem occasioned by 
the death of a person which typically includes a movement from expressed sorrow to 
consolation. See ‘elegiac’. (PEPP, 322). 
 
Elegiac. The elegiac distich (see ‘stich’) is a Classical Greek couplet consisting of a 
hexameter followed by a pentameter. It came to be associated with the topic of 
mourning or loss (hence ‘elegy’, q.v.), although originally it treated of a variety of 
subjects. The elegiac stanza is an iambic pentameter quatrain rhymed abab. (PEPP, 
321). 
 
Encomium. “Strictly, a Greek choral lyric performed ‘in the revel’ (kōmos) to 
celebrate a person’s achievement. More generally, the name is applied to any poem 
praising a man rather than a god.”  (PEPP, 332). 
 
Enjambment. “The continuation of a syntactic unit from one line or couplet of a 
poem to the next with no pause” (AHD2, 593). 
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Epanalepsis. “In Classical rhetoric, a figure most often defined as the repetition of a 
word or words after intervening words, either (a) for emphasis . . . or (b) for clarity, as 
to resume a construction after a lengthy parenthesis” (PEPP, 361). 
 
Epic. “An epic is a long narrative poem that treats a single heroic figure or a group of 
such figures and concerns an historical event, such as a war or conquest, or an heroic 
quest or some other significant mythic or legendary achievement that is central to the 
traditions and belief of its culture” (PEPP, 361). “Epic incorporates within it not only 
the methods of narrative poetry, but also of lyric and dramatic poetry. It includes and 
expands upon panegyric and lament. With its extended speeches and well-crafted 
scenic structure, it is often dramatic and it perhaps with the choral ode the true 
ancestor of ancient drama” (362). But note that while it may often be dramatic, it is 
not drama, insofar as it is not written for stage performance (although the storyteller 
might have ‘performed’ such parts), and while it may have lyric passages, it is not 
construed as a lyric poem—music, e.g., is incidental rather than essential to what is 
written. 
Epistrophe. See anaphora.
Epithalamium. “A lyric ode in honor of a bride and bridegroom” (AHD2, 601). 
 
Epizeuxis. See ploce.
Foot. “A unit of poetic meter consisting of stressed and unstressed syllables in any of 
various set combinations. For example, an iambic foot has an unstressed followed by 
a stressed syllable” (AHD2, 684-685). 
 
Form. “Method of arrangement or manner of coordinating elements in literary or 
musical composition or in organized discourse” (AHD2, 690). 
 
Haiku. “A Japanese lyric verse form having three unrhymed lines of five, seven, and 
five syllables, traditionally involving an aspect of nature or the seasons” (AHD2, 
789). 
 
Iamb. “A metrical foot consisting of an unstressed syllable followed by a stressed 
syllable or a short syllable followed by a long syllable, as in delay” (AHD2, 867). 
Ictus. “The accent that falls on a stressed syllable in a line of scanned verse” (AHD2, 
870); ‘the most neutral term for each marked or prominent position’ in a line of verse 
(PEPP, 554). Also called ‘marker’ (q.v.). 
 
Limerick. “A light humorous, nonsensical, or bawdy verse of five anapestic lines 
usually with the rhyme scheme aabba” (AHD2, 1015).  
 
Lyric. “Of or relating to a category of poetry that expresses subjective thoughts and 
feelings, often in a songlike style or form” (AHD2, 1045). 
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Marker. The general term for what is marked in a particular meter or foot: the 
marker of accentual verse is stress, of quantitative verse, length. Also called ‘ictus’ 
(q.v.). 
 
Metaphor. “A figure of speech in which a word or phrase that ordinarily designates 
one thing is used to designate another, thus making an implicit comparison, as in ‘a 
sea of troubles’ or ‘All the world’s a stage’ (Shakespeare)” (AHD2, 1104). 
 
Meter. Meters can be accentual, syllabic, or quantitative (q.q.v.). “The measured 
arrangement of words in poetry, as by accentual rhythm, syllabic quantity, or the 
number of syllables in a line” (AHD2, 1105).  
 
Metonymy. “A figure of speech in which one word or phrase is substituted for 
another with which it is closely associated, as in the use of Washington for the United 
States government or of the sword for military power” (AHD2, 1106). 
 
Metrici (Gk. metrikoi). Metrics theorists, ‘who held that only long and short syllables 
need be considered in scansion (q.v.), and that a long syllable was always twice the 
length of a short; actual variations were ignored’; these included Aristotle, the Latin 
grammarians, Bede, Sidney, Mitford, Shipper, Mayor, Wimsatt and Wright. The 
opposing school of metrical theorists is known as rhythmici (q.v.). (PEPP, 787). 
 
Octave. In poetry, “a poem or stanza containing eight lines” (AHD2, 1217).  
 
Ode. “A lyric poem of some length, usually of a serious or meditative nature and 
having an elevated style and formal stanzaic structure” (AHD2, 1218). 
 
Paean. “A song of joyful praise or exultation” (AHD2, 1262). 
 
Panegyric. “A formal eulogistic composition intended as a public compliment” 
(AHD2, 1269). 
 
Pattern poetry. “Known also as ‘shaped poetry’ (Gr. technopaigneia, Lat. carmina 
figurata), is premodern verse in which the letters, words, or lines are arrayed visually 
to form recognizable shapes, usually the shapes of natural objects” (PEPP, 890). 
 
Ploce. “The genus of figures for word repetition, with or without intervening words, 
generally in close proximity, i.e. within the clause or line. Classical and Renaissance 
rhetoricians distinguished between ploce, as the ‘speedy iteration of one word but 
with some little intermission by inserting one or two words between’ (Puttenham) and 
epizeuxis (q.v.), repetition with no words intervening . . . Other more complex 
rhetorical figures which deploy word repetition in syntax—i.e. at the beginnings and 
endings of phrases and clauses—and in meter as well—i.e. to begin or end lines or 
stanzas, or at caesurae—are anaphora (word-repetition at beginnings), epistrophe (at 
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ends), symploce (combination of the two preceding, i.e. one word repeated at 
beginnings, another at ends—see anaphora) (q.q.v.)” (PEPP, 916).  
 
Prosody. “Prosody, broadly defined, is the study of how languages organize sound 
and the ways in which sound interacts with meaning. It is an ancient field that began 
with the study of poetry, but in the last several hundred years has expanded to include 
many other areas of study as well, such as linguistics, phonetics, artificial intelligence 
and anthropology” (Versification, http://oregonstate.edu/versif/about/index.html). 
 
“ . . . Prosody is concerned with the study of rhythm and sound effects as they occur 
in verse and with the various descriptive, historical, and theoretical approaches to the 
study of these structures” (“prosody” Britannica Online, 10 August, 2004) 
 
“Prosody is that branch of poetics which treats what Aristotle called the material and 
formal causes of art, i.e. its medium and the forms into which that medium can be 
shaped . . . Prosody is thus the study of the means by which verbal material is made 
over into verbal art in texts set in verseform, and more particularly the study of those 
extensions, compressions, and intensifications of meaning of which bound speech 
becomes capable by increase in formal structure” (PEPP, 982-983). 
Prothalamium. “A song in celebration of a wedding” (AHD2, 1409). 
 
Quantitative meter. Meter whose marker is syllable length. 
 
Quatrain. “A stanza or poem of four lines” (AHD2, 1434). 
 
Rhyme. “Correspondence of terminal sounds of words or of lines of verse” (AHD2, 
1496). 
 
Masculine and Feminine Rhyme. “A masculine rhyme joins two oxytonic 
words (i.e. words whose final syllables are stressed), a feminine rhyme, two 
paroxytonic words (penultimate syllables stressed, final syllables unstressed). The 
terms first appear in troubadour poetry of the 14th century” (PEPP, 737). 
 
Rhythm. “The pattern or flow of sound created by the arrangement of stressed and 
unstressed syllables in accentual verse or of long and short syllables in quantitative 
verse” (AHD2, 1496). 
 
Rhythmici (Gk. rhythmikoi). Musical theorists who hold a musical-rhythmical view 
of poetry, finding meter too simple an analysis of scansion. These include 
Aristoxenus of Tarentum (a pupil of Aristotle), Augustine (v. De Musica), Joshua 
Steele, Sidney Lanier, Andreas Heusler, John C. Pope, as well as those who deny that 
modern poetry is metrical at all, such as G.F. Nott and J.G. Southworth.  Their 
opponents are known as metrici (q.v.). (PEPP, 787). 
 
Scansion. “Analysis of verse into metrical patterns” (AHD2, 1555). 
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Sestet. “A group of six lines of poetry, especially the last six lines of a Petrarchan 
sonnet” (AHD2, 1592). 
 
Sestina. “A verse form that was first used by the Provençal troubadours, consisting of 
six six-line stanzas and a three-line envoy. The end words of the first stanza are 
repeated in varied order as end words in the other stanzas, and they also recur in the 
envoy” (AHD2, 1592).  
 
Simile. “A figure of speech in which two essentially unlike things are compared, 
often in a phrase introduced by like or as, as in ‘How like the winter hath my absence 
been’ or ‘So are you to my thoughts as food to life’ (Shakespeare)” (AHD2, 1622). 
 
Simploce. See ploce.
Sonnet. “A fourteen line verse form usually having one of several conventional 
rhyme schemes” (AHD2, 1657). 
 
Spondee. “A metrical foot consisting of two long or stressed syllables” (AHD2, 
1679). 
 
Stanza. “One of the divisions of a poem, composed of two or more lines usually 
characterized by a common pattern of meter, rhyme and number of lines” (AHD2, 
1692). 
 
Stichic verse. Narrative verse written in a continuous run of lines of equal length. 
(From Greek, stichos, line, so that a couplet is called a ‘distich’, though stich is no 
longer used to mean ‘line’ in verse theory.) Contrasted with stanzaic verse, where 
stanza breaks break the continuous flow into quatrains or tercets, for example (q.q.v.). 
(PEPP, 1214). 
 
Syllabic meter. A meter that relies on the counting of syllables. 
Tercet. “A group of three lines of verse, often rhyming together or with another 
triplet” (AHD2, 1784). 
 
Trochee. “A metrical foot consisting of a stressed syllable followed by an unstressed 
syllable, as in season, or of a long syllable followed by a short syllable” (AHD2, 
1847). 
 
Versification. “Versification has traditionally been considered the art or craft of 
writing verse, as distinguished from prosody (q.v.), the branch of poetics devoted to 
the theory and analysis of the structures of verse” (PEPP, 1353). 
 
Villanelle. “A nineteen line poem of fixed form consisting of five tercets and a final 
quatrain on two rhymes, with the first and third lines of the first tercet repeated 
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alternately as a refrain closing the succeeding stanzas and joined as the final couplet 
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